Klimiuk v. ESI Lederle, Inc., Civil Action No. 99-CV-3315 (E.D. Pa. 2000)

• Decision Date: 01 October 2000
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 99-CV-3315.
• Parties: PAULA T. KLIMIUK Plaintiff, v. ESI LEDERLE, INC., a division of WYETH-AYERST LABORATORIES Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

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PAULA T. KLIMIUK Plaintiff, v. ESI LEDERLE, INC., a division of WYETH-AYERST LABORATORIES Defendant.

Civil Action No. 99-CV-3315.

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

October __, 2000.

MEMORANDUM

GREEN, Senior Judge.

Presently before the court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff's Response thereto, and Defendant's Reply Memorandum. For the following reasons, Defendant's motion will be granted in part and denied in part.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, Paula T. Klimiuk, was employed by Defendant, ESI Lederle, Inc., as Group Leader, Physical Testing on or about July 6, 1987. Four (4) months later, Plaintiff was promoted to Supervisor, Physical Testing. On November 9, 1987, Plaintiff complained to Dorothy Stubblebine ("Stubblebine") in Defendant's Human Resources Department that she was receiving significantly less in salary than other supervisors. (Pl.'s Ex. 1.) Stubblebine suggested placing Plaintiff on a six (6) month review cycle "until she is up to the level we are comfortable with." (Pl.'s Ex. 1.) Plaintiff also complained to Stubblebine in June 1988 that she had been paid less than Bill Graham, Plaintiff's successor as Group Leader, Physical Testing. (Pl.'s Ex. 2.) Stubblebine concluded that there was no inequity. (Pl.'s Ex. 2.)

Between 1988 and 1995, Plaintiff received three promotions: (1) Supervisor, Pilots Plant in July, 1988, (2) Supervisor, Pilots Program in June, 1993, and (3) Manager, Pilots in September, 1995. During this period, Plaintiff's performance evaluations rated her performance as "exceeds expectations."¹ (Pl.'s Ex. 4, Ex. 5.) In July and August, 1997, Plaintiff complained to Stubblebine about "hostile and offensive" treatment that she was receiving from her direct supervisor, Dr. Marty Joyce ("Joyce"), and the head of her department, Dr. Ron Warner ("Warner"). (Def.'s Ex. L; Ex. M.) In November, Joyce issued Plaintiff's 1996-1997 Performance Evaluation which rated Plaintiff's performance "at expectations."² (Def.'s Ex. C.) Joyce also rejected Plaintiff's bid for the position of Associate Director of the Pilots Group. (See Klimiuk's Dep. Ex. 29; Pl.'s Ex. 13.) Instead, Joyce hired Eric Brown ("Brown"), a younger male,³ to the position at a higher grade and salary than Plaintiff received as Manager, Pilots. (See Brown's Dep. at 22-23.) Plaintiff alleges that the Associate Director position, as defined, was almost "identical" to Plaintiff's Manager, Pilots position. (See Def.'s Ex. X; Ex. Y.)

After placing her complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Joyce and Warner ridiculed her at project meetings and weekly priority meetings. (See Klimiuk's Dep. at 154; 177-181, 186, 194, 320-324.) In March and April 1998, Plaintiff received "unsatisfactory" performance reviews, which allegedly resulted in her demotion. (See Def.'s Ex. E; Ex. F.) Plaintiff filed a discrimination claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) on July 21, 1998. (Def.'s Ex. AA.) Plaintiff subsequently received her 1997-1998 Performance Evaluation rating her performance "below expectations."⁴ (Def.'s Ex. K.) On January 4, 1999, Plaintiff was terminated from Defendant's employment. Plaintiff filed a second charge with the EEOC on February 1, 1999. (Def.'s Ex. BB.)

After her employment was terminated, Plaintiff interviewed for a position with Nanosystems. (Klimiuk's Dep. at 63-67.) One interviewer, Mike Dickens, informed Plaintiff that he previously worked for Joyce and that they were close friends. (Klimiuk's Dep. at 65.) After the interview, Plaintiff was invited to return the following day to meet with Nanosystems' President. (Klimiuk's Dep. at 66.) Plaintiff was also given information about the company's philosophy, working hours, dress code and benefits. (Klimiuk's Dep. at 64.) The following day, Nanosystems informed Plaintiff that they were not interested in employing her. (Klimiuk's Dep. at 68.) Nanosystems refused to discuss the reason for its decision. (Klimiuk's Dep. at 67-68.)

