Klotzbach-Piper v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp.
| Decision Date | 12 October 2022 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 18-1702 (RC) |
| Parties | KAREN KLOTZBACH-PIPER, Plaintiff, v. NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
GRANTING CERTAIN RELIEF REQUESTED IN DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS IN LIMINE; DEFERRING RULING ON CERTAIN RELIEF REQUESTED IN DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS IN LIMINE; DENYING CERTAIN RELIEF REQUESTED IN DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS IN LIMINE; GRANTING IN PART PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN LIMINE AND DEFERRING RULING ON CERTAIN RELIEF REQUESTED IN PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN LIMINE
Plaintiff Karen Klotzbach-Piper worked for Defendant National Railroad Passenger Corporation, better known as Amtrak, for almost thirty years. Klotzbach-Piper v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., No. CV 18-1702, 2021 WL 4033071, at *1 (D.D.C. Sept. 3, 2021). Early in her career she became a certified locomotive engineer, but let that certification lapse in order to take on other roles with Amtrak. Id. However, in 2014, wishing to move south, she succeeded in bidding for a job as a locomotive engineer in Jacksonville, Florida. Id. She needed to recertify as an engineer in order to work in this position, so upon her start in Jacksonville, Amtrak put her on a training program for recertification. Id. While training, fellow engineers Phillip Shaw and Christopher Martone allegedly “called her names, hit her when she operated the train, and touched her inappropriately.” Id. Amtrak ultimately refused to recertify Klotzbach-Piper as a locomotive engineer, explaining that she had performed deficiently during training. Id. at 3.
Klotzbach-Piper sued Amtrak, alleging that the non-certification decision was the result of sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”), and disability discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”). Compl. at 19-20, 24, ECF No. 1. She also brought claims of retaliation for protected activity under Title VII, the ADEA, and the Family and Medical Leave Act. Id. at 21-25. Finally, she alleged that Amtrak subjected her to a discriminatory hostile work environment in violation of both Title VII and the ADEA. Compl. at 17-19. The Court dismissed some of these claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and then granted summary judgment in favor of Amtrak on all remaining claims except for the hostile work environment claims. Klotzbach-Piper, 2021 WL 4033071, at *1, *4. As relevant here, the Court held that the evidence could not give rise to a reasonable inference that any sex or age discrimination was a but-for or proximate cause of Amtrak's decision to deny Klotzbach-Piper recertification as a locomotive engineer. Id. at *12-13. The summary judgment record showed that, even if some of her evaluators had harbored discriminatory animus, these evaluations were not a but-for cause of the recertification decision because Klotzbach-Piper also “received consistently poor reviews from evaluators whom she [did] not allege harbored sex- or age-related animus.” Id. at 12. Moreover, these “poor reports from unbiased evaluators” “ma[de] any connection between . . . [discriminatory] animus and the noncertification decision too attenuated to constitute proximate cause.” Id.
The parties have filed motions in limine in advance of the trial on the sole remaining claims, for a hostile work environment under Title VII and the ADEA. Throughout its motion-in-limine briefing, Amtrak states that “the only issues for the jury to decide are: (1) whether Plaintiff was subjected to a hostile work environment based on sex in violation of Title VII; (2) whether Plaintiff was subjected to a hostile work environment based on age in violation of the ADEA; (3) whether Amtrak can be held liable for [Plaintiff's] coworkers' alleged harassment based on a negligence standard; and (4) the damages [Plaintiff] can recover if Amtrak is liable.” See, e.g., Def.'s Resp. Pl.'s Proffer Regarding Testimony of Helen Gage Williamson at 1 (“ ”), ECF No. 59. Klotzbach-Piper does not expressly object to this characterization of the remaining issues for trial, and, consistent with the analysis below, the Court agrees that these are the sole remaining issues for trial. See Klotzbach-Piper, 2021 WL 4033071, at *15-17, *17 n.8. The parties also filed a pretrial statement, in which Klotzbach-Piper states that she seeks $414,458.00 in back pay, $354,982.00 in front pay, $1,043,071.00 in pension losses, $300,000.00 in compensatory damages for pain and suffering, and attorney's fees. Pretrial Statement at 8, ECF No. 45.
