Klier v. Elf Atochem North Am. Inc.

Citation658 F.3d 468
Decision Date27 September 2011
Docket NumberNo. 10–20305.,10–20305.
PartiesRalph KLIER, Appellant,v.ELF ATOCHEM NORTH AMERICA, INC., Defendant–Appellee.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit)

658 F.3d 468

Ralph KLIER, Appellant,
v.
ELF ATOCHEM NORTH AMERICA, INC., Defendant–Appellee.

No. 10–20305.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed Sept. 26, 2011.Revised Sept. 27, 2011.


[658 F.3d 470]

Brian Wolfman (argued), Georgetown University Law Ctr., Institute for Pub. Representation, Washington, DC, Allen Mark Stewart, Allen Stewart, P.C., Dallas, TX, for Appellant.Lewis Cooper Sutherland (argued), Knox D. Nunnally, Vinson & Elkins, L.L.P., Houston, TX, Roger M. Milgrim, Paul Hastings, L.L.P., New York City, Kevin T. Van Wart, Kirkland & Ellis,

[658 F.3d 471]

L.L.P., Chicago, IL, for Defendant–Appellee.Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.Before JONES, Chief Judge, and HIGGINBOTHAM and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.PATRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge:

This appeal arises from the settlement of a class action. The defendant paid substantial sums for res judicata protection from the claims of persons assertedly injured by the toxic emissions of an industrial plant near Bryan, Texas. The monies were allocated among three subclasses, one of which was to receive medical monitoring. Upon the monitoring program's completion, substantial sums remained unused. The district court denied the settlement administrator's request to distribute the unused medical-monitoring funds to another subclass of persons suffering serious injuries. Instead, the court repaired to the doctrine of cy pres and ordered that the money be given to three charities suggested by the defendant and one selected by the court.

The gift of class funds to charity is attacked on two fronts: that the district court moved too quickly from the terms of the settlement agreement to a cy pres distribution, and alternatively that the district court neglected a prerequisite of the cy pres doctrine by not selecting charities with a sufficient nexus to the underlying substantive objectives of the class suit. Persuaded by the first contention, we do not reach the second. We hold that the district court abused its discretion by ordering a cy pres distribution in the teeth of the bargained-for terms of the settlement agreement, which required residual funds to be distributed within the class. We reverse the district court's order distributing the unused medical-monitoring funds to third-party charities and remand with instructions that the district court order that the funds be distributed to the subclass comprising the most seriously injured class members.

I.

Lillian Hayden and five others instituted this action in April of 1992 by filing suit in state district court in Brazos County, Texas. Seeking to represent themselves and a class of others similarly situated, they sought compensation for exposure to arsenic and other toxic chemicals alleged to have been emitted into the air around Bryan, Texas, by an agrochemicals plant owned and operated by the defendant, Arkema, Inc. (formerly known as Elf Atochem North America, Inc.). The defendant removed the case to federal court supported by diversity jurisdiction.

Settlement of this aging suit had several iterations as it confronted the changing jurisprudence of federal class actions. The first settlement, confected three years after the filing of the state-court suit, proposed to terminate the suit with about $55 million in payments to a class certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) with no opt-out provisions. 1 This class was quickly undercut on appeal by our intervening decision in Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp.2 There we made plain that where the predominant relief sought is an award of money damages, class certification must proceed through the (b)(3) gate, with its mandatory opt-out provisions.

[658 F.3d 472]

3 On remand from this Court and now proceeding under Rule 23(b)(3), the parties entered into a new settlement agreement. The settlement was reduced to $41.4 million, a reduction reflecting the value of individual settlements reached with opting-out class members.

The settlement agreement created three subclasses and allocated to each subclass a portion of the $41.4 million settlement. The agreement allocated $23.34 million to Subclass A, which was defined to include all persons who lived or worked near the plant between 1973 and 1995 and had contracted any form of cancer, endured a pregnancy that ended in stillbirth, or suffered from any of several enumerated birth defects. A settlement administrator appointed by the district court distributed the funds pro rata pursuant to an agreed-upon grid deployed to score illness, its onset, and its seriousness. Ralph Klier, our appellant here, was a member of Subclass A. Klier had lived close to the plant and suffered from peripheral neuropathy and leukemia, the treatments for which so weakened his heart that he required open-heart surgery in 2003. He received $6,500 in settlement proceeds.

