Kneeple v. Colvin
| Decision Date | 20 November 2015 |
| Docket Number | 14-CV-33-JTC |
| Parties | DAVID W. KNEEPLE, Plaintiff, v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of New York |
APPEARANCES:
KENNETH R. HILLER, ESQ., Buffalo, New York, for Plaintiff.
DANIEL ROBERT JANES, Social Security Administration, Office of General Counsel, New York, New York, for Defendant.
This matter has been transferred to the undersigned for all further proceedings, by order of Chief United States District Judge William M. Skretny dated December 15, 2014 (Item 15).
Plaintiff David W. Kneeple initiated this action on January 14, 2014, pursuant to the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) ("the Act"), for judicial review of the final determination of the Acting Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner") denying plaintiff's application for Social Security Disability Insurance ("SSDI") benefits under Title II of the Act. Both parties have moved for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (see Items 8, 13). For the following reasons, plaintiff's motion is granted, and the Commissioner's motion is denied.
Plaintiff was born on January 18, 1961 (Tr. 40, 111).1 He filed an application for SSDI on November 15, 2010, alleging disability due to illiteracy, Human Immunodeficiency Virus ("HIV"), diabetes, and high blood pressure, with an onset date of February 1, 2004 (Tr. 148-51, 178). This claim was denied administratively on March 16, 2011 (see Tr. 99-110). Plaintiff requested a hearing, which was held on July 25, 2012, before Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Bruce R. Mazzarella (Tr. 31-76). Plaintiff appeared and testified at the hearing, and was represented by counsel. Jay Steinbrenner, an impartial vocational expert ("VE"), also appeared and testified at the hearing.
On September 6, 2012, ALJ Mazzarella issued a decision finding that plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Act (Tr. 15-26). Following the five-step sequential evaluation process outlined in the Social Security Administration regulations governing claims under Title II (see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520), the ALJ found at step one that plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date, voluntarily amended at the hearing to September 30, 2009 (the same date as the date plaintiff was last insured for SSDI benefits)2 (Tr. 18, 20), and at step two that plaintiff's medicallydeterminable impairments (identified as borderline intellectual functioning, illiteracy, and asymptomatic HIV), were "severe" within the meaning of the Act because they caused significant limitations in plaintiff's ability to perform basic work activities (Tr. 20-21). The ALJ found plaintiff's diabetes, hypertension and "wound infections" to be non-severe (Tr. 21).
At step three of the evaluation, the ALJ found that plaintiff's impairments, considered alone or in combination, did not did not meet or medically equal the criteria of any impairment listed at 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (the "Listings"), specifically, Listings 14.08 (Human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) infection) and 12.02 (Organic Mental Disorders) (Tr. 20-22). The ALJ then found that plaintiff had the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to lift and carry 50 pounds occasionally and 25 pounds frequently, sit for an eight-hour workday with normal breaks and meal periods, and stand and walk for an eight-hour workday with normal breaks and meal periods (Tr. 22).3 The ALJ found that plaintiff was limited to work that did not require reading and writing as an integral part of the job performance (id.). Based on this assessment, the ALJ found at the fourth step of the sequential analysis that plaintiff retained the functional capacity to perform his past relevant work as a janitorial cleaner, and was therefore not disabled within the meaning of the Act at any time from the stipulated amended onset date (Tr. 25).
The ALJ's decision became the final determination of the Commissioner on November 21, 2013, when the Appeals Council denied plaintiff's request for review (Tr. 1-4), and this action followed.
In his motion for judgment on the pleadings, plaintiff contends that the Commissioner's determination should be reversed, or remanded for further consideration, because the ALJ (1) failed to properly assess plaintiff's RFC; (2) failed to adequately consider whether plaintiff met the criteria of Listing 12.05 (Mental retardation); (3) denied plaintiff a fair hearing when he refused to allow plaintiff's counsel to reexamine him after the conclusion of the vocational expert's testimony; and (4) failed to properly evaluate the severity of plaintiff's chronic cellulitis. See Item 8-1. The government contends that the Commissioner's determination should be affirmed because the ALJ's decision was made in accordance with the pertinent legal standards and is based on substantial evidence in the record. See Item 13-1.
The Social Security Act provides that, upon district court review of the Commissioner's decision, "[t]he findings of the Commissioner ... as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive ...." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is defined as evidence which "a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938), quoted in Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); see also Tejada v. Apfel, 167 F.3d 770, 773-74 (2d Cir. 1999). The substantial evidence test applies not onlyto findings on basic evidentiary facts, but also to inferences and conclusions drawn from the facts. Giannasca v. Astrue, 2011 WL 4445141, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2011) (citing Rodriguez v. Califano, 431 F. Supp. 421, 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)).
Under these standards, the scope of judicial review of the Commissioner's decision is limited, and the reviewing court may not try the case de novo or substitute its findings for those of the Commissioner. Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401; see also Cage v. Comm'r of Soc. Servs., 692 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2012). The court's inquiry is "whether the record, read as a whole, yields such evidence as would allow a reasonable mind to accept the conclusions reached" by the Commissioner. Sample v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 1982), quoted in Hart v. Colvin, 2014 WL 916747, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2014).
However, "[b]efore the insulation of the substantial evidence test comes into play, it must first be determined that the facts of a particular case have been evaluated in the light of correct legal standards." Klofta v. Mathews, 418 F. Supp. 1139, 1411 (E.D.Wis. 1976), quoted in Sharbaugh v. Apfel, 2000 WL 575632, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2000); Nunez v. Astrue, 2013 WL 3753421, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2013) (citing Tejada, 167 F.3d at 773). "Failure to apply the correct legal standard constitutes reversible error, including, in certain circumstances, failure to adhere to the applicable regulations." Kohler v. Astrue, 546 F.3d 260, 265 (2d Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). Thus, the Commissioner's determination cannot be upheld when it is based on an erroneous view of the law, or misapplication of the regulations, that disregards highly probative evidence. See Grey v. Heckler, 721 F.2d 41, 44 (2d Cir. 1983); see also Johnson v. Bowen, 817 F.2d 983, 985(2d Cir. 1987) (), quoted in McKinzie v. Astrue, 2010 WL 276740, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2010).
If the Commissioner's findings are free of legal error and supported by substantial evidence, the court must uphold the decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (); see Kohler, 546 F.3d at 265. "Where the Commissioner's decision rests on adequate findings supported by evidence having rational probative force, [the court] will not substitute [its] judgment for that of the Commissioner." Veino v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 578, 586 (2d Cir. 2002). Even where there is substantial evidence in the record weighing against the Commissioner's findings, the determination will not be disturbed so long as substantial evidence also supports it. See Marquez v. Colvin, 2013 WL 5568718, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 2013) ().
In addition, it is the function of the Commissioner, not the reviewing court, "to resolve evidentiary conflicts and to appraise the credibility of witnesses, including claimant." Carroll v. Sec'y of Health and Human Services, 705 F.2d 638, 642 (2d Cir. 1983); cf. Cichocki v. Astrue, 534 F. App'x 71, 75 (2d Cir. Sept. 5, 2013). "Genuine conflicts in the medical evidence are for the Commissioner to resolve," Veino, 312 F.3d at 588, and the court "must show special deference" to credibility determinations made by the ALJ, "whohad the opportunity to observe the witnesses' demeanor" while testifying. Yellow Freight Sys. Inc. v. Reich, 38 F.3d 76, 81 (2d Cir. 1994).
To be eligible for SSDI benefits under the Social Security Act, plaintiff must present proof sufficient to show that he suffers from a medically determinable physical or mental impairment "which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months ...," 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A), and is "of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the...
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