Klingbeil Co. v. Ric-Wil, Inc.

Decision Date24 June 1982
Docket NumberNo. 2-281A57,RIC-WI,INC,2-281A57
Citation436 N.E.2d 843
PartiesThe KLINGBEIL COMPANY, Appellant (Plaintiff Below), v.and Kenneth Roan d/b/a Roan Construction Company, Appellees(Defendants Below), and Governour's Square of Indianapolis Company III, Appellee (Plaintiff Below).
CourtIndiana Appellate Court

Alan H. Lobley, Charles E. Greer, Ice Miller Donadio & Ryan, Indianapolis, for appellant.

Marvin Mitchell, Teresa Todd, Mitchell, Yosha & Hurst, Indianapolis, for appellee Kenneth Roan d/b/a Roan Const. Co.

John D. Nell, Wooden McLaughlin & Sterner, Indianapolis, for appellee Ric-Wil, Inc.

SULLIVAN, Judge.

The plaintiff-appellant, The Klingbeil Company (Klingbeil), appeals the entry of summary judgment against it in its action against defendants-appellees, Ric-Wil, Inc. (Ric-Wil) and Kenneth Roan, doing business as Roan Construction Company (Roan). Klingbeil contends that the trial court erred as a matter of law in determining that Klingbeil's claims were time-barred.

We agree and reverse the judgment.

This case represents an appeal from a partial summary judgment pursuant to Ind.Rules of Procedure, Trial Rules 54(B) and 56(C).

Klingbeil raised six alleged errors in its motion to correct errors. Because we hold that the trial court committed reversible error in one respect, we need not discuss the other alleged errors. O'Connor v. O'Connor (1969) 253 Ind. 295, 253 N.E.2d 250; Cowan v. Murphy (1st Dist. 1975) 165 Ind.App. 566, 333 N.E.2d 802.

The dispositive issue is whether the trial court erred in determining that Klingbeil had first asserted its claim in August, 1979 and that its claim did not relate back to the date of the original pleading filed in 1973.

Klingbeil is an Ohio corporation involved in real estate development and construction. In 1971, Klingbeil began the development of a part of an apartment complex in Indianapolis. Klingbeil planned to sell the development to a group of investors to be called Governour's Square of Indianapolis Co. III (Governour's Square).

In Fall, 1971, Klingbeil issued purchase orders to Ric-Wil for piping materials and to Roan for its installation. Klingbeil signed the purchase orders as agent for Governour's Square.

Soon after installation, leaks in the joints of the piping system developed. Repair efforts were unsuccessful. Klingbeil replaced the piping in 1973. At the time, Klingbeil did not own the real estate. The project had been sold to Governour's Square in 1972. However, under the agreement between Governour's Square and Klingbeil, the replacement costs constituted construction costs. Therefore, these costs reduced Klingbeil's fee from Governour's Square.

On March 9, 1973, Governour's Square filed a complaint against Ric-Wil and Roan for breach of contract in the design, sale and installation of the pipe. On May 9, 1973, Ric-Wil filed a motion to join Klingbeil as a party to the lawsuit. The motion did not state in what capacity Klingbeil was to be joined nor did it cite the Indiana Rule of Trial Procedure on which it relied. On May 14, 1973, the trial court granted the motion and ordered that Klingbeil "be added as a party to this case and that summons be issued for service upon such additional party." On May 17, 1973, a printed summons was issued to "defendant" Klingbeil. Klingbeil promptly moved to dismiss the action as to it. Ric-Wil, in its opposing brief contended that "the motion to dismiss by (Klingbeil), additional party plaintiff herein, should be overruled (because) ... Klingbeil is a real party in interest ...." (emphasis added).

The trial court denied Klingbeil's motion, stating: "Defendant's motion to dismiss ... is overruled." (emphasis added). Thereafter, in all documents filed prior to August, 1979, and despite the lack of any pleading filed by or against Klingbeil, Klingbeil was included in the caption allied with the plaintiff Governour's Square. Both Klingbeil and Governour's Square were represented by the same counsel.

On February 10, 1975, Governour's Square filed its motion for leave to amend its complaint to seek additional damages. The motion and the proposed amended complaint referred to plaintiff in the singular. Klingbeil's name appeared in the caption as plaintiff, but no mention was made of it in the body of the motion or in the amended complaint. The trial court granted leave to amend.

Thereafter, Ric-Wil filed its answer to "plaintiff's complaint" and its counterclaim "against plaintiffs." "Plaintiffs" promptly answered to the counterclaim. Roan timely answered "plaintiffs' amended complaint."

The action entered a long period of extensive discovery. Finally, on August 3, 1979, Klingbeil and Governour's Square together moved for leave to file their Second Amended and Supplemental Complaint, recognizing that the first amended complaint did not clearly state Klingbeil's complaint against the defendants. The trial court granted leave to amend. The second amended complaint, filed August 13, 1979, differed from the prior complaints in its allegations that Governour's Square was not organized at the time the purchase orders were issued; that thereafter it was organized and assumed the obligations; that in November, 1972, when the leaks became evident, Ric-Wil made an oral agreement with Klingbeil to repair the leaks, which Ric-Wil subsequently repudiated; that Governour's Square suffered the lost rent damages previously asserted in the first amended complaint; and that Klingbeil suffered the construction loan interest damages previously asserted therein.

