Knapp v. Wing

Citation72 Vt. 334,47 A. 1075
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Vermont
Decision Date06 August 1900
PartiesKNAPP v. WING.

Exceptions from Rutland county court; Taft, Chief Judge.

Action by Dora A. Knapp against Caroline J. Wing. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant excepts. Reversed.

Action on the case, in which the plaintiff sought to recover for the alienation of her husband's affections, whereby she had been deprived of his aid, comfort, and society. It appeared that the defendant was an aunt of Rollin F. Knapp, the former husband of the plaintiff, whose affections were alleged to have been alienated. The plaintiff testified that she had heard the defendant say to her husband that he should never have a cent of her property as long as he lived with the plaintiff, and she was permitted to testify to declarations relating to the amount of the defendant's property, made by the defendant to the plaintiff's husband. One Mrs. Farr, a witness called by the plaintiff, testified that the defendant had told the witness when the plaintiff's husband was not present that she didn't think a child born to the plaintiff during the subsistence of the marriage between the plaintiff and her husband was legitimate. After verdict and before judgment the defendant moved in arrest, on the ground that the declaration did not state a cause of action.

Argued before ROWELL, TYLER, MUNSON, START, THOMPSON, and WATSON, JJ.

Butler & Moloney, for plaintiff.

Joel C. Baker and E. J. Ormsbee, for defendant.

TYLER, J. 1. The declaration states a cause of action, for it alleges loss of consortium as the consequence of the defendant's wrongful acts, and the plaintiff can maintain an action in her own name, under V. S. § 2647. Story v. Downey, 62 Vt 243, 20 Atl. 321. The marriage contract between the plaintiff and her husband conferred upon her the right to his consortium, and the deprivation of that right by the acts of the defendant was a wrong for which the law should afford a remedy.

It was a maxim of the common law that for every wrong the law provided an adequate redress; but the law was consistent in denying to the wife an action against another woman for debauching her husband, or for alienating his affections from and depriving her of his society and support, for she had no legal existence separate from her husband, and consequently could not hold separate property. If such an action had been maintainable, it must have been brought in the husband's name, and a judgment, if recovered, would have been for his benefit, because of the theory that the wife's legal existence was merged in that of her husband, and that she had no property in his society and assistance. It is now nearly a universal rule in those states in this country where the common-law disabilities of married women have been removed that this kind of action is maintainable. It is said in Cooley, Torts, 228, note: "We see no reason why such an action should not be supported when, by statute, the wife is allowed, for her own benefit, to sue for personal wrongs suffered by her." Bigelow, Torts, 153; Bish. Mar. & Div. § 1358. It was said by the court in Daley v. Gates. 65 Vt. 501, 27 Atl. 193: "If an action of this kind can be maintained by a wife, concerning which we are not called upon to express an opinion, the cause of action is the wrongful deprivation of the plaintiff of that to which she is entitled by virtue of the marital relation, namely, the consortium, or the conjugal society, affection, aid, and assistance, of her husband." The only question in that case was whether a new count was for the same cause of action as the original declaration, which charged that the defendant had enticed away the plaintiff's husband per quod amisit, the new count charging criminal conversation, with the same per quod, and it was held to be for the same cause and for the reason that the injury complained of in each count was one and the same, namely, loss of consortium; the new count being merely the statement of another way in which the injury was committed, the identity of the cause of action being preserved. This doctrine is fully recognized in Fratini v. Caslini, (16 Vt. 273, 29 Atl. 252. It is denied in Doe v. Roe, 82 Me. 503, 20 Atl. 83, 8 L. R. A. 833, and in Morgan v. Martin, 92 Me. 190, 42 Atl. 354, that the wife is entitled to this action, even in case of her husband's adultery, and it is held that the action is allowed to the husband for that cause only upon the ground that the wife's infidelity may impose upon her husband the support of another man's child, and throw suspicion upon the legitimacy of his own children. This holding we are not inclined to follow. Mr. Freeman, in his notes to Clow v. Chapman, 125 Mo. 101, 28 S. W. 328, 26 L. R. A. 412, 46 Am. St. Rep. 468, says that Maine and Wisconsin stand alone in maintaining the above doctrine, and he states the general rule that the action is maintainable when there is loss of consortium, and that it is as available to the wife, unless she is under the common-law disability, as it is to the husband. The law is well stated in Schouler, Husb. & Wife, § 65: "To entice away or to corrupt the mind and affections of one's consort is a civil wrong, for which the...

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33 cases
  • Woodhouse v. Woodhouse
    • United States
    • Vermont Supreme Court
    • October 7, 1925
    ...contended that evidence of defendants' wealth would not be admissible, if the circumstances are as claimed by the plaintiff. Knapp v. Wing, 72 Vt. 334, 47 A. 1075, supports the proposition that it would then be admissible. The defendants attempt to distinguish the case at bar by claiming wa......
  • Dorritt Van Deusen Woodhouse v. Lorenzo E. Woodhouse Et Ux
    • United States
    • Vermont Supreme Court
    • October 7, 1925
    ...contended that evidence of defendants' wealth would not be admissible, if the circumstances are as claimed by the plaintiff. Knapp v. Wing, 72 Vt. 334, 47 A. 1075, supports the proposition that it would then be The defendants attempt to distinguish the case at bar by claiming want of eviden......
  • Beasley v. State
    • United States
    • Maryland Court of Appeals
    • May 1, 1974
    ...exploratory; and the rule that the examiner must indicate the purpose of his inquiry does not, in general, apply. Knapp v. Wing, 72 Vt. 334, 340, 47 A. 1075; Martin v. Elden, 32 Ohio St. 282, 289. It is the essence of a fair trial that reasonable latitude be given the cross-examiner, even t......
  • State v. Parker
    • United States
    • Vermont Supreme Court
    • October 18, 1932
    ...attorney, was not bound to state his object in putting the interrogatory. State v. Fairbanks, 101 Vt. 30, 33, 139 A. 918; Knapp v. Wing, 72 Vt. 334, 340, 47 A. 1075. Enough appears to warrant the inference that the state expected to show that Daniels was there for the purpose of purchasing ......
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