Knapp v. State ex rel. Dept. of Prisons
Decision Date | 30 March 1995 |
Docket Number | No. 25262,25262 |
Citation | 892 P.2d 575,111 Nev. 420 |
Parties | William M. KNAPP; State of Nevada, ex rel., its Department of Personnel, Appellants, v. STATE of Nevada, ex rel., its DEPARTMENT OF PRISONS, Respondent. |
Court | Nevada Supreme Court |
Norah Ann McCoy, Legal Counsel, Carson City, for appellants.
Frankie Sue Del Papa, Atty. Gen., and George H. Taylor, Deputy Atty. Gen., Carson City, for respondent.
Appellant William M. Knapp worked as a psychologist for respondent Department of Prisons (DOP) at Northern Nevada Correctional Center (NNCC). DOP fired him for misconduct. A hearing officer of the Nevada State Personnel Commission reversed his dismissal. The district court reversed the hearing officer's decision. We now reverse the district court's order for failure to review the officer's decision under the proper standard.
Knapp worked as a forensic evaluator, reporting to the Parole Board on inmates' potential for recidivism. He also provided substance abuse education for inmates and was on stand-by for crisis intervention.
In January, 1991, Knapp formed Wild West Corporation with the aim of establishing a brothel, saloon, and dance hall. Knapp obtained a business license in Lyon County, began to advertise his venture, and sought to raise money for it. He employed inmates at NNCC through a hobby craft program to type mailing labels and stuff envelopes with flyers advertising his venture and offering coupons to the brothel at a discount. In April, 1991, Knapp's efforts and his employment with DOP were reported in newspapers. DOP dismissed Knapp in May, 1991, for a number of violations of administrative rules and regulations.
Knapp appealed to the Nevada State Personnel Commission. Evidence was presented at a proceeding before a hearing officer in May, 1992. Knapp showed that he had followed established procedures in obtaining inmate labor and properly paid for it. The record also established that confusion existed among prison staff as to exactly what activities were allowed as hobby craft, but that inmates had performed clerical work before similar to that done for Knapp. Knapp also testified that he had discussed his brothel scheme in detail with one of his prison supervisors, but had not sought official approval for it because he assumed that such approval was not necessary until he actually commenced operations.
In a decision issued in October, 1992, the hearing officer found that DOP proved only two violations, reversed Knapp's dismissal, and remanded the matter to DOP for imposition of less severe discipline. DOP appealed to the district court, which heard oral arguments in October, 1993. In November, 1993, the court adopted the hearing officer's findings and conclusions but reversed the officer's determination that dismissal was too severe and ordered that Knapp's dismissal be reimposed. Knapp appealed to this court.
Gandy v. State ex rel. Div. Investigation, 96 Nev. 281, 282, 607 P.2d 581, 582 (1980). "Although the district court may decide pure legal questions without deference to an agency determination, an agency's conclusions of law which are closely related to the agency's view of the facts are entitled to deference and should not be disturbed if they are supported by substantial evidence." State Industrial Insurance System v. Khweiss, 108 Nev. 123, 126, 825 P.2d 218, 220 (1992); see also NRS 233B.135(3). The district court correctly cited this deferential standard of review but erroneously failed to follow it in evaluating the hearing officer's decision.
The district court erred in failing to treat the hearing officer's decision as an agency determination. Dredge v. State ex rel. Dep't Prisons, 105 Nev. 39, 43, 769 P.2d 56, 58 (1989).
The district judge adopted the hearing officer's findings of fact and accepted his conclusions as to the offenses proven, but reversed the officer's reversal of Knapp's dismissal. The judge erroneously assumed that DOP's decision to fire Knapp was entitled to deference and concluded that the hearing officer had acted arbitrarily and capriciously by substituting his judgment for DOP's.
Generally, a hearing officer does not defer to the appointing authority's decision. A hearing officer's task is to determine whether there is evidence showing that a dismissal would serve the good of the public service. Dredge, 105 Nev. at 42, 769 P.2d at 58 (citing NRS 284.385(1)(a)). A hearing officer "determine[s] the reasonableness" of a dismissal, demotion, or suspension. NRS 284.390(1). "The hearing officer shall make no assumptions of innocence or guilt but shall be guided in his decision by the weight of the evidence as it appears to him at the hearing." NAC 284.798. Justice Springer noted in his dissent in...
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