Kmiec v. Reagan

• Decision Date: 27 September 1977
• Docket Number: No. B-6873,B-6873
• Citation: Kmiec v. Reagan, 556 S.W.2d 567 (Tex. 1977)
• Parties: Emil E. KMIEC, Petitioner, v. Doyle REAGAN et ux., Respondents.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

Page 567

556 S.W.2d 567

Emil E. KMIEC, Petitioner, v. Doyle REAGAN et ux., Respondents.

No. B-6873.

Supreme Court of Texas.

Sept. 27, 1977.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 26, 1977.

Harris & Norman, Dona E. Harris, Franklin, Miller, Gann & Perdue, W. Mac Gann, Houston, for petitioner.

Edwards, Faulkner, Giles & Makowsky, John B. Faulkner, Waco, for respondents.

PER CURIAM.

The question here is the adequacy of the description of land, in a contract of sale, to meet the requirement of the Statute of Frauds.

Emil E. Kmiec and Esidor J. Brounkowski purchased approximately 300 acres of land and obtained an option to purchase an additional 493.5 acres in Robertson County, Texas, from Doyle Reagan and his wife. It is the option that is the subject of this suit. The contract of sale gave Kmiec and Brounkowski, who assigned all of his interest to Kmiec, the option to purchase the 493.5 additional acres owned by the Reagans at a price of $200 per acre. The land covered by the option provision was described as follows:

It is understood and agreed that Sellers also own other lands in said Marquez 11 Leagues Grant in Robertson County, Texas, the same lying south of and across said gravel County Road from the premises above described (referring to the 300 acres), said premises being described as containing 493.5 acres of land, more or less, being 150 acres of land, more or less, lying in the southeast corner of Section Number 31 of said 11 Leagues; 168.25 acres of land, more or less, and 168.25 acres of land, more of less, situated in the northeast and southeast corners of Section Number 42 of said 11 Leagues; and a tract of approximately seven (7) acres lying adjacent to said County Road between Steel's Creek and the west boundary line of Section Number 32 of said 11 Leagues.

Kmiec timely notified the Reagans of his desire to exercise the option to purchase the 493.5 acres. The Reagans, however, "disavowed" the option. Kmiec sued for specific performance. The trial court rendered judgment for Kmiec, ordering the Reagans to convey the 493.5 acres for $200 per acre, the price stated in the option provision.

The Court of Civil Appeals in Waco reversed and rendered a take nothing judgment. 551 S.W.2d 525. The Court held that since the option provision did not identify the land to be conveyed with reasonable certainty to satisfy the Statute of Frauds, Tex.Bus. & Comm.Code Ann. § 26.01 (1968), the option to purchase was unenforceable.

While the Statute of Frauds provides that all contracts for the sale of real estate must be in writing, no requirements for the writing, other than it be signed by the grantor, are set out. It has been left to the courts to determine the substance and form the written instrument must satisfy before it is enforceable. Insofar as the description of the property to be conveyed is concerned, the writing must furnish within itself the means or data by which that particular land may be identified with reasonable certainty. Morrow v. Shotwell, 477 S.W.2d 538 (Tex.1972); Wilson v. Fisher, 144 Tex. 53, 188 S.W.2d 150 (1945).

One clear method by which property can be described with reasonable certainty is set out in Pickett v....