In their answers, Ric-Wil and Roan asserted the affirmative defense of the statute of limitations as to all of Klingbeil's claims. Both defendants thereafter filed motions for summary judgment.

Prior to the ruling of the trial court on the motions, the plaintiffs moved for leave to file their third amended complaint. The trial court sustained the plaintiffs' motion, stating: "All pending motions are now moot." The third amended complaint contained a more elaborate explanation of the succession of rights between Governour's Square and Klingbeil. The complaint no longer separated the damages between Klingbeil and Governour's Square. Rather, it asserted: "The Klingbeil Company succeeded to the rights of (Governour's Square) against the defendants ...."

Both defendants renewed their motions for summary judgment. The trial court, after a hearing, sustained the defendants' motions and entered judgment on September 26, 1980 against both plaintiffs, stating: "Ric-Wil and Roan are entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Governour's Square has suffered no damages for which relief is sought under the Third Amended Complaint .... (and) because Klingbeil's claims are time-barred by the four (4) year statute of limitations found at IC 26-1-2-725."

Klingbeil contends the trial court erroneously ruled that Klingbeil first asserted its claim in August, 1979. It points out that Klingbeil was added as a party in 1973 and that all parties thereafter treated Klingbeil as a plaintiff. Further, Klingbeil asserts that the 1975 Amended Complaint identified both plaintiffs in the caption, but through an oversight, failed to refer to Klingbeil in the text.

In case after case, Indiana courts have recognized that the underlying philosophy of the rules of procedure is to facilitate decisions on the merits and to avoid pleading traps. Soft Water Utilities, Inc. v. LeFevre (1973) 261 Ind. 260, 269, 301 N.E.2d 745, 750; Eberbach v. McNabney (2d Dist. 1980) Ind.App., 413 N.E.2d 958, reh. denied, 421 N.E.2d 651, trans. denied; Carvey v. Indiana National Bank (2d Dist. 1978) Ind.App., 374 N.E.2d 1173; Chrysler Corp. v. Alumbaugh (3d Dist. 1976) 168 Ind.App. 363, 342 N.E.2d 908, modified on other grounds, 348 N.E.2d 654. Specifically, in interpreting Ind. Rules of Procedure, Trial Rule 15(C), our courts have found persuasive the reasoning of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals:

"This purpose is not furthered by giving Rule 15 lip service rather than full fealty. Nor is the purpose of the federal rules furthered by denying the addition of a party who has a close identity of interest with the old party when the added party will not be prejudiced. The ends of justice are not served when forfeiture of just claims because of technical rules is allowed." Travelers Indemnity Co. v. United States ex rel. Construction Specialties Co. (10th Cir. 1967) 382 F.2d 103, 106.

The broadest view of Ric-Wil's joinder of Klingbeil is that its request was based on Ind. Rules of Procedure, Trial Rule 20(A) which provides in pertinent part:

"(T)he defendant may make any persons who could be joined under this rule parties by asserting their interest therein with a prayer that their rights in the controversy be determined, along with any counter-claim or cross-claim against them, if any, as if they had been originally joined as parties."

In spite of the great liberality of T.R. 20(A), however, the rule does not excuse any of the joined parties from the obligation to state a claim against the defendant or defendants upon which relief may be granted. See, C. Wright & J. Miller, Fed.Prac. & Proc., § 1656 at 284 (1971 ed.). It is clear that Klingbeil failed to do so at least until 1975.

Klingbeil asserts that it stated a claim in the 1975 amended complaint. There, Klingbeil's name was set forth in the caption as a plaintiff, but not in the body of the complaint. Indiana courts have held that if the names of all parties have been given in the title or caption of the complaint, it is not necessary to repeat them in the body of the complaint. Cosby v. Powers (1893) 137 Ind. 694, 695-96, 37 N.E. 321; Lowry v. Dutton (1867) 28 Ind. 473, 474-75. These cases are, however, distinguishable from the case at bar in that they concerned the failure of all named plaintiffs to state their names in the body of the complaint. In the instant case, Governour's Square was mentioned in the body of the...

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3 cases
  • Harp v. Indiana Dept. of Highways
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • 23 Enero 1992
    ...philosophy of the rules of procedure is to facilitate decisions on the merits and to avoid pleading traps." Klingbeil Co. v. Ric-Wil, Inc. (1982), Ind.App., 436 N.E.2d 843, 846 (citing Soft Water Utilities, Inc. v. Le Fevre (1973), 261 Ind. 260, 269, 301 N.E.2d 745, 750; Eberbach v. McNabne......
  • Benke v. Barbour, 1-1282A361
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • 29 Junio 1983
    ...philosophy of the rules of procedure is to facilitate decisions on the merits and to avoid pleading traps. Klingbeil Company v. Ric-Wil, Inc., (1982) Ind.App., 436 N.E.2d 843. More specifically, in Chrysler Corporation v. Alumbaugh, (1976) 168 Ind.App. 363, 342 N.E.2d 908, 913, this court f......
  • Alumax Extrusions, Inc. v. Evans Transp. Co., Monon Trailer Div.
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • 19 Abril 1984
    ...of the parties. However, such language tracks the wording of the joinder statute and as such is proper. See, Klingbeil Co. v. Ric-Wil, Inc., (1982) Ind.App., 436 N.E.2d 843. ...

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