Kligman v. Lautman

• Decision Date: 22 June 1966
• Docket Number: No. A--620,A--620
• Citation: 221 A.2d 231,91 N.J.Super. 488
• Parties: Joel KLIGMAN and Marcia Kligman, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. Solomon LAUTMAN, Daniel S. Kruman and Ralph W. Campbell, etc., et al., Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division

Page 488

91 N.J.Super. 488

221 A.2d 231

Joel KLIGMAN and Marcia Kligman, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. Solomon LAUTMAN, Daniel S. Kruman and Ralph W. Campbell etc., et al., Defendants-Appellants.

No. A--620.

Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division.

Argued June 13, 1966.

Decided June 22, 1966.

Henry J. Saling, Shrewsbury, for appellants. (Stout & O'Hagan, Allenhurst, attorneys).

Jerome S. Lieb, East Orange, for respondents. (Harkavy & Lieb, East Orange, attorneys; Abraham I. Harkavy, East Orange, of counsel).

Before Judges CONFORD, KILKENNY and LEONARD.

PER CURIAM.

Preliminarily, we are not in accord with the manner in which summary judgment was entered for plaintiffs in this case. The map on which judgment was entered was not that upon the basis of which the action was filed. There were neither amended pleadings concerning the denial of approval of the revised map nor any hearing before the court on the merits of that denial. Summary judgment was entered apparently on the mere submission to the court of proof of the fact that the revised map was denied approval by the borough. We do not think that the anticipatory argument directed by the court on the hearing of the motion for summary judgment in relation to a hypothetical revised map adequately substituted for amended pleadings and a hearing on the merits of the case for the filing of the revised map. Counsel for the municipality rightfully stressed at the time that the only matter before the court was the sufficiency of the original map, and we agree with the court's determination that that map was defective because it showed lots not conforming with the lot size requirements of the zoning ordinance.

Secondly, we deem it dangerous as a matter of public policy judicially to direct the public filing of a map, purportedly under the authority of the Map Filing Law (L.1960, c. 141; N.J.S.A. 46:23--9.9 et seq.), as was done here, without requiring punctilious compliance by the applicant with all the requirements of that statute. The act is obviously a regulation upon which the general public may be expected to rely in purchasing property. The safeguards incorporated therein to assure the regularity of a filed map should not be telescoped or disregarded on the basis of informal applications for approval, conferences between applicants and members of governing bodies, or of decisions by such bodies acting alone. For example, one important prerequisite for approval of filing is a certification by the municipal engineer that the map complies with the act and the municipal ordinances and requirements applicable thereto. N.J.S.A. 46:23--9.11(n). In the present case neither the original nor revised map was ever submitted by the applicants to the municipal engineer, so far as the record before us shows. It may well be that there are pertinent regulations known to him but not to the governing body. The burden of getting the engineer's approval or his reasons for disapproval rests on the applicant, not the governing body. There are other requirements for approval of filing which applicants may have failed to comply with strictly, insofar as can be told from the sparse record before us.

However, our reversal in this matter is mainly based on the circumstance that denial of approval of the revised map by the municipality may at the present date well be justified by the provision of the statute, N.J.S.A. 46:23--9.11(p), that if the map shows a street, the municipal clerk must certify that the municipal body has 'approved' such street. The combined effect of a 1956 ordinance amending the zoning ordinance and of an amendment adopted February 8, 1966 of the ordinance regulating acceptance of dedicated streets could arguably justify refusal by the governing body to approve the street shown on the map here involved. This is an issue we will not conclusively decide on this appeal because plaintiffs have attacked the validity and purported effect of the second ordinance in another pending action and should have the opportunity on the remand herein to offer factual data and legal argument addressed to that point.

We do here decide, however, that the present controversy as to the propriety of the filing of the map is to be determined on the basis of the municipal ordinances now in existence, without regard to the fact that one of them was adopted subsequent to judgment below. See Hohl v. Readington Tp., 37 N.J. 271, 279, 181 A.2d 150 (1962); Tidewater Oil Co. v. Mayor, etc., of Borough of Carteret, 84 N.J.Super. 525, 530, 202 A.2d 865 (App.Div.1964), affirmed 44 N.J. 338, 209 A.2d 105 (1965); Roselle v. Mayor, etc., of Borough of Moonachie, 49 N.J.Super. 35, 39--42, 139 A.2d 42 (App.Div.1958); Noble v. Chairman, etc., of Mendham Tp., 91 N.J.Super. 111, 116, 219 A.2d 335 (App.Div.1966). In the Roselle decision we stated:

'* * * Nor does the fact that the particular application for the use reveals the need for the new zoning regulation and provides the incentive for its passage derogate against the effectiveness of the regulation as against the proposed use. Guaclides v. Borough of Englewood Cliffs, supra, 11 N.J.Super. (405) at page 415, 78 A.2d (435) at page 440. The predominant viewpoint goes to the extent of sanctioning the revocation of a permit for a use valid when issued, where a subsequent prohibitory regulation is adopted prior to reliance by the owner upon the permit by substantial investment or expenditure. McQuillin, op. cit., supra (8 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3d ed. 1957)), §§ 25.157, 25.158, pp. 360--366; cf. Freeman v. Hague, 106 N.J.L. 137, 147 A. 553 (E. & A. 1929); Atlantic Broadcasting Co....