Knapp v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Railway Company, a Corporation

• Decision Date: 23 February 1916
• Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

156 N.W. 1019

33 N.D. 291

D. C. KNAPP v. MINNEAPOLIS, ST. PAUL & SAULT STE. MARIE RAILWAY COMPANY, a Corporation

Supreme Court of North Dakota

February 23, 1916

Action to recover on a contract for hauling freight, Buttz, J Appeal from the District Court of Burke County from an order setting aside a judgment and granting a new trial after a verdict had been directed for the defendant. Defendant appeals.

Order granting new trial affirmed.

Affirmed.

Palda Aaker, & Greene (Alfred H. Bright and John L. Erdall, of counsel), for appellant.

The agreed freight rate from Kenmare to Minnesota points was 17 cents per 100 pounds. The rate from the lake points was 22 cents per 100 pounds. The alleged contract with the plaintiff for an allowance of 5 cents per bushel for hauling from the lake points to Kenmare amounts to a rebate of 2 cents per 100 pounds, from the established schedule of tariffs, and is in violation of the interstate commerce act as amended. 34 Stat. at L. 587, chap. 3591, Comp. Stat. 1913, § 8597; F Stat. Anno. 1909 Supp. pp. 262, 263; N.D. Codes, §§ 5870, 5874, 5878 and 5922.

George A. Gilmore and F. B. Lambert, for respondent.

A station agent for a railroad company, authorized to sell and collect for passenger tickets, and to receive and deliver freight and to collect for freight shipments, is sufficient of a managing agent within the meaning of the statute, to make service of summons upon him, in a civil action against a railroad company, service upon such corporation. Brown v Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 12 N.D. 61, 102 Am. St. Rep. 564, 95 N.W. 153, 14 Am. Neg. Rep. 169; Porter v. Chicago & N.W. R. Co. 1 Neb. 14; American Exp. Co. v. Johnson, 17 Ohio St. 641; Foster v. Charles Betcher Lumber Co. 5 S.D. 57, 23 L.R.A. 490, 99 Am. St. Rep. 859, 58 N.W. 9.

"Managing agent" should be construed to include an agent of a railroad company described as its "general passenger agent, etc." Tuchband v. Chicago & A. R. Co. 115 N.Y. 437, 22 N.E. 360; Palmer v. Chicago Herald Co. 70 F. 888; Palmer v. Pennsylvania, 35 Hun, 369; Klopp v. Creston City Guarantee Waterworks Co. 34 Neb. 808, 33 Am. St. Rep. 666, 52 N.W. 819; Blanc v. Paymaster Min. Co. 95 Cal. 524, 29 Am. St. Rep. 157, 30 P. 765; Hampson v. Weare, 4 Iowa 13, 66 Am. Dec. 121.

Such agent may, therefore, be called by the adverse party for cross-examination under the statute, and the corporation is bound by his testimony. Comp. Laws 1913, §§ 7863, 7870.

In order to urge the illegality of a contract when such illegality does not appear either upon its face or in the plaintiff's evidence necessary to prove the same, the defendant must specifically allege such illegality. Neither of these conditions appeared in this case, and hence it was error to direct a verdict on such ground. Frankel v. Hillier, 16 N.D. 387, 113 N.W. 1067, 15 Ann. Cas. 265.

Where a party claims a privilege under a statute, it is necessary to plead and prove that the party comes under such statute. Bullard v. Northern P. R. Co. 10 Mont. 168, 11 L.R.A. 246, 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 536, 25 P. 120.

Agency is a question of fact. Corey v. Hunter, 10 N.D. 5, 84 N.W. 570.

Whether the relation of principal and agent exists is a question of fact for the jury. 2 Thomp. Trials, 2d ed. §§ 1368, 1377; Reid v. Kellogg, 8 S.D. 596, 67 N.W. 687.

A principal cannot take the benefits and repudiate an unauthorized agency. Wyckoff v. Johnson, 2 S.D. 91, 48 N.W. 837; Union Trust Co. v. Phillips, 7 S.D. 225, 63 N.W. 903.

Ratification of part of an individual transaction is a ratification of the whole. Comp. Laws 1913, § 5764.

The freight charge here questioned was just and reasonable, and this is all the law demands. Fed. Stat. Anno. 1909 Supp. p. 266, 34 Stat. at L. 589, chap. 3591.

But no one shall be given an undue preference. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 162 U.S. 184, 40 L.Ed. 935, 5 Inters. Com. Rep. 391, 16 S.Ct. 700; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. 145 U.S. 263, 36 L.Ed. 699, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 92, 12 S.Ct. 844.

The defense of ultra vires cannot be raised unless the act is directly prohibited by law, and especially when the corporation has accepted and retained the benefits of its contract. Tourtelot v. Whithed, 9 N.D. 467, 84 N.W. 8; Hunt v. Northwestern Mortg. Trust Co. 16 S.D. 241, 92 N.W. 23.

In cases of doubt, where relief is sought in the interest of the carrier, the construction will be against the carrier. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 73 F. 409, citing Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 192, 43 F. 51.

The rate must be not only reasonable, but it must be equal and uniform, taking into consideration the time, kind, and circumstances of the transaction. The object of the statute is to prevent one shipper from getting the advantage over his competitor in the matter of rates only where they both make substantially a like offering to the carrier. United States v. Hanley, 71 F. 673.

