Knapik v. United States
| Decision Date | 29 December 2020 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:19-cv-00185-TES |
| Parties | RODERIC KNAPIK, Individually and as Executor of the Estate of Michael Charles Knapik, Deceased, ROBIN LYNN KNAPIK, Individually, Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Georgia |
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO TRANSFER AND GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Michael Charles Knapik ("Mr. Knapik"), a Navy veteran, suffered from stage 4 cancer. He died August 25, 2015. During the two months preceding his death, Mr. Knapik underwent extensive medical testing related to his underlying cancer diagnosis, which is the subject of this action. In fact, Plaintiffs adamantly claim that the true subject of this action is the alleged failure on the part of treating physicians and medical staff at two Veterans Affairs medical centers to inform Mr. Knapik of his cancer diagnosis. Accordingly, Plaintiffs1 brought this wrongful death action against the United States of America, via its agency, the Department of Veterans Affairs under the Federal TortClaims Act (the "FTCA"). After the Government filed its Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 15], Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Transfer [Doc. 34] the case to another district. For the reasons discussed below, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs' Motion to Transfer and GRANTS the Government's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Before discussing the merits of the Government's Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court finds it necessary to first address Plaintiffs' Motion to Transfer this case to the Northern District of Georgia. [Doc. 34]. The Court can easily rule on this transfer motion without muddying the waters by wading into extensive factual background regarding the substantive facts surrounding Mr. Knapik's medical diagnostic testing and treatment at the VA.
However, in the interest of clarity, some background is necessary. To start, "motions to transfer are typically considered at an early stage in a case[.]" Jones v. Walgreen Co., 463 F. Supp. 2d 267, 271 (D. Conn. 2006). Yet, Plaintiffs bring their transfer motion seventeen months after initiating this action. Discovery has closed and the opposing party has moved for summary judgment. At this point in the proceedings, the Court certainly did not expect to find itself ruling on a transfer motion, especially one filed by the parties that initially chose the Middle District as the appropriate venue to file suit.
However, by way of explanation, Plaintiffs claim their sudden interest in transfer arises only "after response and reflection on the Court's Order to Show Cause[.]" [Doc. 34, p. 1]. Appropriately, it appears a brief background of that Order [Doc. 30] is necessary to understand the context in which Plaintiffs' Motion to Transfer arises.
As noted earlier, the Government moved for summary judgment after the close of discovery. In its Motion for Summary Judgment, the Government contended that all claims arising in this action, despite how they were otherwise characterized by Plaintiffs in their Complaint, were nonetheless classic medical malpractice claims. [Doc. 15-1, pp. 10-15]. And, this characterization is important, because the Government argued that any plaintiff alleging medical malpractice under Georgia law must provide expert testimony in support of such claims to survive summary judgment. [Id.]. Therefore, because Plaintiffs failed to produce the requisite expert testimony, the Government concluded that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all such claims asserted against it. [Id.].
As expected, Plaintiffs responded. See generally [Doc. 25]. However, quite unexpectedly, Plaintiffs responded by arguing that the claims the Government labeled as malpractice claims were really just garden-variety claims for ordinary negligence. [Id.at pp. 2, 4]. The Government responded in turn, and this back-and-forth between the parties as to how the Court should consider Plaintiffs' claims forced the Court toconsider the matter thoroughly.
First, the Court turned to Plaintiffs' Complaint, immediately noting the sparse detail2 provided in support of the following claims/theories of liability: (1) negligence; (2) omission; (3) personal injury; (4) wrongful death; and (5) medical malpractice. [Doc. 1, pp. 2, 6]. Second, the Court reviewed the evidence proffered during the nine-month discovery period in support of these claims and noted areas in deposition testimony where even the plaintiffs appeared to not understand the full extent of their claims.3And while the Court could identify a generalized failure-to-inform claim, it wanted to ensure that it was truly ruling on that claim alone. Wrapped up in this analysis, the Court was also well-aware that certain claims alleged against the VA, those implicating judicial review of veterans' benefits, are barred by the Veterans' Judicial Review Act (the "VJRA"). 38 U.S.C. § 511(a).4 Therefore, in an abundance of caution, the Court issued an Order to Show Cause, as to why subject-matter jurisdiction was appropriate in this action given the limitations imposed by the VJRA. See generally [Doc. 30].
In response, both parties assured the Court that it was not limited in any way by the VJRA so that the Court had the authority to rule on the underlying issue in this action—the failure-to-inform claim. ; [Doc. 39, p. 15 ()]. The Court also independently reviewed the supplemental evidence and caselaw provided by the Government in support of its argument for subject-matter jurisdiction, because parties cannot simply consent to subject-matter jurisdiction if it would otherwise be absent. See Ins. Corp. of Ir. Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982) (). Satisfied with its findings, the Court moved forward with reviewing the Government's Motion for Summary Judgment.
And yet, despite assuring the Court that they believed that it had jurisdiction to rule on this matter, Plaintiffs inexplicably moved to transfer this action "to cure jurisdictional and venue defects" raised by the Court in its Order to Show Cause. [Doc. 34, p. 1]. Curiously enough, the Court does not know of any such defects that may exist related to the VJRA discussion raised in its Order. But, the Court considers such discussion, if relevant, in relation to the merits of Plaintiffs' Motion to Transfer.
Plaintiffs seek to have their case transferred to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. [Doc. 34]. The Government opposes this Motion. See generally [Doc. 37]. Upon review of Plaintiffs' two-page Motion to Transfer, the Court finds no citation to any legal authority for which their transfer arguments may be grounded. See generally [Doc. 34]. Nor does the Court find any citation to the record to suggest some factual basis that supports Plaintiffs' sudden interest in transferring thiscase. See generally [id.]. Instead, Plaintiffs baldly assert that there are "jurisdictional and venue defects in the filing of the case in the Middle District[]" that warrant a transfer to the Northern District. [Doc. 34, p. 1]. In response, the Government first contends that "Plaintiffs do not explain what they mean by 'jurisdictional . . . defects.'" [Doc. 37, p. 2]. And the Court, upon review, similarly agrees. Plaintiffs provide no detail or explanation in support of their assertions, except to generally allege that such defects came to light upon reflection of the Court's Order to Show Cause. See generally [Doc. 34]. But any such alleged "jurisdictional . . . defects" have been addressed and resolved—to the extent there was a defect at all.5
The Court now addresses those alleged "venue defects" that warrant a transfer to the Northern District. Plaintiffs cite only the following reason as to why the Court should transfer this action:
[w]hile it is true that part of the actions or inactions happened in the Middle District and part of the actions or inactions happened in the Northern District, on the failure to inform of the [s]tage 4 [c]ancer [d]iagnosis, the actual diagnosis occurred in Atlanta[,] Georgia at the Atlanta VA.
In their reason for transfer, Plaintiffs admit that the Middle District is anappropriate venue because "part of the actions or inactions" at issue in this suit "happened in the Middle District[.]" [Id.]. And yet, Plaintiffs also argue they filed their Motion to Transfer to "cure . . . venue defects in the filing of the case in the Middle District." [Id.]. The actual Motion provides little to no detail as to what venue defects exist. Indeed, Plaintiffs never attempt to base their argument on any legal authority until the Government opposed their attempt to transfer the case. Compare [Doc. 34], with [Doc. 38]. Regardless, the Court considers Plaintiffs' Motion under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)—the statutory framework that grants district courts the authority to transfer venue.6
"For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought[.]" 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Appropriately, "the purpose of the section is toprevent the waste of time, energy and money and to protect litigants, witnesses and the public against unnecessary inconvenience and expense." Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 616 (1964) (citation omitted). In...
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