Kline v. Nationsbank of Virginia, NA

• Citation: 886 F. Supp. 1285
• Decision Date: 18 May 1995
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 2:94cv810.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia
• Parties: Starlett Sheffield KLINE, Plaintiff, v. NATIONSBANK OF VIRGINIA, N.A., Defendant.

886 F. Supp. 1285

Starlett Sheffield KLINE, Plaintiff, v. NATIONSBANK OF VIRGINIA, N.A., Defendant.

Civ. A. No. 2:94cv810.

United States District Court, E.D. Virginia, Norfolk Division.

May 18, 1995.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

John W. Hart, Beaton & Hart, Virginia Beach, VA, for plaintiff.

Robert W. McFarland, David M. Young, McGuire, Woods, Battle & Boothe, Norfolk, VA, for defendant.

ORDER

REBECCA BEACH SMITH, District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant's and Plaintiffs objections to the Magistrate's Report and Recommendation filed March 13, 1995.

I. Procedural History

In this action filed August 12, 1994, Plaintiff Starlett Sheffield Kline states claims for negligence and malfeasance, breach of express trust, and breach of the duty of loyalty. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and exemplary damages relating to her claims as well as attorney's fees and costs. On September 6, 1994, Defendant Nationsbank of Virginia, N.A. ("Nationsbank") moved to dismiss the Plaintiff's complaint based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction, failure to state a claim, the statute of limitations, adverse possession, laches, waiver, ratification, and estoppel. On September 19, 1994, Plaintiff responded in opposition to Defendant's motion to dismiss. On September 22, 1994, Plaintiff filed a reply memorandum to Plaintiff's opposition brief. On October 26, 1994, the matter came before Magistrate Judge William T. Prince. By order dated October 27, 1994, the Court directed Plaintiff to file an amended complaint on or before November 9, 1994, and the Court ordered Plaintiff to submit a statement in support of the jurisdictional amount within two months of the entry of the Order.

On November 9, 1994, Plaintiff moved the Court for leave to file her amended complaint. By order dated November 22, 1994, the Court granted Plaintiff's motion to file the amended complaint. Also on November 22, 1994, the amended complaint was filed. By order dated November 23, 1994, the Court set December 9, 1994, as the filing deadline for Defendant to file a motion to dismiss. On December 9, 1994, Defendant moved to dismiss Plaintiff's amended complaint because of failure to state a claim for punitive damages and failure to plead fraud with particularity and because Plaintiff's fraud claim was barred by the statute of limitations.

This matter was again referred to a United States Magistrate Judge by order filed December 30, 1994, for report and recommendations pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). The referral order required the Magistrate Judge to conduct a hearing and to submit proposed recommendations for the disposition of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint filed December 9, 1994.¹ Additionally, on December 28, 1994, Plaintiff filed a statement in support of the jurisdictional amount in the case. Defendant filed a response on January 10, 1995 in which Defendant disputed whether Plaintiff has demonstrated the requisite amount in controversy.

The Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation was filed on March 13, 1995, recommending the following:

1. Defendant's motion to stay or dismiss this action because of the pending state action should be DENIED;

2. Defendant's motion to dismiss Counts One, Two, and Three for failure to state a claim should be DENIED;

3. Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's claims for punitive damages under Counts One, Two, and Three for failure to state a claim should be GRANTED;

4. Defendant's motion to dismiss Count Four for failure to state fraud with particularity should be GRANTED;

5. Defendant's motion to dismiss any claim for pre-1987 damages under Count Three as time barred should be DENIED;

6. Defendant's motion to dismiss Counts One and Two as time barred should be DENIED;

7. Defendant's motion to dismiss Count Three on grounds of ratification should be DENIED; and

8. Defendant's motion to dismiss the entire action based on want of diversity jurisdiction, due to plaintiff's failure to meet the amount in controversy, should be DENIED.

By copy of the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, the parties were advised of their right to file written objections. On March 27, 1995, this Court received both Defendant's Objections to Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation and Plaintiff's Objections to Magistrate's Findings and Recommendations. Defendant raises the following objections:

1. Nationsbank objects to the Magistrate Judge's determination that the Court should not abstain from hearing this action pending the resolution of the state proceeding.