Upon receiving a Right to Sue letter from the EEOC on her first charge, Plaintiff filed the instant action on or about June 29, 1999 bringing claims against Defendant for violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq., the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) and Pennsylvania common law. Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on all counts. Plaintiff filed a Response and Defendant responded with a Reply Memorandum.

DISCUSSION

Summary judgment shall be awarded "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A dispute regarding a material fact is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Once the moving party has carried the initial burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the non-moving party cannot rely on conclusory allegations in its pleadings or in memoranda and briefs to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Pastore v. Bell Telephone Co. of Pa., 24 F.3d 508, 511 (3d Cir. 1994). The nonmoving party, instead, must establish the existence of every element essential to his case, based on the affidavits or by the depositions and admissions on file. Id. (citing Harter v. GAF Corp., 967 F.2d 846, 852 (3d Cir. 1992)); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). The evidence presented must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Lang v. New York Life Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 118, 119 (3d Cir. 1983).

Age and Sex Discrimination Claims (Counts I and II)

To prove a prima facie case of age discrimination, the plaintiff must show that: (1) she was a member of a protected class, i.e., above 40 years of age; (2) she was qualified for the position; (3) she was discharged or suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) she was replaced by a sufficiently younger person to create an inference of age discrimination, or if the discharged employee's position has been eliminated and the employee is not replaced, that other similarly situated employees not in the protected class were retained. Showwalter v. University of Pittsburgh, 190 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1999); Ryder v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 879 F. Supp. 534 (W.D.Pa. 1995). To make out a prima facie case of sex discrimination, the plaintiff must establish that: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified for the position from which she was discharged; (3) she was discharged from the position; and (4) she was fired under circumstances creating an inference of unlawful discrimination. Showwalter, 190 F.3d at 231; Ryder, 879 F. Supp. at 534. The plaintiff may introduce direct or circumstantial evidence to meet the prima facie burden. See Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 814 F.2d 893, 898 (3d Cir. 1987); Jackson v. University of Pittsburgh, 826 F.2d 230, 236 (3d Cir. 1987).

Once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the defendant has the burden to produce a "legitimate, non-discriminatory reason" for its action. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981). After the defendant has satisfied its burden, the plaintiff may prove that the reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons but, rather, a pretext for discrimination. See id. at 253. The plaintiff's testimony alone may be sufficient to show discriminatory intent. See Weldon v. Kraft, Inc., 896 F.2d 793, 800 (3d Cir. 1990).

In the present case, Defendant moves for summary judgment on Plaintiff's age and sex discrimination claims on grounds that Plaintiff is unable to establish the second and fourth elements of either cause of action. Specifically, Defendant asserts that (1) Plaintiff cannot show that she was qualified for the job from which she was discharged or qualified for the job which she did not receive and (2) Plaintiff cannot establish that her salary, the failure to promote her or her termination give rise to an inference of age and/or sex discrimination. Assuming Plaintiff meets her prima facie burdens, Defendant argues that summary judgment is appropriate because Defendant can show legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for its employment decisions. First, Brown's wages exceeded that of Plaintiff, because Brown had greater ability and level of responsibility. (See Def.'s Ex. X; Ex. Y.) Second, Plaintiff was demoted and subsequently terminated, because she failed to meet Defendant's legitimate expectations. (See Def.'s Ex. C.)

In response, Plaintiff argues that she was objectively qualified for both Manager, Pilots and Assistant Director positions in terms of her background, education and experience. Plaintiff points to her 1996-1997 Performance Evaluation as Manager, Pilots which rates her performance as "at expectations."⁵ (See Def.'s Ex. C.) She asserts that subsequent evaluations rating her performance "below expectations" are not reflective of her qualifications but, rather, a pretext for discrimination in that they occurred after she complained of "hostile treatment" to Defendant's Human Resources Department.⁶ (See Def.'s Ex. E; Ex. F.) Plaintiff also challenges Defendant's assertion that she failed to meet its legitimate expectations by pointing to inaccuracies and assumptions in her performance reviews.⁷ (See Pl.'s Ex. 7.)

In addition, Plaintiff contends that the appointment of Brown, a younger male, to the position that Plaintiff was seeking raises an inference of age and sex discrimination,⁸ as do the unwarranted performance evaluations and salary discrepancies between Plaintiff and "similarly situated" male employees. Plaintiff challenges Defendant's stated reason for the wage disparity between Brown...