Kmart Corp. v. County of Becker

Decision Date28 February 2002
Docket NumberNo. C6-01-826.,C6-01-826.
Citation639 N.W.2d 856
PartiesKMART CORPORATION, Relator, v. COUNTY OF BECKER, Respondent.
CourtMinnesota Supreme Court

Laurie J. Miller, Thomas R. Wilhelmy, Fredrikson & Byron, P.A., Minneapolis, Relator's Attorney(s).

Gretchen Dee Thilmony, Assistant Becker County Attorney, Detroit Lakes, Respondent's Attorney(s).

Heard, considered, and decided by the court en banc.

OPINION

BLATZ, Chief Justice.

This property tax appeal raises two issues for our consideration. The first issue concerns when a property's status as income-producing is determined for the purposes of Minn.Stat. § 278.05, subd. 6(a) (2000), the 60-Day Rule, and the second concerns whether relator provided sufficient income information to the county pursuant to the 60-Day Rule. The tax court ruled that the relevant date of inquiry for whether property is income-producing is the date of assessment and that the income information the relator provided within the statutory time period was insufficient. Accordingly, the tax court dismissed relator's chapter 278 petition for failure to comply with the statute. Because the tax court did not err in determining the property's status nor in applying the clear language of the 60-Day Rule to the undisputed facts, we affirm.

Relator Kmart Corporation operates a retail store in a shopping center in Detroit Lakes, Minnesota. Kmart leased the property for its store until October 14, 1999, when it purchased the same property. On March 31, 2000, Kmart filed a chapter 278 petition challenging the Becker County assessor's 1999 valuation of the property. Minnesota Statutes § 278.05, subd. 6(a) requires that all petitioners challenging assessments for income-producing property provide the county with information, "including income and expense figures, verified net rentable areas, and anticipated income and expenses * * * within 60 days after the petition has been filed under this chapter." Id. Kmart timely provided the county with a lease summary and a copy of pertinent sections of its former lease. This information disclosed that Kmart's lease provided for an annual minimum rent, but also contained a provision known as a percentage rent clause, requiring additional rent if Kmart's gross retail sales for the year exceeded a specified amount. Kmart did not provide other information specifying the actual rent paid or whether the percentage rent clause was triggered.

Becker County filed a motion to dismiss the petition, arguing that the income information provided by Kmart was incomplete and, therefore, insufficient. Specifically, the county asserted that the information provided by Kmart did not meet the requirements of the 60-Day Rule because the information provided did not indicate whether the percentage rent clause had been triggered. Thus, the county argued that it did not know and could not determine what rent was actually paid.

In response to the county's motion to dismiss, Kmart first contended that its property was not subject to section 278.05, subd. 6(a) because it had purchased the property on October 14, 1999, and consequently the property was owner-occupied and therefore not income-producing at the time the petition was filed in March of 2000. Kmart further argued that if the property was subject to section 278.05, subd. 6(a), the information it supplied did comply with the statute because the percentage rent clause had not been triggered and no additional rent beyond the minimum amount stated in the lease summary was owed.

The tax court dismissed Kmart's petition. In doing so, the tax court stated: "We find the relevant date for determination of the status of a property for purposes of the 60-Day Rule to be the date of assessment. Therefore, in this case, because the subject property was income-producing on the date of assessment * * * the 60-Day Rule requirements apply." Kmart Corp. v. County of Becker, No. C2-00-395, 2001 WL 311234 (Minn. T.C. March 16, 2001). The tax court then concluded that the income information provided by Kmart failed to comply with the requirements of the statute, because even though Kmart provided some lease information, it failed to provide necessary information as to what rent was in fact paid.

Our review of the tax court's decision is limited to whether the tax court had jurisdiction, whether its decision was justified by the evidence and in conformity with the law or whether it committed an error of law. Minn.Stat. § 271.10, subd. 1 (2000). When the parties do not dispute the relevant facts, as here, we review legal issues de novo. BFW Co. v. County of Ramsey, 566 N.W.2d 702, 704 (Minn.1997).

