Knapp's Estate, In re

Decision Date11 August 1953
Citation149 Me. 130,99 A.2d 331
PartiesIn re KNAPP'S ESTATE. Appeal of KNAPP. Appeal of LEWISTON AND AUBURN SOC. FOR PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS.
CourtMaine Supreme Court

Seth May, Auburn, Frank T. Powers, Lewiston, John G. Marshall, Auburn, for Roy C. Knapp.

Berman & Berman and Benjamin L. Berman, Lewiston, for Lewiston & Auburn Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals.

Carl F. Getchell, Lewiston, for Maine State Society for the Protection of Animals.

Israel Alpren, Lewiston, Charles F. Adams, Auburn, for Oral E. Holmes, Admr., d. b. n. c. t. a., of Knapp Estate.

Ralph C. Masterman, Bar Harbor, for Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals of Hancock County.

Before MERRILL, C. J., and THAXTER, FELLOWS, WILLIAMSON and TIRRELL, JJ., and MURRAY, A. R. J.

FELLOWS, Justice.

These cases come to the Law Court on exceptions to the decision of a Justice of the Superior Court, sitting as the Supreme Court of Probate for Androscoggin County.

It appears that Fred E. Knapp died testate in 1944, leaving in the first clause of his will all his property to his wife, Lida A. Knapp, for her life, with power of disposal for her comfortable support and maintenance. Then follows the portions of his will that are the subject of this litigation:

'Second, Subject to the first clause of my will, I give, bequeath and devise ten per cent (10%) of the residue remaining at my wife's decease, to the Stanton Bird Club, a corporation existing in Lewiston, Androscoggin County, Maine.

'Third, Subject to the foregoing provisions of this will whatever may be remaining of the residue of my estate after Clauses 1 and 2 of this will are satisfied, I give, bequeath and devise the same, in equal shares, to the Salvation Army, Inc. and to the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals. The gifts to each of them are upon the express condition that each of the said beneficiaries shall use all of said fund which they may receive under this will wholly in Androscoggin County, Maine, each respectively for the support of their general work in said County.'

The will was admitted to Probate and administered upon, and on the filing of the final account by Oral E. Holmes, Admr. d. b. n. c. t. a., there remained an undistributed balance of $49,002.42. The Admr. d. b. n. c. t. a. then filed in the Probate Court his petition for authority to distribute this residue, under the third clause in the will. On November 28, 1947, the Judge of Probate made a decree ordering this balance (less a sum of $3.00 for future expenses) paid as follows: $24,499.71 to 'Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals' and $24,499.71 to 'Salvation Army, Inc.' The Admr. d. b. n. c. t. a. later filed a distribution account that showed that he had paid to 'The Salvation Army, $24,499.71' and Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, $24,499.71' as ordered. This distribution account was allowed in 1948, although the voucher for the payment to the 'Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals' read 'Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, by William M. Ingraham, Pres. Me. State Society for the Protection of Animals.'

The will gave nothing to the testator's brother Roy C. Knapp, who is the appellant and exceptant in these proceedings. The will gave nothing to any blood relative. No question is raised as to the bequests and payments to the Stanton Bird Club or to the Salvation Army, but the payment of $24,499.71 by the administrator to the Maine State Society for the Protection of Animals, where the will left one-half of the residue to the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, is strenuously objected to as a fraud upon the Court, and is the subject of this controversy.

The widow was named executrix of the will but she died about four months after the testator, and was succeeded by her sister's husband Oral E. Holmes, as administrator of goods not administered upon with the will annexed.

The administrator was uncertain as to the identity of the 'Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals.' The only society having nearly such a name was 'The Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals of Hancock County, Maine' at Bar Harbor, and a check for one-half the residue was offered to it, but was declined, probably because its charter authorized work in Hancock County, and the will in this pending case provides that testator's money is to be used in Androscoggin County.

