Knape v. Livingston Oil Co.
| Citation | 193 Kan. 278,392 P.2d 842 |
| Decision Date | 06 June 1964 |
| Docket Number | No. 43726,43726 |
| Parties | Henry J. KNAPE, Appellee, v. LIVINGSTON OIL COMPANY, a Corporation, Appellant. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Kansas |
Syllabus by the Court
1. General findings in the nature of conclusions, if contradicted by specific detailed findings, cannot prevail, but are controlled by the must yield to such specific detailed findings of ultimate facts.
2. In an action to recover damages resulting from a collision of motor vehicles, the jury returned a general verdict for plaintiff and made special findings. Defendant appeals, contending the trial court erred in overruling its motion for judgment on the special findings. The record is examined and considered and, all as fully set forth in the opinion, it is held that a special finding absolving plaintiff of any negligence which was the proximate cause of the collision is general in character and in the nature of a conclusion, and, being contradicted by specific detailed findings, it therefore is controlled by and must yield to such other specific detailed findings of ultimate facts. Further held, the special findings are inconsistent with the general verdict and defendant's motion for judgment on the special findings notwithstanding the general verdict should have been sustained.
Jerry M. Ward, Great Bend, argued the cause, and Frank Hahn, Phillipsburg, and Tudor W. Hampton and Herb Rohleder, Great Bend, were with him on the brief for appellant.
William H. Stowell, Phillipsburg, and J. Eugene Balloun, Great Bend, argued the cause, and Doris Dixon Stowell, Phillipsburg, and H. Lee Turner, Great Bend, were with them on the brief for appellee.
This was an action to recover for personal injuries and property damage arising out of an automobile collision. Judgment was for plaintiff, and defendant has appealed.
The only question presented is whether the special findings of the jury compel a judgment for defendant notwithstanding the general verdict in favor of the plaintiff.
A brief summary of the facts is sufficient to show the picture.
At about 8:30 on the morning of June 21, 1960, plaintiff left home and proceeded to drive his car in an easterly direction over a dirt township road with which he was completely familiar. The road was about seventeen or eighteen feet wide and was quite hilly. He proceeded up and down three hills within about the first one and one-half miles. He then proceeded up a rather sharp hill which obstructed his vision to the east until he reached the crest. As he topped the crest he saw a pickup truck coming up the hill from the east. He applied his brakes and skidded in an easterly direction down the hill for approximately forty-three feet before the collision. Plaintiff's car was damaged and he sustained personal injuries. The driver of the pickup truck, which was owned by defendant company, died the next day as the result of the collision and without making any statement. The day was clear and the narrow dirt road was dry. Due to the nature and width of the road there were not two so-called well-defined traffic lanes. The evidence was to the effect that immediately prior to and at the time of the collision both vehicles were being driven in the middle of the road.
The jury returned a general verdict for plaintiff in the sum of $4,510.68, and also returned the following special findings:
'1. Do you find that the driver of Defendant's pickup truck negligently operated his vehicle in such a manner as to be a contributing cause of the accident in question?
'Answer: Yes.
'If you answer the preceding question 'yes' you need not answer questions 2 to 8 inclusive.
* * *
* * *
'Question No. 9: Where, with reference to the center of the road, were the left wheels of the plaintiff, Knape's car prior to the application of brakes by the plaintiff?
'Answer: Left (North) of center line.
'Question No. 10: At the time of impact, where with reference to the center line of the road were the left wheels of the plaintiff, Knape's car?
'Answer: Approximately on or to the left of the imaginary center line.
'Question No. 11: Where, with reference to the hill crest, did the collision or impact occur:
'Answer: East.
'Question No. 12: Was the plaintiff, Knape's, vision to the east obstructed by the hill crest:
'Answer: Yes.
'Question No. 13: At what rate of speed was plaintiff driving immediately prior to the time he first the pickup truck?
'Answer: 30 to 40 mi per hour.
'Question No. 14: What was the maximum safe rate of speed under the conditions existing for vehicles proceeding over the hill crest?
'Answer: 30 to 40 mi per hour.
'Question No. 15: Do you find the plaintiff guilty of any negligence which was the proximate cause of the collision?
'Answer: No.'
Defendant's motions for judgment on the special findings notwithstanding the general verdict, and for a new trial, being overruled--it has appealed.
Although nine specifications of error are asserted, in its brief and upon oral argument of the appeal defendant relies solely upon the proposition that the special findings compel a judgment in its favor, and that the trial court erred in overruling its motion for judgment notwithstanding the general verdict.
Before discussing the specific point in issue, attention is called to a few general rules applicable to questions relating to special findings and general verdicts:
A motion for judgment on the special findings notwithstanding the general verdict concedes, for the purpose of the motion, that the special findings are supported by the evidence. A general verdict imports a finding upon all of the issues in the case not inconsistent with the special findings. In considering special findings the court is not permitted to isolate one and ignore others, but all are to be considered together, and if one interpretation leads to inconsistency and another to harmony with the verdict, the latter is to be adopted. If special findings cannot be reconciled with the general verdict and are sufficiently full and complete in themselves, and are not inconsistent in themselves, judgment must follow the special findings.
It also is the rule that general findings in the nature of conclusions, if contradicted by special or detailed findings, cannot prevail, but are controlled by and must yield to such detailed findings of ultimate facts.
With respect to the last-mentioned rule, defendant contends that finding No. 15, which absolved plaintiff of any negligence which was the proximate cause of the collision, is general in nature and amounts to no more than a conclusion, and therefore is controlled by and must yield to the detailed specific findings Nos. 9, 10 and 12.
Plaintiff, on the other hand, contends that proximate cause always is a question for the jury; that it is not necessarily negligence as a matter of law to drive on the wrong side of the road, and that one may be negligent and still not be barred from recovery unless such negligence contributes to the collision as a proximate cause.
As abstract statements of law the correctness of the foregoing contentions of plaintiff is not to be disputed, but we believe that under the facts of this case and the specific findings of the jury such contentions are of no help to him.
In Harrison v. Travelers Mutual Cas. Co., above, each of four plaintiffs sought damages resulting from a rear-end collision between a car occupied by plaintiffs and a transport truck. The car was being driven by plaintiff Webb. The general verdict was for plaintiffs. In special finding No. 1 the jury found that the operators of defendants' truck were guilty of negligence. In finding No. 12 the jury absolved Webb of any negligence which was one of the proximate causes of the collision, and in finding No. 15 found that Webb had maintained a reasonable lookout for his own safety. Other detailed and more specific findings were made which established that Webb was guilty of negligence. In the appeal by defendants it was contended the court erred in overruling their motion for judgment on the special findings notwithstanding the general verdict for plaintiffs. Plaintiffs argued that finding No. 12, which absolved the driver of the car of any negligence which was one of the proximate causes of the collision, conclusively settled the matter in their favor. This court disagreed and said:
(156 Kan. p. 498, 134 P.2d p. 685.)
The opinion then pointed out and discussed specific findings which definitely established negligence on the part of Webb, the driver of the car, and it was held that defendants' motion for judgment on the special findings notwithstanding the general verdict for plaintiffs should...
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