Kneeland v. American Loan Trust Co Same v. Ballou

• Decision Date: 02 March 1891
• Docket Number: No. 1,539,No. 1,540,1,539,1,540
• Citation: 34 L.Ed. 1052,11 S.Ct. 426,138 U.S. 509
• Parties: KNEELAND v. AMERICAN LOAN & TRUST CO. et al. SAME v. BALLOU et al
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

138 U.S. 509

11 S.Ct. 426

34 L.Ed. 1052

KNEELAND v. AMERICAN LOAN & TRUST CO. et al.

No. 1,539.

SAME

v. BALLOU et al.

No. 1,540.

March 2, 1891.

R. G. Ingersoll, Clarence Brown, and John M. Butler, for appellant.

Henry D. Hyde, for appellees in 1,539.

Bluford Wilson and J. L. High, for appellees in 1,540.

BREWER, J.

These cases, being appeals from two decrees of the circuit court of the United States for the district of Indiana, making allowances to certain intervenors in railroad foreclosure suits, by stipulation of parties are to be heard together and treated as one case. They were before the court a year ago. Kneeland v. Loan Co., 136 U. S. 89, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 950. The claims of the intervenors are for the rental of rolling stock from the 1st of August, 1883, to the 1st of January, 1885. The road during that time was in the possession of a receiver. From the 1st of August, 1883, to the 1st of December, 1883, the receivership was at the instance of a judgement creditor; the remainder of the time, at the instance of the bondholders, for whose benefit the appellant became the purchaser at the foreclosure sales. The only questions then determined, which are important to the present controversy, were these: First, the time for which the property was responsible for the rental; and, second, the method of computing it. It was there adjudged that the bondholders, represented by the appellant, the beneficial owners of the property, could not be held liable for rental value prior to December 1, 1883, and during the time that the receivership was at the instance of a judgment creditor. It was also ruled, against the contention of the appellant, that the mileage basis was not the proper one for determining the compensation to be paid to the intervenors; but that they were entitled to recover a reasonable rental value, computed as ordinary rentals, by the month, and irrespective of the actual use of the rolling stock. That was the basis of computation pursued by the circuit court in the decrees from which those appeals were taken; and therefore in that respect, its rulings were sustained. In those decrees the court had found the amounts due to the several intervenors, stating each separately, and decreeing a recovery therefor. These decrees were based upon and confirmed final reports made by the master. Back of these reports was an immense volume of testimony upon which they were founded. They stated the amounts due the intervenors, separately and for different periods,—one, from August 1, 1883, to August 1, 1884; and the other, from thence on to January 1, 1885. With these reports it was a simple matter of arithmetical computation to determine the amount due to each intervenor for the four months from August 1, 1883, to December 1, 1883; that being simply one-third of the year. The order which was entered by this court was that the decrees be 'reversed, and the cases remanded with instructions to strike out all allowancesfor rental prior to December 1, 1883, the time when the receiver was appointed at the instance of the mortgagees, and to allow the rentals as fixed for the time subsequent.' In other words, all that the court had to do was to deduct from the amount allowed to each intervenor one-third of the amount allowed for the year ending August 1, 1884. In each of the reports, as well as the decrees, the rentals due from August 1, 1884, to January 1, 1885, had been stated, and on receiving our mandates the circuit court interpreted them as in effect affirming so much of the decrees as allowed these amounts to the intervenors, and its new decrees awarded interest thereon from the date of the former decrees. This is the first ground of alleged error.

We think the ruling of the circuit court was correct. The amount of the allowances for these five months was separately stated, and such allowances were sustained by this court. While the former decrees were in terms reversed, and the cases remanded for the entering of new decrees, yet the terms of those new decrees were...