Kneip v. Herseth

• Decision Date: 09 January 1974
• Docket Number: No. 11348,11348
• Citation: 214 N.W.2d 93,87 S.D. 642
• Parties: Richard F. KNEIP, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Lorna HERSETH, as Secretary of State of the State of South Dakota, and Kermit A. Sande, as Attorney General of the State of South Dakota, Defendants and Respondents.
• Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

Page 93

214 N.W.2d 93

87 S.D. 642

Richard F. KNEIP, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Lorna HERSETH, as Secretary of State of the State of South Dakota, and Kermit A. Sande, as Attorney General of the State of South Dakota, Defendants and Respondents.

No. 11348.

Supreme Court of South Dakota.

Argued Dec. 6, 1973.

Decided Jan. 9, 1974.

Donald J. Porter, Martens, Goldsmith, May, Porter & Adams, Pierre, for plaintiff and appellant.

Samuel W. Masten, Canton, for defendants and respondents.

ISSUE I

HALL, Circuit Judge.

On May 14, 1973, the plaintiff commenced a suit against the defendants under South Dakota's Declaratory Judgment Act (SDCL 21--24). Plaintiff Governor Kneip, an announced candidate for the 1974 Democrat nomination for Governor, sought to have SDCL 12--6--2 declared unconstitutional and inapplicable to him in the 1974 primary and general elections.

Both defendants moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. In their answer, the defendants contended that they would comply with the Constitution and laws of South Dakota and that SDCL 12--6--2 is a constitutional statute which precludes the plaintiff from seeking nomination in the 1974 primary.

The trial court denied both motions of defendants to dismiss and for summary judgment. At trial, the court ruled that plaintiff could properly maintain his declaratory judgment action, but was otherwise precluded from seeking nomination in the 1974 primary because SDCL 12--6--2 was constitutional. The trial court denied plaintiff the relief sought; from this ruling, the plaintiff has appealed. Defendants have raised the question of the trial court's jurisdiction to grant a declaratory judgment.

The questions for decision on this appeal are thus clearly delineated.

South Dakota's Declaratory Judgment Act provides that its purpose is to 'declare rights, status, and other legal relations'. SDCL 21--24--1. This purpose may be accomplished by securing a declaration of the 'construction or validity' of any instrument, statute, or ordinance if these affect the person seeking the declaration. SDCL 21--24--3; Torigian v. Saunders, 1959, 77 S.D. 610, 97 N.W.2d 586. To effectuate the purpose of this remedial declaratory judgment legislation, the courts are to interpret it with liberality. SDCL 21--24--14. Standard Casualty Co. v. Boyd, 1955, 75 S.D. 617, 71 N.W.2d 450.

The philosophy of the Declaratory Judgment Act establishes that through it the courts seek to enable parties to authoritatively settle their rights in advance of any invasion thereof. Danforth v. City of Yankton, 1946, 71 S.D. 406, 25 N.W.2d 50; Security State Bank v. Breen, 1938, 65 S.D. 640, 277 N.W. 497. The objective of the act is to prevent actual invasions of rights and to establish guidelines for parties' actions so they may keep within lawful bounds, avoid expense, bitterness of feeling, the disturbance of orderly pursuits and to foster judicial economy. Merkel v. Long, 1962, 368 Mich. 1, 117 N.W.2d 130; Greene v. Wiese, 1955, 75 S.D. 515, 69 N.W.2d 325. Within the bounds of the remedial act's command of a liberal construction and liberal administration is found its ultimate goal of allowing "the courts (to be) more serviceable to the people." Nims v. Grand Trunk Western Ry. Co., 1949, 326 Mich. 371, 40 N.W.2d 188; Larkin v. Bontatibus, 1958, 145 Conn. 570, 145 A.2d 133. The achievement of peace through the avoidance of predictable conflict permeates as the Act's main function, Trossman v. Trossman, 1960, 24 Ill.App.2d 521, 165 N.W.2d 368.

However, the courts have established restrictions on the extent to which a declaratory judgment may be sought. The limits are achieved in the proscriptions that there must be a justiciable controversy between legally protected rights of parties whose interests are adverse. Greene v. Wiese, 1955, 75 S.D. 515, 69 N.W.2d 325; Danforth v. City of Yankton, 1946, 71 S.D. 406, 25 N.W.2d 50; Security State Bank v. Breen, 1938, 65 S.D. 640, 277 N.W. 497. So-called advisory opinions or the decisions of moot theoretical questions are normally not encouraged where the future shows no indication of the invasion of a right. Courts normally seek to avoid decisions involving future rights based upon contingencies which may or may not occur. Courts often require adverse claims, based upon present rather than speculative facts, which have ripened to a state of being capable of judicial adjustment. 22 Am.Jur.2d, Declaratory Judgments, § 26, at p. 871.

