Klunder v. Trustees & Fellows of the College or Univ. in the English Colony of Rhode Island
| Decision Date | 13 July 2011 |
| Docket Number | C.A. No. 10-410 ML |
| Parties | JOE KLUNDER, Plaintiff, v. TRUSTEES AND FELLOWS OF THE COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY IN THE ENGLISH COLONY OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS, IN NEW ENGLAND, IN AMERICA, later known as BROWN UNIVERSITY IN PROVIDENCE IN THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND, AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS; RUTH SIMMONS (in her individual and official capacities); CARLA HANSEN (in her individual and official capacities); MARGARET KLAWUNN (in her individual and official capacities); TERRY ADDISON (in his individual and official capacities); J. ALLEN WARD (in his individual and official capacities); RICHARD BOVA (in his individual and official capacities); ROBERT ENOS (in his individual and official capacities); PHILIP GRUPPUSO (in his individual and official capacities); DAVID KERTZER (in his individual and official capacities); YOLANDA CASTILLO APPOLLONIO, ESQ. (in her individual and official capacities); JANE DOE, ESQ. (a Brown University attorney presently unknown to Plaintiff) (in her individual and official capacities), Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island |
Plaintiff, Joe Klunder ("Plaintiff) has filed an eleven-count complaint against Brown University ("Brown") and individuals associated with Brown (collectively "Defendants") alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Rhode Island law. The matter is before the Court on cross-motions for partial summary judgement. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' motion is granted in part and denied in part. Plaintiff's motion is denied.
Summary judgment is appropriate only "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). An issue is "genuine" if the pertinent evidence is such that a rational factfinder could resolve the issue in favor of either party, and a fact is "material" if it "has the capacity to sway the outcome of the litigation under the applicable law." National Amusements. Inc. v. Town of Dedham. 43 F.3d 731, 735 (1st Cir. 1995).
The moving party bears the burden of showing the Court that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Id. The Court views all facts and draws all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Continental Casualty Co. v. Canadian Universal Insurance Co., 924 F.2d 370 (1st Cir. 1991). The legal standard for summary judgment is not changed when parties file cross motions for summary judgment. Adria International Group. Inc. v. Ferre Development. Inc., 241 F.3d 103 (1st Cir. 2001). "The court must rule on each party's motion on an individual and separate basis, determining, for each side, whether a judgment may be entered in accordance with the Rule 56 standard." Bienkowski v. Northeastern University, 285 F.3d 138, 140 (1st Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 "requires the parties to submit admissible evidence in supporting and opposing motions for summary judgment." Feliciano v. Rhode Island. 160 F.3d 780, 787 (1st Cir. 1998).
Brown was established in February of 1764 by a charter granted by the General Assembly of the English Colony of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations. The charter provides thatBrown "corporators shall be a 'body corporate and politic' . . . ." Brown University v. Granger, 19 R.I. 704, 705, 36 A. 720, 720 (1897).1 The charter was granted in response to a petition put forth by a number of individuals of the Baptist faith who sought to establish a university in Rhode Island. The funds for the establishment and operation of Brown were raised privately. The charter, among other things, granted Brown perpetual succession, provided a means for selecting successors to the original incorporators, and granted Brown the right to sue and be sued and the right to own, receive, and hold property. The charter also provided for internal governance of Brown. The charter has never been amended without the express consent of Brown. Since its creation, Brown has operated as a private institution of higher learning.
Plaintiff enrolled at Brown during the 2003-2004 academic year. Plaintiff contends that, in September 2007, Brown suspended him from classes and removed him from campus. Among other things, Plaintiff alleges that Brown employed a university police officer, Defendant Robert Enos, to enforce its student disciplinary policies and to remove him from campus.2
Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated § 1983 and Rhode Island law by taking certainactions against him pursuant to Brown's student disciplinary policies. In essence, Plaintiff argues that he was suspended from Brown and removed from campus without being provided with "constitutional safeguards." Plaintiffs Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 1 ("Plaintiff's Memo"). Plaintiff, among other things, alleges that Defendants violated his rights under the First, Fourth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
The parties cross-move for summary judgment only as to Count I of the complaint. Count I of the complaint seeks a declaratory judgment from this Court finding that Brown and its agents and employees (1) are "persons" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) "are, and have been since February 25[,] 1871,3 subject to the provisions of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution[] and Article I of the Rhode Island Constitution, 42 U.S.C. [§] 1983 and other implementing statutes[,]" and (3) "have acted since February 25, 1871, under color of law." Complaint at 141.
Plaintiff contends that Brown is a "person" acting under color of state law within the meaning of "constitutional guarantees." Plaintiff's Memo at 1. Plaintiff argues that Brown is "imbued with the power to exercise certain governmental authority delegated by the colonial assembly" in a "power sharing arrangement." Plaintiff's Memo at 1. Although Plaintiff concedes that Brown is a "private institution," Plaintiff argues that as a "body politic" Brown was created as the "holder of delegated governmental power and authority." Plaintiff's Objection toDefendant's [sic] Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 10 ("Plaintiff's Objection"). As the holder of such governmental power and authority, Plaintiff concludes that Brown is a state actor. Defendants contend that Brown is a private institution not subject to suit under § 1983.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 "provides a remedy for deprivations of rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States when that deprivation takes place under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . . " Rockwell v. Cape Cod Hospital. 26 F.3d 254, 256 (1994) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In order to state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must show (1) the existence of a federal constitutional or statutory right, (2) a deprivation of that right by a "person," (3) acting under color of state law. Id. Private parties and "private institutions meet the state action requirements only in rare circumstances." Rinsky v. Trustees of Boston University. Civil Action No. 10cvl0779-NG, 2010 WL 5437289 (D. Mass. Dec. 27, 2010) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
This Court recognizes that for purposes of § 1983, the term "person" may be applied to "bodies politic and corporate." Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 688 (1978). "[T]he Supreme Court [has] recognized that there is an understanding going back at least to [1787] . . . that municipal corporations and private [corporations are] simply two species of body politic and corporate, treated alike in terms of their legal status as persons capable of suing and being sued." Eliserio v. Floydada Housing Authority, 455 F. Supp. 2d 648, 654 (S.D. Tex. 2006) (emphasis added) ). The "phrase [bodies politic and corporate] was used [circa 1871] to mean corporations, both private and public . . . and not toinclude the States." Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 69 (1989).
The understanding that the term "body politic" is a general term used to describe both private and public corporations is well-reflected in Rhode Island law. See e.g., Doe v. Gelineau, 732 A.2d 43, 45 n.2 (R.I. 1999) (); Masse v. Church of Our Lady of Consolation, 49 R.I. 269, 141 A. 703 (1928) (); Mason v. Perry, 22 R.I. 475, 48 A. 671 (1901) (); Wing v. Slater, 19 R.I. 597, 35 A. 302 (1896) ().4 In fact, in Gelineau. the Rhode Island Supreme Court defined the term corporation as:
An artificial person or legal entity created by or under the authority of the laws of a state. An association of persons created by statute as a legal entity. The law treats the corporation itself as a person which can sue and be sued. The corporation is distinct from the individuals who comprise it (shareholders). The corporation survives the death of its investors, as the shares can usually be transferred. Such entity subsists as a body politic under a special denomination, which is regarded in law as having a personality and existence distinct from that of its several members, and which is, by the same authority, vested with the capacity of continuous succession, irrespective of changes in its membership, either in perpetuity or for a...
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