The burden of proof rests upon the party alleging the existence of an undue preference or advantage. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 192, 43 F. 37; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 73 F. 409; Denaby Main Colliery Co. v. Manchester, S. & L. R. Co. L. R. 11 App. Cas. 97, 55 L. J. Q. B. N. S. 181, 54 L. T. N. S. 1, 50 J. P. 340, 6 Eng. Ry. & C. Traffic Cas. 133.

The burden of proof is upon the complaining carrier to show a discrimination within the statute. Oregon Short Line & U. N. R. Co. v. Northern P. R. Co. 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 249, 51 F. 465; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 73 F. 409;

It has been held that, in an action for damages for charging unreasonable rates, the published schedule rate is conclusively taken as a reasonable rate, and if no more is charged, there can be no recovery. Van Patten v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 81 F. 545; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Alabama Midland R. Co. 168 U.S. 169, 42 L.Ed. 423, 18 S.Ct. 45.

Adequate consideration for reduced rates prevents such rates from constituting unjust discrimination. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. 145 U.S. 281, 36 L.Ed. 705, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 92, 12 S.Ct. 844; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Texas & P. R. Co. 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 114, 52 F. 187.

A rebate, drawback, or special rate is not of itself unjust discrimination; for it does not necessarily follow that a like rebate, drawback, or special rate has not been extended to all the patrons of the carrier. United States v. Hanley, 71 F. 673; United States ex rel. Morris v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 617, 40 F. 101.

The law does not prohibit all discrimination, but only such as is undue or unreasonable, under the circumstances of the case. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Texas & P. R. Co. supra; Oregon Short Line & U. N. R. Co. v. Northern P. R. Co. 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 249, 51 F. 465, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 718, 9 C. C. A. 409, 15 U.S. App. 479, 61 F. 158; Little Rock & M. R. Co. v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 537, 59 F. 402; Little Rock & M. R. Co. v. St. Louis Southwestern R. Co. 26 L.R.A. 192, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 854, 11 C. C. A. 417, 27 U.S. App. 380, 63 F. 775; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Alabama Midland R. Co. 5 Inters. Com. Rep. 308, 69 F. 227; United States ex rel. Coffman v. Norfolk & W. R. Co. 109 F. 836; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Alabama Midland R. Co. 168 U.S. 170, 42 L.Ed. 424, 18 S.Ct. 45, (C. C. A.) 5 Inters. Com. Rep. 685, 21 C. C. A. 51, 41 U.S. App. 453, 74 F. 715; Denaby Main Colliery Co. v. Manchester, S. & L. R. Co. (1880) 3 Eng. Ry. & C. Traffic Cas. 426; Phipps v. London & N.W. R. Co. [1892] 2 Q. B. 229, 61 L. J. Q. B. N. S. 379, 66 L. T. N. S. 721, 8 Eng. Ry. & C. Traffic Cas. 83; Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 162 U.S. 184, 40 L.Ed. 935, 5 Inters. Com. Rep. 391, 16 S.Ct. 700; Texas & P. R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 162 U.S. 197, 40 L.Ed. 940, 5 Inters. Com. Rep. 405, 16 S.Ct. 666; Palmer v. London & S.W. R. Co. L. R. 1 C. P. 593, 35 L. J. C. P. N. S. 289, 12 Jur. N. S. 926, 15 L. T. N. S. 159, 15 Week. Rep. 11; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 73 F. 409; United States v. Tozer, 39 F. 369.

A carrier may protect itself against physical disadvantages. Detroit, G. H. & M. R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 21 C. C. A. 103, 43 U.S. App. 308, 74 F. 832, affirmed on other points in 167 U.S. 644, 42 L.Ed. 309, 17 S.Ct. 986; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Chicago G. W. R. Co. 209 U.S. 108, 52 L.Ed. 705, 28 S.Ct. 493.

There is no power vested to declare an established or proposed rate unreasonable, or enjoin its enforcement prior to the decision of the Commission. Potlatch Lumber Co. v. Spokane Falls & N. R. Co. 157 F. 588; Great Northern R. Co. v. Kalispell Lumber Co. 91 C. C. A. 63, 165 F. 25; Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Macon Grocery Co. 92 C. C. A. 114, 166 F. 206; Meeker v. Lehigh Valley R. Co. 162 F. 354; Southern R. Co. v. Tift, 206 U.S. 428, 51 L.Ed. 1124, 27 S.Ct. 709, 11 Ann. Cas. 846.

The Interstate Commerce Commission has exclusive jurisdiction as to the reasonableness of rates or charges. Columbus Iron & S. Co. v. Kanawha & M. R. Co. 171 F. 713; Houston Coal & Coke Co. v. Norfolk & W. R. Co. 171 F. 723, 101 C. C. A. 626, 178 F. 266; Langdon v. Pennsylvania R Co. 194 F. 486; L. Starks Co. v. Grand Rapids & I. R. Co. 165 Mich. 642, 131 N.W. 143; Texas & P. R. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co. 204 U.S. 426, 51 L.Ed. 553, 27 S.Ct. 350, 9 Ann. Cas. 1075; Meeker v. Lehigh Valley R. Co. 162 F. 354; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Diffenbaugh, 222 U.S. 42, 56 L.Ed. 83, 32 S.Ct. 22; ...