Knapp v. Knapp

• Decision Date: 05 June 1893
• Citation: 59 F. 641
• Parties: KNAPP v. KNAPP.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Alaska

59 F. 641

KNAPP v. KNAPP.

United States District Court, District of Alaska.

June 5, 1893

C. S Johnson, for plaintiff.

Lyman E. Knapp, for defendant.

TRUITT District Judge.

This is an action at law for debt, and is based on a decree of said superior court, which is set out in haec verba in the complaint, as follows:

'In the Superior Court of the State of Washington for the County of Skagit.

'George E. Knapp, Plaintiff, vs. Gertrude Knapp Defendant. (No. 1,538.)

'Decree.

'On this 1st day of February, 1893, this cause having been tried upon the issues raised by the pleadings, and after such trial the court having made and filed its findings of facts and conclusions of law, whereby it appears: First. That both parties to this cause are entitled to a decree of divorce. Second. That the defendant is entitled to the custody of the child, Matilda, until it should arrive at the age of five (5) years, and thereafter until the further order of the court. Third. That plaintiff assign to the defendant a certain mortgage on land in Lincoln county, Wash., and coupon note collateral thereto, guarantied by the Vermont Loan &amp Trust Company, of the face value of five hundred dollars, and that the defendant also have decree for an additional sum of three hundred ($300) dollars, and that the plaintiff pay the sum of ten ($10) dollars per month for the support of said child: Now, therefore, it is hereby adjudged and decree that a divorce from the bonds of matrimony be, and the same hereby is, granted to both parties; and that the marriage contract existing between them be, and the same hereby is, dissolved as to both parties. (2) That the defendant have the care and custody of the child, Matilda, until it shall arrive at the age of five (5) years, and thereafter until the further order of the court. (3) It is further decreed that the plaintiff assign to the defendant the coupon note, and collateral mortgage thereto on lands in Lincoln county, Wash., and guarantied by the Vermont Loan & Trust Company, of the face value of five hundred dollars. (4) It is further decree that the defendant have and recover from the plaintiff an additional sum of three hundred ($300) dollars, and that defendant have execution therefor. (5) It is further decreed that the plaintiff pay the defendant, in monthly installments, and payable on the first of each and every month, the sum of ten ($10.00) dollars, for the support and maintenance of said child, commencing on the 1st day of March next, and that defendant have execution therefor. (6) It is further decreed that each party pay his or her own costs of this suit.

'Henry McBride, Judge.'

The complaint, after setting out this decree, then states that the plaintiff has duly complied with the directions thereof as to assigning to defendant the note and mortgage therein mentioned, but has wholly failed and neglected to pay said $300, or any part thereof, to plaintiff, and has failed to pay, or make provision for payment of, said sum of $10 per month, as provided in said decree; that said sum of $300 is now due and owing, together with interest thereon from the 1st day of February, 1893. The complaint further alleges 'that before the hearing on this complaint can be had, to wit, on the 1st day of March, 1893, the first of said monthly payments of $10 will be due, and that on the 1st day of each succeeding month a payment of $10 will be due from defendant to plaintiff.' It also alleges that said superior court had the jurisdiction and power to make said decree, and that the same is in full force and effect, and has never been reversed, satisfied, or otherwise vacated. The prayer is for judgment for the sum of $300, with legal interest since February 1, 1893, and for the further sum of $10 per month, to be paid on the 1st day of each and every month, beginning on the 1st day of March, 1893, so long as said decree of said superior court shall remain in force, and for the costs and disbursements of the action. This complaint was filed on the 21st day of February, 1893, and the defendant has filed a demurrer thereto, in which the following grounds therefor are specified: (1) That the court has no jurisdiction of the person or subject-matter of the action; and (2) that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

The question of jurisdiction of the court that rendered the decree upon which this action is based is not raised by this demurrer, for that can only be done by a plea in the way of an answer. This court has jurisdiction of the person of the defendant, because he has not only been regularly served with process, but has also appeared in the case.

The only question, then, which could be raised by this demurrer, and the only question presented in arguing it, is as to whether or not a complaint in an action at law for debt, based upon a decree of a court of chancery in a state court of general jurisdiction for a specific amount of money, states a cause of action in a federal court in another state or territory. Upon first approaching this question, I was somewhat surprised to find that Mr. Bishop, in his very learned work on Marriage and Divorce, in treating of it, says, 'The doctrine is believed to be general, that an action at law will not lie for money decreed in a court of equity.' 2 Bish. Mar. & Div. § 499. But the case of Hugh v. Higgs, 8 Wheat. 697, to which he refers as authority, has been overruled in Pennington v. Gibson, 16 How. 65, where it is expressly held that in all cases where an action of debt can be maintained upon a judgment at law, to recover a sum of money awarded by such judgment, the like action may be maintained upon a decree in equity, provided it is for a specific amount, and the records of the court are of equal dignity and binding obligation. The other cases cited are from the courts of Massachusetts, and I have not been able to examine them; but under the clear statement of the law on the subject in Pennington v. Gibson, supra, which is reaffirmed in Nations v. Johnson, 24 How. 203, I consider the question settled in the federal courts. I do not, therefore, feel called upon to investigate a line of decisions made by a state court, which, if not modified or overruled by the court that made them, are certainly at variance with most of the other state courts, as well as the federal courts; for Black, in his very exhaustive treatise on the Law of Judgments, (volume 2, § 962,) gives the following statement and rule of law:

'The English law has always sanctioned the maintenance of actions at law upon decrees in chancery rendered in foreign countries, or in the colonies, when such decrees were merely for the

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