Knaub v. State, 904

• Decision Date: 10 July 1968
• Docket Number: No. 904,904
• Citation: 443 P.2d 44
• Parties: William George KNAUB, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee.
• Court: Alaska Supreme Court

Page 44

443 P.2d 44

William George KNAUB, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee.

No. 904.

Supreme Court of Alaska.

July 10, 1968.

William George Knaub, pro se.

Russell J. Gallagher, Asst. Dist. Atty., Douglas B. Baily, Dist. Atty., Anchorage, for appellee.

OPINION

Before NESBETT, C. J., and DIMOND and RABINOWITZ, JJ.

RABINOWITZ, Justice.

Appellant, now serving concurrent life sentences, appeals from the superior court's denial of post conviction relief. Treating the matter as an appeal from a denial of a Criminal Rule 35(b) motion, we are of the opinion that the trial court correctly determined the motion. The files and records in the case conclusively show that appellant is not entitled to relief. ¹

On July 29, 1964, a complaint was filed charging appellant with the first degree murder of Shirley L. Scott. On the same day the record shows that appellant signed a waiver of preliminary hearing and was bound over to the superior court. On July 30 appellant appeared before Superior Court Judge Edward V. Davis who appointed counsel and also informed appellant that if his court-appointed counsel so desired, the waiver of preliminary hearing would be set aside.

Subsequently, on August 10, 1964, an Anchorage superior court grand jury returned a two-count indictment charging appellant with the first degree killings of his wife, Bessie Knaub, and Shirley L. Scott. Four days later appellant, represented by counsel, was arraigned and entered not guilty pleas. At arraignment counsel for appellant requested a psychiatric examination of appellant and indicated to the court that he sought the services of Dr. Raymond Langdon. On August 19, 1964, Judge Davis signed an order appointing Dr. Langdon to examine appellant. ²

There matters stood until October 15, 1964, at which time counsel for appellant filed an affidavit which stated in part that Dr. Langdon had been unable to accomplish the contemplated psychiatric examination, and that in counsel's opinion there was 'need for a psychiatric evaluation of appellant.' As a result of this affidavit Superior Court Judge Hubert A. Gilbert appointed Dr. William Rader, a psychiatrist, to make an examination and to make his findings and testimony available to both prosecution and defense counsel.

On November 19, 1964, new counsel, Frank Nosek, was appointed for appellant. ³ On December 10, 1964, a hearing was held to determine whether appellant was competent to stand trial. At this hearing Dr. William Rader testified that he had examined appellant on four different occasions and in his opinion appellant was able 'to understand the charges and able to help in his defense.' At the conclusion of the hearing Superior Court Judge Hubert A. Gilbert adjudged appellant competent to stand trial and trial was set to commence on December 15, 1964. Prior to trial appellant's counsel moved, pursuant to Criminal Rule 17(b), for the issuance of subpoenas at state expense to secure the testimony of Dr. Michael Beirne and Dr. William J. Rader. This motion was granted and the trial commenced on December 15, 1964.

During the empaneling of the jury, counsel for appellant informed the trial judge that appellant desired to change his plea and to enter pleas of guilty to the murder counts. Appellant was then sworn and questioned by both the judge and the prosecutor for the purpose of ascertaining whether appellant's guilty pleas were voluntary and made with an understanding of the nature of the changes against him. After completion of this inquiry the trial court permitted appellant to withdraw his prior not guilty pleas and to enter pleas of guilty to the two homicide charges. ⁴ At this time the court discharged the jury and ordered the Youth and Adult Authority of the State of Alaska to conduct a presentence investigation and to furnish the court and counsel with a presentence report.

Judge Gilbert then left the Third Judicial District. During Judge Gilbert's absence, Superior Court Judge Ralph E. Moody received information from an officer of the Youth and Adult Authority that appellant claimed he did not understand the nature of the crime of murder in the first degree at the time he entered guilty pleas to the first degree charges. At a hearing held on January 22, 1965, Judge Moody replayed the tape recording of the December 15, 1964, change-of-plea proceedings. Upon ascertaining that appellant claimed he was not represented 'correctly,' the court had appellant sworn for the purpose of determining what degree of homicide appellant had in fact committed. ⁵ After hearing detailed testimony going to the circumstances surrounding the dual slaying, Judge Moody referred the matter back to Judge Gilbert for decision. On February 19, 1965, Judge Gilbert, after alluding to the proceedings which were had before Judge Moody, denied appellant's motion to withdraw his pleas of guilty and also denied appellant's request that new court-appointed counsel be furnished him. ⁶ Appellant was then sentenced to concurrent life sentences.

