Kline v. Kline

• Decision Date: 28 January 1868
• Citation: 57 Pa. 120
• Parties: Kline <I>versus</I> Kline.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 120

57 Pa. 120

Kline versus Kline.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

January 21, 1868.

January 28, 1868.

January 21st 1868.

Before THOMPSON, C. J., READ, AGNEW and SHARSWOOD, JJ. STRONG, J., at Nisi Prius

Error to the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery county: To January Term 1868 C. Hunsicker and G. R. Fox, for plaintiff in error, cited 1 Story's Eq., §§ 187, 189, 217-222, 270-271, 308.

D. H. Mulvany (with whom was B. M. Boyer), for defendant in error, cited 1 Story's Eq., § 218; 2 Id. §§ 1368, 1519; Cannel v. Buckle, 2 P. Wms. 243, 244.

The opinion of the court was delivered, January 28th 1868, by SHARSWOOD, J.

Upon a question arising in the Orphans' Court as to the right of the widow of Gabriel Kline to any share of his estate, an issue was directed to try the validity of an antenuptial contract between her and the intestate, dated March 21st 1850, by which it seems to have been assumed that she had by anticipation renounced or released all her rights as widow. Whether the instrument does bear that meaning is a question which does not arise on this record, has not been argued, and upon it, we desire to be understood, there is no opinion either expressed or to be implied in the judgment we now enter. The deed was executed by the parties a very short time before their marriage, and it was alleged on behalf of the widow that the circumstances of her intended husband were concealed from her and misrepresented in the writing itself, in consequence of which she was induced for a very inadequate consideration to subscribe it. Evidence tending to show this was given. It was contended on her part, that it was incumbent on the plaintiffs in the issue to show that Gabriel Kline fully informed her of the amount and extent of the property owned by him. Had the judge contented himself with giving a simple negative to this proposition, it would perhaps have been unexceptionable. But his charge was much broader, for he instructed the jury that, "the woman was bound to exercise her judgment and take advantage of the opportunity that existed to obtain information; if she did not do so it was her own fault. The parties were dealing at arm's length. He was not bound to disclose to her the amount or value of his property." This part of the charge was excepted to and is assigned for error.

There is perhaps no relation of life in which more unbounded confidence is reposed than in that existing between parties who are betrothed to each other. Especially does the woman place the most implicit trust in the truth and affection of him in whose keeping she is about to deposit the happiness of her future life. From him she has no secrets; she believes he has none from her. To consider such persons as in the same category with buyers and sellers, and to say that they are dealing at arm's length, we think is a mistake. Surely when a man and woman are on the eve of marriage, and it is proposed between them,...