Counsel for the administrator then corresponded with the Maine State Society for the Protection of Animals at Portland, and concluded that this Society for the Protection of Animals was the society intended by the testator. The money was then paid to the Maine State Society for the Protection of Animals. Payment was made to its president William M. Ingraham who signed the voucher in the name of 'Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals,' as president of the 'Maine State Society for the Protection of Animals.'

The distribution account was filed in January 1948, and allowed, and showed payment according to the terms of the order of distribution and according to the terms of the will.

In 1949, more than a year after the distribution account was allowed, the testator's brother Roy C. Knapp filed in the Probate Court his petition to revoke the original decree allowing the will, on the ground that the will had not been proved. This petition was denied by the Probate Court and denied on appeal. Exceptions were overruled by the Law Court in Re Estate of Knapp, Appellant, 145 Me. 189, 74 A.2d 217.

Later, in January 1951, Roy C. Knapp filed this petition, which commenced the pending litigation, alleging that the bequest to the 'Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals' in paragraph third of the will contains a description of the Society at Bar Harbor; that it is the only society within the terms of the will; that this society having declined the gift, the money descends as intestate property and should be ordered paid to the petitioner as next of kin; that payment to the Maine State Society for the Protection of Animals was erroneous, and that the statement in the distribution account to the effect that the money was paid to the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals when actually paid to the Maine State Society for Protection of Animals was 'false and untrue' and 'a fraud' on the Probate Court. The petitioner, Roy C. Knapp, therefore, asked the Probate Court to reopen 'said order of distribution and said distribution account,' and to order and require the administrator to pay the petitioner $24,499.71 and to issue a new order of distribution in favor of himself in the sum of $24,499.71.

The Lewiston and Auburn Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals was a local body which about 1903 passed out of useful existence by the death of all its members. It had disintegrated but was apparently continued, or reorganized, as an organization known as 'Androscoggin County Humane Society.' The Lewiston and Auburn Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, however, was lately revived and petitioned for leave to intervene, and claimed to be the legatee intended by the testator.

After hearing on this petition to reopen, in the Probate Court the Judge of Probate presumptively found no fraud had been practiced; that the payment to the Maine State Society for the Protection of Animals was a correct payment, and that this Society was the intended legatee. The decree of the Probate Court denied the Knapp petition. On appeal, with the Superior Court Justice sitting as the Supreme Court of Probate, the decree of the Probate Court was affirmed. The pending exceptions were taken by Roy C. Knapp and the Lewiston and Auburn Society for the Protection of Animals.

The presiding Justice in the Supreme Court of Probate found no fraud or imposition on the Probate Court, and found that the words in the will, 'Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals,' did not convey a plain meaning; that extrinsic evidence was admissible without preliminary resort to equity; that the will and the evidence eliminated the Bar Harbor Society; and that the evidence failed to place the Lewiston and Auburn and other Androscoggin County bodies 'in the ken or in the consciousness of the testator;' that the testator contemplated not a local body but one with a broader area and base which should use the legacy wholly in Androscoggin County; that there was sufficient evidence to support the contention that testator knew of the existence of the Maine State Society and of its purposes and activities and that he sympathized with its objects; that the latter has a statewide range including Androscoggin County, and that it operated in 1935 and in 1944 and is still active, and is the only society conforming to the elements of description in paragraph third of the will, and is therefore entitled to the legacy. The presiding Justice ruled that extrinsic evidence was admissible under the circumstances to identify a devisee or legatee, and 'beneficient bequests are not to be defeated by misnomers.' The Justice also ruled that the testimony of witnesses is admissible concerning declarations of the testator because of doubt or latent ambiguity.

The bills of exceptions of Roy C. Knapp and Lewiston and Auburn Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals are more or less similar, and with petitions, decrees, and evidence made a part, (differing according to their particular contentions) contain exceptions to the effect that (1) there was a fraud perpetrated upon the Court because of voucher showing payment to Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, and there is no sufficient legal evidence to sustain the finding and ruling that the Maine State Society for the Protection of Animals was the society intended by Fred E. Knapp testator; (2) that the Court erred in admitting in evidence the deposition of one Ernest H. Dyer; (3) that the Court...

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