The liberality to be afforded the construction of the Declaratory Judgment Act, because of its remedial goals, should allow, however, the decision of present rights or status which are based upon future events when a good-faith controversy is brought before the courts. This appears particularly true when the construction of statutes dealing with zoning, taxation, voting or family relations presents matters involving the public interest in which timely relief is desirable. Amer. Ind. Party in Idaho, Inc. v. Cenarrusa, 1968, 92 Idaho 356, 442 P.2d 766; Benesch v. Miller, 1968, Alaska, 446 P.2d 400; Baker v. Carr, 1962, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663; Ervin v. Collins, 1956, Fla., 85 So.2d 852, 59 A.L.R.2d 706; Larkin v. Bontatibus, 1958, 145 Conn. 570, 145 A.2d 133; contra, Torigian v. Saunders, 1959, 77 S.D. 610, 97 N.W.2d 586; see, Dickson, Declaratory Remedies and Constitutional Change, 24 Vand.L.Rev. 257 (1971); Borchard, Declaratory Judgments, at p. 58 (2d Ed.1941).

In Ervin v. Collins, supra, the Florida Supreme Court allowed a declaratory judgment in a case similar to the one now brought by plaintiff Governor Kneip. Prior to the election process, the court ruled on Governor Collins' action to determine his eligibility for another term. The court felt this matter to be of such 'public interest' as to demand a 'more liberal' rule in regard to this type of declaratory judgment suit.

The case of Benesch v. Miller, supra, finds the Supreme Court of Alaska overruling the trial court's holding that Senator Gruening's declaratory judgment action was premature until after the election when it was determined if he had won. The court held that the statute itself, with nothing more, created an adverse interest which would allow Senator Gruening's suit, and that unless immediate pre-election relief was granted the 'unequivocal wording of the statute will likely discourage potential Gruening supporters' and thus work an injustice to both Gruening, himself a voter, and other voters who may desire his candidacy. In Amer. Ind. Party in Idaho, Inc. v. Cenarrusa, supra, the Idaho court ruled that even though the Secretary of State had yet to be approached, the declaratory relief could be afforded in an election matter. The mere enactment of a statute imposing restraints on an individual and implying enforcement creates that justiciability to sustain a proceeding for declaratory judgment. 26 C.J.S. Declaratory Judgments § 45, p. 129.

These electoral cases achieve a common ground. They command affirmative relief against no one. They merely resolve the uncertainty surrounding a person's candidacy by determining his status at a timely point. They prevent the watering down of the voter franchise by explaining who could run before a vote was irretrievably lost. This is desirable because present voting rights often depend on a determination of future questions.

An example of the extent to which courts have gone in handling a matter which can only arise as the result of future conduct is found in Larkin v. Bontatibus, supra. There, the plaintiffs were taxpayers who were challenging a proposed creation of a new municipal district which may have built a sewer system to handle an adjoining area. If the sewer were built it would infringe upon plaintiffs' easements. The court held that plaintiffs' declaratory suit was brought in good faith based upon the municipality's efforts which, though contingent, appeared likely to occur. Thus, the court said, "The remedy by means of declaratory judgments is highly remedial, and the statute * * * should be accorded a liberal construction to carry out the purposes" of the act. To "(f)ully * * * carry out the purposes intended to be served by such judgments, it is sometimes necessary to determine rights which will arise or become complete only in the contingency of some future happening." Larkin v. Bontatibus, supra, at 145 A.2d 135--136. They were rightly desirous of the prevention of conflict by the settlement of rights or status in advance of any claimed invasion thereof or irreparable harm caused by uncertainty.

South Dakota's law dealing with declaratory judgments, as applied to construction of a statute, may appear to be in conflict with the previous cases. Torigian v. Saunders, 1959, 77 S.D. 610, 97 N.W.2d 586; Danforth v. City of Yankton, 1946, 71 S.D. 406, 25 N.W.2d 50. Review of the Danforth case indicates that the jurisdictional requirements are more restrictive when future contingencies are involved. A declaratory judgment was there denied by the court because the city had yet to decide whether it would buy a bridge, and because no matter how the case was decided plaintiff's taxes would not be changed. The opinion states there were no real adverse interests, thus no controversy, and the court should not give a mere advisory opinion. There are intimations that had the proposed city activity been such as to increase the taxpayer's taxes the suit would have been allowed even though the contingency of the bridge being purchased still existed. In the present case mere delay infringes upon plaintiff's voting rights.

The Danforth case stated the basic principles involved in a declaratory judgment. The recent years have, however, found a liberalization of what constitutes adversely affected parties with interests which are entwined in a justiciable controversy. This is particularly true in matters dealing with civil rights,...