Kline v. Dep't of Corr.

• Decision Date: 03 August 2022
• Docket Number: 19-cv-62142-ALTMAN/REID
• Parties: DANIEL L. KLINE, Petitioner, v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida

DANIEL L. KLINE, Petitioner, v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent.

No. 19-cv-62142-ALTMAN/REID

United States District Court, S.D. Florida

August 3, 2022

REPORT OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE

LISETTE M. REID UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This cause is before the Court upon Petitioner, Daniel L Kline's 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (the “Petition”) challenging the constitutionality of his conviction for burglary of an occupied dwelling, following a jury trial in the state circuit court in and for Broward County, Florida. [ECF No 1]. He was sentenced to 40-years imprisonment with a 30-year minimum mandatory as a habitual violent felony offender (“HVFO”). [Id. at 11-15].

The Petition was referred to the Undersigned by the Honorable Roy K. Altman for a Report and Recommendation. [ECF No. 19]. For the reasons addressed below, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petition be DENIED.

BACKGROUND

I. The Underlying Offense

At trial, Mrs. Sandra Courtney testified that on April 30, 2012, when she returned to home after walking her dogs, she noticed her front door was open. [ECF No. 9-1 at 262-65]. As she entered, she found an unknown individual, later identified as Petitioner, standing in the living room holding a backpack. [Id.]. She gave a very detailed description of the intruder. She described him as white, approximately 5' 7” or 5' 8” tall, with “really short hair,” wearing a black t-shirt and shorts, and noticed that he had tattoos on his neck and arms and gold teeth. [Id. at 264-65]. Mrs. Courtney asked Petitioner what he was doing in her home. [Id. at 266]. He told Mrs. Courtney that he had not stolen anything and proceeded to show her that his backpack was empty. [Id. at 26667]. Shortly thereafter, Petitioner provided Mrs. Courtney with a fictitious name, “Steven,” and then left the home. [Id. at 267]. Her husband, Mr. Courtney, was at home at the time but was asleep in the bedroom. [Id.].

After Petitioner left, Mrs. Courtney woke her husband and asked him if he knew where his wallet was. [Id.]. After he noticed the wallet was missing, Mrs. Courtney found Petitioner outside walking away from her home. [Id. at 270]. She asked him to stop and return her husband's wallet. [Id.]. Petitioner “pat[ted] himself down and open[ed] the backpack again,” to show Mrs. Courtney he did not have the wallet. [Id.]. The two then returned to the Courtneys' home where Petitioner and Mr. Courtney spoke outside for approximately ten minutes. [Id. at 271]. Petitioner gave Mr. Courtney an explanation for being in the house: “[h]e said he was in there because he saw a black guy walk through the yard. And the door was open. So, he just wanted to peek in and see if everything was okay.” [Id. at 298].

Ultimately, the wallet was discovered inside the home. [Id.]. Notwithstanding, the wallet, as well as other items in the home, including a laptop and printer, had either been shifted or moved from their normal location while Petitioner was in the home. [Id. at 271-72]. Mrs. Courtney testified that her husband always left his wallet near the laptop computer and always left the laptop computer open because it was broken, and they were concerned that the wires would be cut if they attempted to close it [Id. at 268]. She noticed that the laptop computer had been closed. [Id.].

The Courtneys did not contact law enforcement because Petitioner did not take any of their property and they “didn't want any more trouble.” [Id. at 272-73]. The Courtneys did, however, subsequently install a security system on their property. [Id. at 273]. Approximately a week after the incident, one of the Courtneys' dogs set off the newly installed security alarm. [Id. at 274]. Law enforcement arrived at the Courtneys' home in response. [Id.]. Mrs. Courtney mentioned to the responding officers what had occurred approximately one week earlier. [Id.]. Afterwards, Mrs. Courtney met with a Detective named Robert Janzer to discuss the incident. [Id.at 275].

During Petitioner's trial, Detective Janzer testified that Mrs. Courtney provided a statement regarding the April 30, 2012, incident. [Id. at 323-24]. He presented her with a photograph lineup from which she identified Petitioner as the individual who broke into her home. [Id. at 321]. Several days later, Detective Janzer met with Mr. Courtney who also identified Petitioner as the perpetrator of the break-in. [Id.at 324-25]. Following meeting with the Courtneys, Detective Janzer arrested Petitioner. [Id. at 325-26]. Upon being told he was arrested and the charge, Petitioner stated that “he is glad he got caught,” and that the “Roxy's got him,” referring to the street name for Roxicodone, a painkiller. [Id. at 326-27].

