Knickerbocker Ice Co. of Baltimore City v. Gardiner Dairy Co.
| Decision Date | 31 March 1908 |
| Citation | 69 A. 405,107 Md. 556 |
| Parties | KNICKERBOCKER ICE CO. OF BALTIMORE CITY v. GARDINER DAIRY CO. OF BALTIMORE CITY. |
| Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Appeal from Baltimore Court of Common Pleas; Henry D. Harlan, Judge.
Action by Gardiner Dairy Company of Baltimore City against the Knickerbocker Ice Company of Baltimore City. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Reversed, and new trial granted.
Edward C. Carrington, for appellant.
Aubrey Pearre and Randolph Barton, Jr., for appellee.
This is an appeal from a judgment rendered against the appellant in favor of the appellee for causing the Sumwalt Ice & Coal Company to break a contract between it and the appellee, by which the former had agreed to furnish the latter with ice. As the first question to be considered is a demurrer to the declaration, which was overruled, we will state the material allegations made in it. It is alleged that the plaintiff was engaged in the dairy business in June, 1906, and required a large quantity of ice during the spring and summer months that, in order to meet its requirements, it entered into a contract with the Sumwalt Company whereby that company contracted to deliver to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff agreed to buy from it, an amount not exceeding 20 tons of ice each day from the date of the contract until the completion of the plaintiff's plant then in course of construction at the price of $5 per ton delivered; that at the time the Sumwalt Company was purchasing ice in large quantities from the defendant, which was engaged in the manufacture of ice that the defendant, learning of the contract between the plaintiff and the Sumwalt Company, notified the latter that it would refuse to deliver any ice whatever to it, unless it refrained from delivering ice to the plaintiff; that said Sumwalt Company being compelled by the exigencies of its business to secure ice from the defendant, and being alarmed by the threat of the defendant, broke its said contract with the plaintiff, and advised it that, because of the action of the defendant, it could not carry out its contract with the plaintiff; that thereby the plaintiff was compelled to purchase ice directly from the defendant at a price considerably greater, and on terms considerably less advantageous to it, than it was enjoying under its contract with the Sumwalt Company. It is further alleged that the action of the defendant in causing the Sumwalt Company to break its contract with the plaintiff "was with the desire and intention on the part of the defendant of injuring the plaintiff, and of obtaining a benefit for itself; that said action was deliberate and malicious, and inspired by the wish and purpose to force the plaintiff to buy ice directly from the defendant at a larger price, in larger quantities and for a longer period than were required of the plaintiff under the terms of its aforesaid contract with the Sumwalt Ice & Coal Company, by which unlawful and malicious action on the part of the defendant the plaintiff has been greatly damaged."
There is great conflict between judges and law writers as to how far there is a remedy for interference with contract relations, and it would be a useless task to undertake to reconcile them. They quite generally agree in their conclusions when the relation of master and servant exists, but even then reach the same point by different routes. Lumley v. Guye, 2 E. & B. 216, is the leading case on the subject. Prior to the dissenting opinion delivered by Justice Coleridge in that case, is seems to have been assumed that the action for enticing servants was a commonlaw action, but in that opinion he asserted, and with his marked ability undertook to establish, that such was not the case, and that it was founded on the statute of laborers of 23 Edw. III, and that both on principle and authority was limited by it. But, however that may be, that statute was never in force in this state, and could not have been applicable to conditions here, and the right to such action has always been regarded as a part of the common law. Justice Coleridge also undertook to show that the general rule of the English law in respect to breaches of contracts was to confine its remedies by action to the contracting parties; but while it may be conceded that, as a rule, such actions had been confined to those parties, it does not follow that the right of action in third parties did not exist. In Lumley v. Guye there was a demurrer to each of the three counts in the declaration, and it was held by Judges Wightman, Erle, and Crompton, quoting from the syllabus, that In Ensor v. Bolgiano, 67 Md. 190, 9 A. 529, Mr. Ensor, an attorney, sued the defendant, alleging that, with malice towards the plaintiff, he induced one Allen to compromise his case against a turnpike company in which the defendant had stock, and to break his contract with the plaintiff to pay him a contingent fee. This court disposed of the case on the ground that there was no legally sufficient evidence to support the action, and declined to express any opinion on the law as laid down in Lumley v. Guye, although Judges Yellott and Bryan filed dissenting opinions in which they approved of the doctrine announced in that case. In Lucke's Case, 77 Md. 396, 26 A. 505, 19 L. R. A. 408, 39 Am. St. Rep. 421, it was held that, where an employé, who was performing the duties of his position to the entire satisfaction of his employers, was discharged in consequence of a threat from a labor organization that if he was longer retained it would be compelled to notify all labor organizations of the city that the business house of the employers was a nonunion one, and thus subject them to great loss, such interference was wrongful, and an action would lie against the labor organization by the employé for the damage he sustained in consequence of such discharge. The evidence showed that the employé was to continue in the employ of his employers as long as his work was satisfactory, but they reserved the right to discharge him at the end of any week. A member of the firm testified that they would not have discharged him except for the objections by the appellee. This court quoted with approval from Benton v. Pratt, 2 Wend. (N. Y.) 385, 25 Am. Dec. 623, that: "Where a contract would have been fulfilled but for the false and fraudulent representations of a third person, an action will lie against such person, although the contract could not have been enforced by action." It also quoted at length from Chipley v. Atkinson, 23 Fla. 206, 1 So. 934, 11 Am. St. Rep. 367, which said that neither the fact that the term of service interrupted was not for a fixed period, nor that there was a right of action against the person induced or influenced to terminate the service, or to refuse to perform his agreement, was of itself The court also quoted from Bowen v. Hall, L. R. 6 Q. B. D. 338, which we will refer to later. It said that the Lucke Case and that of Lumley v. Guye "widely differ in important facts, and there is but small analogy in the principles of law properly applicable in each case"; but it will be observed that it announced principles which are analogous to those sought to be applied in this case. It distinctly held that an action by an employé would lie against a third person who maliciously and wantonly procured the termination of the arrangement between the employer and employé, which was not for a definite period, and the facts show that Lucke was not a mere menial servant, but a skilled, "first-class customs cutter."
Some material distinctions between that case and the one before us are apparent; but it does go one step further than the cases usually found in the books in which the relation of master and servant or employer and employé is in any way involved and there was not as here a binding contract between the parties. Generally speaking, such suits have been by the master for the enticement of his servant, while the Lucke Case was by an employé against a third person for causing his discharge by the employer; and it is difficult to see why, upon principle, a party to a contract should be confined to an action against the other party for a breach of it, when a third party has been the deliberate cause of the breach, for his own selfish or malicious purposes. To say that he has his remedy against the other contracting party is in many cases offering a mere shadow for substance, for oftentimes he may have his trouble for his pay, as the other party to the contract may be financially irresponsible. Why should a labor...
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