Minnesota Statutes § 278.05, subd. 6(a), the 60-Day Rule, applies to income-producing property.1 Kmart first raises the issue of when a property's status as income-producing is determined for purposes of this rule. In Minnesota, real property subject to taxation is appraised with reference to its value on January 2 of the assessment year. Minn.Stat. § 273.01 (2000). Because the purpose of the 60-Day Rule is to provide information that would be useful to the determination of value, the relevant date of inquiry for whether property is income-producing is the date of assessment, not the date the petition is filed. See Menards, Inc. v. County of Sherburne, No. C2-98-460, 1998 WL 668734 at *2 (Minn. T.C. Aug. 20, 1998) (finding that property was not income-producing because it had no rental income at the time of assessment). Kmart's purchase of the leased property on October 14, 1999, does not change the property's status on the assessment date, January 2, 1999. Therefore we affirm the tax court and hold that the assessment date is the relevant date of determination of a property's status as income-producing under Minn.Stat. § 278.05, subd. 6(a).

Next we determine whether the income information provided by Kmart complies with the requirements of the 60-Day Rule, which states:

Information, including income and expense figures, verified net rentable areas, and anticipated income and expenses, for income-producing property must be provided to the county assessor within 60 days after the petition has been filed under this chapter. Failure to provide the information required in this paragraph shall result in the dismissal of the petition, unless the failure to provide it was due to the unavailability of the evidence at that time.

Id. The text of the statute is clear— information must be timely provided unless it is unavailable. Further, the statute mandates dismissal upon the failure to provide the information, and does not require that the delay in providing information cause actual prejudice. BFW, 566 N.W.2d at 704-05. Kmart has not argued that the disputed information was not available to it during the statutory time period.

We recognize that section 278.05 subd. 6(a) provides an extraordinary remedy unlike our traditional rules of discovery.2 A chapter 278 petition exists to provide "an adequate, speedy, and simple remedy" for a taxpayer who claims that real estate has been unfairly assessed. Land O'Lakes Dairy Co. v. Village of Sebeka, 225 Minn. 540, 548, 31 N.W.2d 660, 665 (1948). The legislature has made clear that a chapter 278 petition must be adjudicated promptly. Minn.Stat. § 278.05, (stating that a court "shall without delay summarily hear and determine the claims"). Delays in adjudication have obvious adverse impacts on taxing authorities' ability to set levies and establish budgets. Therefore, as we have recognized previously, strict enforcement of the 60-Day Rule advances the legislative purpose of providing an adequate, speedy, and simple remedy. BFW, 566 N.W.2d at 705; see also Mendota Mall Assocs. v. County of Dakota, 578 N.W.2d 350, 350 (Minn. 1998)

(applying BFW).

Nonetheless, Kmart urges this court to soften what it views as the hard edges of the law. Specifically, Kmart contends that when a petitioner provides the lease information provided here, then the counties and the court should presume that the minimum rent was the only rent due, and that the petitioner satisfied its disclosure obligations under the 60-Day Rule. Thus Kmart advocates that county assessors and the courts proceed, in the absence of an indication to the contrary, on the presumption that contingent clauses in the lease have not affected base rent. While at first glance such an approach is seemingly reasonable, problems in its application become readily apparent. To begin with, we have concerns that such a presumption may not in fact be justified.3 Further, creating a presumption in favor of the petitioner is likely to result in tax petitioners providing and the county relying on incomplete or vague information. In that event, valuations would be unequal and inaccurate, contrary to legislative intent.

Second, in order to rebut such a court-created presumption, the burden would shift to the county to conduct further discovery of the accuracy of the information provided by petitioner. While on the facts of this case it may appear reasonable for the county to obtain from the taxpayer a simple indication whether the percentage rent clause was triggered, this burden-shifting directly contradicts the allocation of the burden of proof to the petitioner in a chapter 278 proceeding. In re Objections & Defenses to Real Property Taxes for the 1970 Assessment, 306 Minn. 184, 186-87, 235 N.W.2d 390, 392 (1975). Further, it would delay the process in other cases where insufficient but necessary information is provided that needs further clarification in order to be meaningful to the assessor. Therefore, we reject the invitation to modify the 60-Day Rule by reading such a presumption into it.4

In reaching this decision, we recognize that taxation is uniquely a function of the legislature, Wulff v. Tax Court of Appeals, 288 N.W.2d 221, 224 (Minn.1979), and the legislature has provided chapter 278 as the exclusive remedy for challenging the assessments upon which property taxes...

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