While neither the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure nor the Federal Rules of Evidence expressly provide for motions in limine, the Court may allow such motions “‘pursuant to the district court's inherent authority to manage the course of trials.'” Barnes v. District of Columbia, 924 F.Supp.2d 74, 78 (D.D.C. 2013) (quoting Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41 n.4 (1984)). “Motions in limine are designed to narrow the evidentiary issues at trial.” Williams v. Johnson, 747 F.Supp.2d 10, 14 (D.D.C. 2010). Importantly, a trial judge's discretion “extends not only to the substantive evidentiary ruling, but also to the threshold question of whether a motion in limine presents an evidentiary issue that is appropriate for ruling in advance of trial.” Barnes, 924 F.Supp.2d at 79 (quoting Graves v. District of Columbia, 850 F.Supp.2d 6, 11 (D.D.C. 2011)). “[A] motion in limine should not be used to resolve factual disputes or weigh evidence.” C & E Servs., Inc. v. Ashland Inc., 539 F.Supp.2d 316, 323 (D.D.C. 2008) (citation omitted).
“Rather, parties should target their arguments to demonstrating why certain categories of evidence should (or should not) be introduced at trial, and direct the district court to specific evidence in the record that would favor or disfavor the introduction of those particular categories of evidence.” Williams, 747 F.Supp.2d at 14.
“In evaluating the admissibility of proffered evidence on a pretrial motion in limine the court must assess whether the evidence is relevant and, if so, whether it is admissible, pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 402.” Daniels v. District of Columbia, 15 F.Supp.3d 62, 66 (D.D.C. 2014). “Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” Fed.R.Evid. 401. Relevant evidence is admissible unless otherwise provided by the U.S. Constitution, a federal statute, the Federal Rules of Evidence, or other rules prescribed by the U.S. Supreme Court. See Fed.R.Evid. 402. “Irrelevant evidence is not admissible.” Id. Further, Federal Rule of Evidence 403 provides that a court may “exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Fed.R.Evid. 403. “The burden is on the introducing party to establish relevancy as well as admissibility.” Corrigan v. Glover, 254 F.Supp.3d 184, 191 (D.D.C. 2017) (cleaned up).
Amtrak seeks an order precluding Klotzbach-Piper from “(1) calling any witnesses to testify; (2) introducing any other evidence; (3) offering any argument; and (4) recovering any economic damages related to her non-certification as a locomotive engineer and non-selection for other positions at Amtrak.” Def.'s Mem. Supp. Mot. In Lim. to Exclude All Evid. of Pl.'s Dismissed Discrimination and Retaliation Claims and Economic Damages at 6 (“Def.'s Dismissed Claims and Economic Damages Mem.”), ECF No. 48-1. Among other things, this would require the exclusion of the testimony of Klotzbach-Piper's economic expert Joseph Rosenberg, id., who plans to testify that, apparently as a result of the non-certification decision, Klotzbach-Piper stopped working “prior to reaching the thirty years of employment with Amtrak that would have resulted in her receiving a full pension,” Pl.'s Suppl. Resp. Regarding Expert Testimony at 2, ECF No. 56; see Def.'s Mem. Supp. Mot. In Lim. to Limit Pl.'s Damages at 2 n.2, ECF No. 49-1 (). In support of its motion, Amtrak reasons that the non-certification decision was the basis for the discrimination and retaliation claims that the Court has already disposed of, and therefore has no relevance to the two hostile work environment claims that remain for trial. Def.'s Dismissed Claims and Economic Damages Mem. at 4-5.
In response, Klotzbach-Piper does not draw any clear connection between her hostile environment claims and the non-certification decision. Instead, she says that “the hostile work environment claim[s are] still outstanding and there has not been a decision regarding whether Amtrak intentionally discriminated against Plaintiff by allowing a hostile work environment to occur.” Pl.'s Opp'n Def.'s Mot. In Lim. to Limit Pl.'s Damages at 3, ECF No. 53-1; Pl.'s Opp'n Def.'s Mot In Lim. to Exclude All Evid. of Pl.'s Dismissed Discrimination and Retaliation Claims and Economic Damages at 3, ECF No. 52 (...
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