No direct appeal was thereafter taken by appellant. Approximately two and one-half years after sentence had been imposed, appellant filed in the superior court a pleading which was captioned in part 'Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.' On July 26, 1967, Judge Gilbert denied appellant's petition without conducting a hearing. ⁷ On August 10, 1967, Judge Gilbert also denied without hearing a supplement to the original petition for writ of habeas corpus. The superior court's denials have been appealed by appellant. ⁸

In this appeal appellant's primary contentions are that his pleas of guilty were not entered voluntarily and with understanding of the nature of the charges against him; ⁹ that Judge Gilbert lacked jurisdiction to rule upon appellant's motion to withdraw his pleas of guilty and was without jurisdiction to impose sentence; and that appellant was denied a fair and impartial mental competency hearing.

In regard to appellant's assertion that Judge Gilbert did not possess jurisdiction to decide the motion to withdraw the pleas of guilty and further lacked jurisdiction to pass sentence, we believe that the provisions of Criminal Rule 25(a) are controlling here. This subsection of Criminal Rule 25 provides:

Where a judge of the superior court is disqualified or for any other reason is unable to sit in the trial or hearing of any pending matter, the presiding judge or the chief justice of the supreme court shall designate another judge of the judicial district in which the matter is pending or a judge temporarily assigned thereto, to hear the matter.

As we have detailed previously, the record demonstrates that Judge Gilbert presided over the mental competency hearing and had adjudged appellant competent to stand trial. Further, Judge Gilbert was assigned to preside over appellant's trial and during the course of the trial accepted appellant's changes of plea. It is significant that while Judge Gilbert was absent from his judicial district, and as a result of the Youth and Adult Authority's presentence investigation of appellant, it came to the attention of presiding Superior Court Judge Ralph Moody that there was some question as to whether appellant understood the nature of the charges against him at the time he pled guilty. Under the circumstances of Judge Gilbert's absence from the judicial district, Judge Moody had 'jurisdiction' to hear appellant's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. ¹⁰

We further hold that Judge Gilbert possessed authority to determine appellant's motion to withdraw his pleas of guilty after the matter had been referred back to him by Judge Moody. ¹¹ As a matter of logic and procedural experience, it is apparent on the facts of this record that it was preferable to have Judge Gilbert pass upon appellant's motion to withdraw his pleas of guilty. We further hold that findings of fact and conclusions of law are not required to be filed by the judge in determining Criminal Rule 32(d) motions for withdrawals of pleas of guilty. ¹² This conclusion disposes of appellant's contention that Judge Gilbert lacked jurisdiction to sentence him because of Judge Gilbert's failure to file findings of fact and conclusions of law in ruling upon appellant's Criminal Rule 32(d) motion. We, therefore hold that Judge Gilbert had the authority to decide the Criminal Rule 32(d) motion to withdraw and subsequently to impose sentence upon appellant.

In regard to appellant's assertion that he was denied a fair and impartial competency hearing, it appears that his arguments center on the fact that Dr. William Rader testified at the hearing instead of Dr. Raymond Langdon. It is true that at the time of his arraignment appellant's counsel requested that a psychiatric examination be made of appellant by Dr. Raymond Langdon and that on August 19, 1964, Judge Davis did appoint Dr. Langdon to conduct such an examination. But as we previously pointed out, even at this early stage appellant's counsel indicated that in the future he might request the court to appoint another psychiatrist. ¹³ The record also shows that on October 15, 1964, appellant's counsel notified the court that despite the fact that Dr. Langdon had been unable to examine appellant there still was a need for a psychiatric examination. As a result Dr. William Rader was appointed to examine appellant and, as we have already pointed out, Dr. Rader testified at the competency hearing. In view of our study of the record, we have concluded that appellant's allegations of improprieties regarding the competency hearing are totally lacking in merit. At no place in the record does it appear that the prosecution suppressed the superior court's order of August 19, 1964, appointing Dr. Langdon. On the contrary, appellant's counsel requested that a psychiatric examination be had of appellant despite the fact that Dr. Langdon was unable to complete such an evaluation. At the competency hearing itself, neither appellant nor...