Knapp v. United States
| Decision Date | 25 August 2022 |
| Docket Number | 21-1523 |
| Parties | CHRISTINA KNAPP; DOUGLAS KNAPP, Appellants v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
CHRISTINA KNAPP; DOUGLAS KNAPP, Appellants
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
No. 21-1523
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit
August 25, 2022
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
Argued on May 4, 2022
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (D.C. No. 3-20-cv-00694) Honorable Malachy E. Mannion, District Judge
Edwin A. Abrahamsen, Sr., Esq.
Kevin M. Conaboy, Esq. [ARGUED]
Abrahamsen Conaboy & Abrahamsen
Counsel for Appellants
Timothy S. Judge, Esq.
Office of United States Attorney for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
Dana Kaersvang, Esq. [ARGUED]
United States Department of Justice
Counsel for Appellees
Before: GREENAWAY, JR., KRAUSE, and PHIPPS, Circuit Judges
OPINION [*]
GREENAWAY, JR., CIRCUIT JUDGE
I. Introduction
Like rules of a board game, procedural rules established by law have underlying purposes. These rules safeguard objectives; provide for the orderly administration of justice; ensure predictability; facilitate strategic thinking; and, very often, serve as a best attempt to obtain consistent results. Yet, unlike a board game-where deviating from the rules is frequently inconsequential-straying from a procedural rule established by law can be ruinous. This possibility of ruin looms large even in Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") cases, where "the risk that a lawyer will be unable to understand the exhaustion requirement is virtually nonexistent." McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993).
Justice Stevens, who wrote the above-quoted language from McNeil, quite possibly never imagined the facts of this case. These facts involve a unique state mechanism for commencing an action, and a narrowly-drawn provision of the FTCA that may save an otherwise time-barred suit. The viability of the underlying action ultimately hinges on whether the Westfall Savings Clause, that narrowly-drawn provision of the FTCA, can save Appellants' suit. We think that it cannot. As a result, we shall affirm the District Court's ruling.
II. Background a. Factual Background
Federally-qualified health centers ("FQHC") are community-based health care providers that receive funding from the federal government to provide services in underserved areas throughout the United States.[1] On May 14, 2015, Appellant Christina Knapp ("Appellant" or "Knapp") went to the Pike County Family Health Center (the "Health Center"), an FQHC in Hawley, Pennsylvania. There, she sought treatment for a red rash on her forehead and hairline, as well as stiffness in her jaw.[2] Certified
Registered Nurse Practitioner Eileen Arenson attended to Knapp and recorded that Knapp was experiencing pain in her face and scalp, which were believed to be from bug bites and a tick found embedded in her toe the prior week. Arenson diagnosed Knapp with Lyme Disease and prescribed her Doxycycline for 21 days. They scheduled a follow-up appointment for four weeks later.
About one week after this initial visit, Knapp developed a rash on her palms and thumb. A few days later, Knapp and her husband returned to the Health Center, but were told by the receptionist that no one could see her and Arenson would only be in the office the following day. Later that evening, Knapp contacted the Health Center's on-call doctor, who advised her to visit the emergency room if the rash was still present in the morning. The doctor speculated that the cause could be Rocky Mountain Spotted Fever, but also advised Knapp to immediately stop taking the Doxycycline in case it was a reaction to the drug. Knapp stopped taking the medication.
The next day, Knapp contacted the Health Center to schedule an appointment with Arenson that same morning to address the persistent rash. By the appointment, Knapp had developed a fever, chills, aches, and bloodshot eyes in addition to the rash. Knapp and her husband alerted Arenson to the possibility of Rocky Mountain Spotted Fever. Arenson stated that she was not familiar with the disease, and advised Knapp to resume the Doxycycline for the remainder of the prescription. That day, the Health Center also did blood work for Rocky Mountain Spotted Fever and Lyme Disease. Both tests were negative.
Knapp's condition continued to worsen, and she soon became very weak and found it difficult to eat or drink. She also fainted in the shower, causing a bruise and swelling. Knapp ended the medication regimen on June 3, 2015, then returned to the Health Center the next day for an appointment with Arenson. Knapp's rash had spread to her neck and chest. Arenson told Knapp that she suspected the issue was myalgia and ordered more blood work. Within a week of the follow-up session, Knapp's condition deteriorated, and she went to the emergency room. Once there, an emergency room physician ordered tests for Lyme Disease and a chest x-ray before discharging her with directions to drink extra fluids and eat regularly.
A week after this discharge, Knapp continued to feel ill and unable to consume food or fluids. She was admitted to the hospital to receive IV treatment and begin medication for other suspected causes. Knapp was eventually told that she may be suffering from rheumatoid arthritis and was advised to obtain a new family physician. Knapp, still ill, returned to the Health Center to see a rheumatologist, who prescribed more medication.
After seeing this rheumatologist, Knapp went to another health center whose physician suggested several other possible causes and advised that she take new medication. Following additional visits to this new health center and a recommendation to seek treatment at another area hospital, Knapp learned on July 15, 2015 that she was suffering from microscopic polyangiitis and stage 3 chronic kidney disease caused by the Doxycycline prescribed by Arenson.
b. Procedural History
i. Initial State Action: The Writ of Summons
On May 26, 2017, Knapp and her husband ("Appellants") filed a praecipe for a writ of summons ("writ of summons") in the Court of Common Pleas of Pike County against the Health Center and Arenson. Pennsylvania law permits a plaintiff to commence a civil action by either filing with the prothonotary a writ of summons or a complaint. Pa. R. Civ. P. 1007; c.f. Fed.R.Civ.P. 3. The mere filing of a writ of summons is sufficient to toll the statute of limitations under state law. Lamp v. Heyman, 366 A.2d 882, 885 (Pa. 1976). A writ of summons is not required to include factual or jurisdictional allegations, nor does it need to assert the plaintiff's cause of action. See Pa. R. Civ. P. 1351; c.f. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a). Appellants' writ of summons contained a single sentence requesting that the prothonotary "[k]indly issue a summons in [the above captioned] civil action." App. II, 1 (cleaned up).
Appellants' writ was served on Arenson and the Health Center on June 20, 2017. Three days later, counsel for the Health Center contacted Appellants' counsel and informed him that the Health Center received federal funding, so the claim was subject to the Federal Tort Claims Act.[3] The FTCA requires plaintiffs to first present their claims
to the appropriate federal administrative agency, here HHS, before filing suit in a court of law. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). It also grants federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over these claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). Despite these prescriptions, Appellants' counsel faxed and hand-delivered the applicable administrative tort claim form to the local Health Center on June 28, 2017. By July 18, 2017, Arenson came into possession of the form. On July 19, 2017, she forwarded it to a manager in the human resources department at Wayne Memorial Community Health Center, which operates the Pike County Family Health Center. That same day, the human resources manager emailed the form to a senior attorney in HHS. HHS never acted on the claim.
ii. Knapp I
On July 17, 2018, Appellants filed a complaint in federal district court against the United States pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a).[4] Appellants' complaint identified July 15, 2015 as the accrual date, when Appellant Christina Knapp received a diagnosis and learned that the Doxycycline had caused the polyangiitis and kidney disease. Therefore, the applicable FTCA two-year statute of limitations expired on July 17, 2017.[5] See 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b).
The Government moved to dismiss the action or, alternatively, for summary judgment, because Appellants failed to timely present their claim to HHS. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Government on February 28, 2020...
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