II. State Court Procedural History

Petitioner was charged by Information with burglary of an occupied dwelling in violation of Fla. Stat. 810.02(1) and 810.02(3)(a). [ECF No. 8-1 at 6]. Prior to trial, Petitioner rejected the State's plea offer of 8 years' imprisonment and designation as a habitual offender. [ECF No. 9-1 at 23-27]. At trial, the verdict form gave the jury the options of finding Petitioner guilty of burglary of an occupied dwelling, or guilty of trespass in a structure as a lesser included offense, or not guilty. [ECF No. 8-1 at 9]. The jury found Petitioner guilty of burglary of an occupied dwelling. [Id.].

Petitioner appealed his conviction to the Florida Fourth District Court of Appeals (“Fourth DCA”). [Id. at 26]. Petitioner raised four issues on appeal: (1) the trial “court erred in denying the defense motion for judgment of acquittal as to burglary; (2) “[f]undamental error occurred when the jury was not instructed on the next lesser included offense of theft;” (3) “[f]undamental error occurred in that the instructions allowed a conviction on an invalid legal theory;” and (4) that the HVFO statute Petitioner was sentenced under is facially unconstitutional. [Id.]. The Fourth DCA affirmed the conviction and sentence without written opinion on July 27, 2017. [Id. at 78]. The mandate issued on August 25, 2017. [Id. at 80].

On August 27, 2018, Petitioner filed a Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850 motion for postconviction relief in which he alleged eight grounds for relief based upon ineffective assistance of counsel. [Id. at 82]. He alleged trial counsel failed to: (1) adequately argue Petitioner's motion for judgment of acquittal; (2) argue that the verdict was contrary to the greater weight of the evidence; (3) move to suppress eyewitness identification of Petitioner; (4) sufficiently advise Petitioner regarding the State's 8-year plea offer; (5) present “psychological fact evidence” before trial; (6) request a jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of theft; and (7) raise the issue of Petitioner's competency. He also argued that the cumulative effect of these errors prejudiced him. [Id.]. The State responded on December 5, 2018. [Id. at 115].

The trial court denied Petitioner's 3.850 motion on December 11, 2018, stating that it had relied upon the reasoning set forth in the State's Response. [Id. at 147]. The Fourth DCA affirmed the trial court's decision on January 9, 2019, per curium [Id. at 202], and the mandate issued on August 23, 2019. [Id. at 204].

III. The Instant Petition

Petitioner initiated the instant 28 U.S.C. § 2254 federal habeas Petition on August 26, 2019. [ECF No. 1]. In the Petition, which almost verbatim mirrors Petitioner's 3.850 motion, he raised the following seven claims:

I(A): counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately argue Petitioner's motion for judgment of acquittal;

I(B): counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that the verdict was contrary to the greater weight of the evidence;

I(C): counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress eyewitness identifications of Petitioner;

I(D): counsel was ineffective for failing to sufficiently advise Petitioner regarding the State's 8-year plea offer;

I(E): counsel was ineffective for failing to request a jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of theft;

II: counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue of Petitioner's competency; and

IV^[1]: Petitioner was prejudiced by the cumulative effect of counsel's errors.

See generally [Id.].

DISCUSSION

I. Timeliness

Before discussing the merits of Petitioner's claims, the Court must first determine whether they are timely raised. As the State acknowledges, and as explained below, the Petition was timely filed.

The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) governs petitions for writ of habeas corpus brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. S. 735, 104th Cong. § 102-108 (1996). See Wilcox v. Fla. Dep't of Corr., 158 F.3d 1209, 1210 (11th Cir. 1998) (per curiam). The AEDPA imposes a one-year statute of limitations on petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed by state prisoners. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Specifically, relevant to this case, the AEDPA provides that the one-year limitations period shall run from “(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” See Id.

The Eleventh Circuit has held the one-year limitations period begins to run ninety days after the state appellate court affirms a petitioner's conviction. Chavers v. Sec'y, Florida Dep't of Corr., 468 F.3d 1273, 1275-76 (11th Cir. 2006). The limitations period is tolled, however, for the time during which a properly filed application for post-conviction or other collateral review is pending in the state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Consequently, if Petitioner sat on any claim creating time gaps in the review process, the one-year clock would continue to run. Kearse v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 736 F.3d 1359, 1362 (11th Cir. 2013).

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