The settlement agreement allocated approximately $6.46 million to Subclass B. Its members were not required to demonstrate physical injury; the district court referred to Subclass B as the “nuisance-exposure/future claims” subclass. If its members met proximity-to-plant and exposure standards, they could either recover a small compensation sum or elect to participate in a medical-monitoring program, which was funded by $2 million of the proceeds allocated to the subclass. The remaining $4.46 million funded payments to the more than 12,000 subclass members who elected not to participate in the program. Responsive to the risk of latent illness, the settlement also gave members of Subclass B—who by definition had suffered no injury or illness as a result of their arsenic exposure as of the signing of the agreement—back-end opt-out rights. Any member of Subclass B who later developed an arsenic-related cancer or birth defect for which they could meet standards of general causation retained the right to file a new lawsuit against Arkema.

Finally, $10.6 million was allocated to Subclass C, which included all class members who, during the class time frame, owned property that was located within the portion of the class area that was exposed to the highest levels of arsenic emissions. The funds were to compensate members of Subclass C for property damage and diminution in property value.

At issue on this appeal is the district court's use of the cy pres doctrine to dispose of approximately $830,000 that went unused during the administration of the medical-monitoring program created for the benefit of Subclass B. The program allowed members of Subclass B to forego receipt of a small cash payment and instead enroll in a program through which they would receive regular checkups and physician visits over a five-year period. The aim was to assist members of the subclass in monitoring their health for any indication that they were developing an arsenic-related illness. Two primary factors contributed to the program's not exhausting its allocated funds. First, the initial participation rate was low. Some 329 members of Subclass B—less than three percent of the total subclass membership—opted to receive medical monitoring in lieu of a cash payment; just 221 attended their first monitoring examination. Second, in the course of this monitoring, no significant health problems were

[658 F.3d 473]

found. Among those who initially chose to participate, demand for monitoring greatly diminished, yielding a high dropout rate. Only 46 class members participated in all three rounds of screening as scheduled.

As activity in the case subsided, the settlement administrator filed a status report in which he stated that the medical-monitoring program had come to a close and that approximately $830,000 had gone unused and needed to be distributed by the district court. The parties were in agreement that an additional distribution to the members of Subclass B was not economically feasible. The district court asked the parties for proposals for distribution of remaining funds. Taking an inexplicably narrow view of their duty to the class, class counsel did not respond. The defendant proposed seven entities as potential beneficiaries of a cy pres distribution: five local charities, the Bryan Independent School District, and the city of Bryan.

Klier opposed the proposal. He urged that the monies set aside but not drawn down for medical monitoring be distributed pro rata to members of Subclass A. Klier argued that an additional distribution to the members of Subclass A was economically feasible and would be equitable since the members of Subclass A had been found to suffer from arsenic poisoning, related cancers, and birth defects that are compensable under the settlement. In the alternative, Klier argued that the defendant's proposed charities were not proper recipients under the doctrine of cy pres, lacking a sufficient nexus to the injuries of the class or the principles the class action sought to vindicate. Klier proposed that the money instead be used to fund arsenic-pollution research at Texas A & M University.

In April of 2010, some eighteen years after this litigation commenced and fourteen years after the closing of the plant, the district court ordered distribution of the remaining funds to three of the charities proposed by the defendant: a scholarship program called Arkema New Horizons Scholarships and two museums. The court then added a charity of its own, a local history and genealogy library. The money was to be distributed in four equal shares. Despite having pledged several years before to consider a proposal to reallocate the medical-monitoring funds to other members of the class,4 the court never addressed Klier's primary request that the monies be distributed to the members of Subclass A, denying it only implicitly. Instead, the district court proceeded directly to Klier's alternative proposal that the money be donated to Texas A&M, which it rejected because it would not benefit the Bryan community. The...

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