Knapp v. Kremer

• Decision Date: 25 January 1927
• Citation: Knapp v. Kremer, 103 N.J.L. 227, 135 A. 771 (N.J. 1927)
• Docket Number: 234
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court
• Parties: EDGAR A. KNAPP, PROSECUTOR, v. WARD KREMER, JUDGE OF THE DISTRICT COURT, ET AL., DEFENDANTS

135 A. 771

KNAPP

v. KREMER, Judge, et al.

No. 224.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Jan. 25, 1927.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Certiorari to District Court, Monmouth County.

Certiorari by Edgar A. Knapp against Ward Kremer, Judge of the District Court, to review a judgment of nonsuit in an action of replevin by prosecutor against one Antick. Proceedings and judgment set aside.

Argued October term, 1926, before PARKER, BLACK, and CAMPBELL.

Scott Scammell, of Trenton, for the prosecutor.

PARKER, J. The writ is directed to the proceedings and alleged judgment in the district court of the First judicial district of the county of Monmouth, in a case arising under the statute commonly called the Garage Keepers' Lien Act, P. L. 1915, p. 556, as amended by P. L. 1922, p. 401, P. L. 1924, p. 424, and P. L. 1925, p. 96.

Knapp, the prosecutor, was the owner of a motor ear, on which one Antick claimed a lien for repairs amounting to $15. Knapp disputed the bill, and Antick seized the car in virtue of the powers conferred by the statute. Knapp, acting under advice of counsel, tendered $8 as the amount to which he considered Antick justly entitled, and, the latter having refused to accept that amount and deliver the car, Knapp, following the procedure laid down in section 2 of the statute as amended, deposited with the clerk of the district court the amount claimed, plus $10 fixed by the statute to cover costs, which entitled him to the statutory writ of replevin to obtain possession of the car. That writ issued and the car was taken by the officer and delivered to Knapp.

So far, as it seems, the procedure laid down in the statute was followed; from this point, it was not. That procedure is purely statutory, and not according to the course of the common law. From this stage the statute seems to treat further steps as an action brought by the lien claimant against the actor in the writ of replevin, whom it calls the "defendant." He is not required, in the first instance, to move further against the lien claimant; but this latter, within 30 days after the execution (or perhaps after the issue) of the writ of replevin, shall "file his state of demand or complaint with the said clerk, showing the amount claimed by him," and in such case the court fixes a date for trial and "gives judgment according to the facts." "If no action is brought within thirty days, or judgment should go for defendant (the actor in the writ), the court may order the return of the money. * * *" Nothing is said about a jury; so far as appears, none is contemplated. The proceeding is not limited to district courts, but may be instituted in "any court of competent jurisdiction in the county."

Antick, the lien claimant, did not file any complaint or state of demand within 30 days, or at all. Hence, at the expiration of that time, Knapp was entitled to an order refunding his money; but he discovered that the district court, apparently overlooking the statutory procedure, had treated the matter as an ordinary replevin suit, and entered up a judgment of nonsuit against Knapp for failure to file a state of demand which he was under no duty whatever to file. This was, of course, clearly erroneous, and if now properly reviewed, should be reversed and set aside. Counsel for prosecutor urges that certiorari is the proper remedy, and has devoted a good part of his brief to substantiating that view. There is no argument or brief in reply.

We think that certiorari is the proper remedy, but on somewhat broader grounds that those suggested in the brief, which are restricted to the review of a procedure in a district court. Even in that narrow aspect, it was held by this court in Marcus v. Graver, 71 N. J. Law, 95, 58 A. 564, that the exclusiveness of appeal to the circuit court, provided by section 89 et seq. of the District Court Act of 1898 (P. L. 591 [2 Comp. St. 1910, p. 1983]), and held unconstitutional in Green V. Heritage, 64 N. J. Law, 567, 46 A. 634, was inapplicable to appeals under the act of 1902 (P. L. p. 565 [2 Comp. St. 1910, pp. 2016, 2017, §§ 213a-213e]), and that said last act was in no way in derogation of the general powers of the Supreme Court to...