2. Nationsbank objects to the Magistrate Judge's recommendation that Counts One through Three should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim.

3. Nationsbank objects to the Magistrate Judge's recommendation that Counts One through Three are not time barred.

4. Nationsbank objects to the Magistrate Judge's recommendation that the action should not be dismissed on grounds of laches, waiver, release, estoppel, or ratification.

5. Nationsbank objects to the Magistrate Judge's recommendation that this action not be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Plaintiff objects solely to the Magistrate Judge's finding that all claims for punitive damages should be dismissed. Plaintiff also requests leave to file an amended complaint with respect to her claims for punitive damages only if the Court dismisses her punitive damages claims. On April 5, 1995, Defendant responded in opposition to Plaintiff's Objections and to Plaintiff's motion to amend. On April 10, 1995, Plaintiff filed a Response to Defendant's Objections.

II. Discussion

If a party serves and files written objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation, the District Judge is required to make a de novo determination of those portions of the report to which objection is made, and either affirm, reject, or modify the Magistrate Judge's recommendation. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (1988). After examining Defendant's and Plaintiff's objections, the Court finds that Defendant's and Plaintiff's objections repeat arguments raised in Defendant's motions to dismiss and in Plaintiff's responses to those motions to dismiss, and the Court finds de novo that the objections raised are without merit. Therefore, the Court, having independently examined the objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation and having made de novo findings with respect thereto, does hereby adopt and approve in full the findings and recommendations set forth in the Report and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge filed March 13, 1995.² Accordingly, Defendant's motion to stay or dismiss this action because of the pending state action is DENIED; Defendant's motion to dismiss Counts One, Two, and Three for failure to state a claim is DENIED; Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's claims for punitive damages under Counts One, Two, and Three for failure to state a claim is GRANTED; Defendant's motion to dismiss Count Four for failure to state fraud with particularity is GRANTED; Defendant's motion to dismiss Counts One and Two as time barred should be DENIED; Defendant's motion to dismiss any claim for pre-1987 damages under Count Three as time barred is DENIED; Defendant's motion to dismiss Count Three on grounds of ratification is DENIED; and Defendant's motion to dismiss the entire action based on want of diversity jurisdiction because of Plaintiff's failure to meet the amount in controversy, is DENIED.

In her objections, Plaintiff requested that if her claims for punitive damages are dismissed for failure to state a claim that she be allowed to amend her complaint with respect to the punitive damages claims only. Because Plaintiff has already amended her complaint one time, she requires leave of court to amend further. Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). "Leave should be freely given when justice so requires." Id.

The Court considers whether justice requires that Plaintiff be allowed to amend. First, Plaintiff received notice of the problems with her request for punitive damages when Defendant challenged Plaintiff's punitive damages claims in its Rebuttal Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff then had an opportunity to strengthen her claims for punitive damages in her amended complaint; however, as indicated above, her allegations supporting her claim of punitive damages in her amended complaint fail to state a claim. Second, Plaintiff does not present what additional allegations she proposes to append to her complaint. Instead, Plaintiff simply states that the terms "`outrageous and highly prejudicial' are synonymous with malice when pled in context with breach of trust actions." Pl.'s Objections to Magistrate's Findings and Recommendations at 2. Therefore, in this case, because justice does not require that Plaintiff be allowed to amend her complaint a second time with respect to her punitive damages claims, Plaintiff motion to amend is DENIED.

The Clerk shall forward a copy of this Order to all counsel of record for the parties.

It is so ORDERED.

MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

PRINCE, United States Magistrate Judge.

I. Procedural History

Plaintiff filed this action on August 12, 1994. Senior United States District Judge J. Calvitt Clarke, Jr., by order entered October 21, 1994, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), designated the undersigned Magistrate Judge to conduct a hearing and to submit to a Judge of the Court proposed recommendations for disposition of defendant's Motion To Dismiss filed September 6, 1994. The Court held a hearing on October 26, 1994, at which John W. Hart, Esquire appeared on behalf of plaintiff; and Robert W. McFarland, Esquire and David M. Young, Esquire appeared on behalf of defendant. On October 27, the Court ordered plaintiff to submit a statement in support of the jurisdictional amount, and plaintiff did so on December 28, to which defendant responded on January...