Kneberg v. HL Green Co.
Decision Date | 23 March 1937 |
Docket Number | No. 5997.,5997. |
Citation | 89 F.2d 100 |
Parties | KNEBERG v. H. L. GREEN CO., Inc. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Geo. W. Wood and Dan H. McNeal, both of Moline, Ill., and Edward W. Schoede, of Rock Island, Ill., for appellant.
Cutting, Moore & Sidley, of Chicago, Ill., and Clarence W. Heyl, of Peoria, Ill. (Donald F. McPherson and Howard Neitzert, both of Chicago, Ill., of counsel), for appellee.
Before EVANS, Circuit Judge, and LINDLEY and BRIGGLE, District Judges.
Appellant contracted that upon payment of an aggregate sum of some $160,000, she would convey, and furnish merchantable abstract of title to, certain real estate to appellee's assignor, who in turn promised to make the payments provided. One covenant was that the agreement should be binding upon the assigns of the respective parties. The purchaser assigned the contract to the Metropolitan Investment Company which, later, was adjudicated a bankrupt. Still later its trustee in bankruptcy, by authority of the court, assigned the agreement, all rights growing out of same and all sums recoverable on account thereof to appellee. Haber, the original vendee, had paid part of the purchase price, $15,000, and appellee filed this suit alleging that appellant had failed to comply with the contract, in that she had failed to furnish merchantable abstract of title; that, thereby, the contract had been discharged and terminated; and seeking to recover the partial payment made.
Appellant answered, denying the allegations of the complaint, and filed a crosscomplaint of equitable character, alleging that, by the acceptance of the contract providing that the covenants and agreements thereof should extend to and be binding upon the assigns of the parties, appellee had assumed and was bound by the obligations of the original purchaser; that by acceptance of the contract, the attempt to terminate same and commencement of the suit, appellee had by implication assumed the original purchaser's obligations; that appellant had not defaulted but was ready, willing, and able to perform. She prayed that the court might enter a decree of specific performance, awarding to her the balance of the purchase price. The cross-complaint contained, as an alternative prayer for relief, the request that if for any reason specific performance might be denied, appellee might be decreed to cancel and surrender the contract and release it of record. There was also a prayer for general relief. The court sustained appellee's motion to strike and dismiss the counterclaim. From this order the present appeal was taken.
A motion to dismiss the appeal has been filed. By inadvertence the record of this court indicates that the motion was overruled, whereas the order should have been that action was reserved until hearing upon the merits. Irrespective of our formal order, therefore, of our own motion, we have examined the question of the propriety of the appeal, for if we are without jurisdiction, it is our duty to observe that fact.
Appellee contends that an order dismissing a counterclaim in equity is not appealable; that it is not final in character and not the kind of interlocutory order reviewable by appeal. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 225-227; 45 U.S.C.A. § 159.
An order dismissing a counterclaim is not a final order within the meaning of section 128, Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C.A. § 225. Winters v. Ethell, 132 U.S. 207, 10 S.Ct. 56, 33 L.Ed. 339; Ayres v. Carver, 17 How. (58 U.S.) 591, 15 L.Ed. 179. But appellant insists that the order is appealable under section 129 of the Judicial Code, title 28 U.S.C.A. § 227 in part as follows: "Where, upon a hearing in a district court, * * * an injunction is granted, continued, modified, refused, or dissolved by an interlocutory order or decree, or an application to dissolve or modify an injunction is refused, * * * an appeal may be taken from such interlocutory order or decree to the circuit court of appeals."
Appellant's position in this respect is founded upon her theory of her remedies under section 274b of the Judicial Code, title 28 U.S.C.A. § 398, which provides that:
It is insisted that when equitable relief is prayed as here, in an answer or counterclaim, in a suit at law, in pursuance of the statute, the dismissal of the same is, in effect, the denial of a prayer to enjoin the suit at law and is, therefore, appealable.
In Liberty Oil Co. v. Condon Nat. Bank, 260 U.S. 235, 43 S.Ct. 118, 121, 67 L.Ed. 232, the vendee in an executory contract for sale of real estate sued the bank to recover the purchase price. The bank answered alleging that it held the money but that the fund was claimed by both vendee and vendor. The vendor filed a cross-petition denying default and asking specific performance. A decree was entered in favor of defendant, and plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court reversed an order of the Circuit Court of Appeals (271 F. 928) dismissing the appeal on the ground that it was an action at law and could not be reviewed by appeal, and held that: "Where an equitable defense is interposed to a suit at law, the equitable issue raised should first be disposed of as in a court of equity, and then, if an issue at law remains, it is triable to a jury."
The later case, Enelow v. New York Life Ins. Co., 293 U.S. 379, 55 S.Ct. 310, 311, 79 L.Ed. 440, was an action at law upon a life insurance policy. The defendant included an affirmative equitable defense and asked the court to hear this cause of action in equity prior to the determination of the suit at law. This the District Court did. The decree which followed was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals. 70 F.(2d) 728. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. Concerning the propriety of the appeal the court said:
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Andrews, 73 F.(2d) 839, was dealing with a similar situation, where, to an action at law to recover on an insurance policy, defendant filed a counterclaim asking that the policy be canceled. The District Court sustained the motion to dismiss the amended counterclaim; the defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals concluded that the order was not appealable and reversed the judgment. A motion for rehearing was made and granted because of the decision of the Supreme Court in the last-mentioned case, the court saying (C.C.A.) 77 F.(2d) 692, 693: "Pending a motion in this court for a rehearing, the Supreme Court of the United States handed down an opinion in the case of Enelow v. New York Life Insurance Co., ...
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