Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Cent. Intelligence Agency

• Decision Date: 27 August 2021
• Docket Number: No. 20-5045,20-5045
• Citation: 11 F.4th 810
• Parties: KNIGHT FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTE AT COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, Appellee Committee to Protect Journalists, Appellant v. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, et al., Appellees
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

11 F.4th 810

KNIGHT FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTE AT COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, Appellee

Committee to Protect Journalists, Appellant

v.CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, et al., Appellees

No. 20-5045

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued January 12, 2021

Decided August 27, 2021

Alexandra P. Swain argued the cause for appellant. With her on the briefs were Jeremy Feigelson and Timothy K. Beeken.

Bruce D. Brown and Katie Townsend were on the brief for amici curiae the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, et al. in support of appellant.

David A. Schulz and Mara Gassmann were on the brief for amici curiae Human Rights Watch, et al. in support of appellant.

Sharon Swingle, Assistant Director, U.S. Department of Justice, argued the cause for appellees. On the brief were Jeffrey Bossert Clark, Acting Assistant Attorney General, and H. Thomas Byron III and Sonia Carson, Attorneys.

Before: Millett, Katsas, and Walker, Circuit Judges.

Katsas, Circuit Judge:

Jamal Khashoggi, a prominent Saudi journalist, was murdered in a Saudi consulate in 2018, apparently on orders of the Saudi Crown Prince. Under the Freedom of Information Act, the plaintiffs here sought records about whether four United States intelligence agencies knew, before the murder, of an impending threat to Khashoggi. The agencies refused to confirm or deny whether they have any responsive records, on the ground that the existence or nonexistence of such records is classified information. We consider whether FOIA permitted this response.

I

FOIA generally requires federal agencies to disclose their records upon request, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A), subject to nine exemptions. Exemption 1 covers matters that are "specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy" and are "properly classified pursuant to such Executive order." Id. § 552(b)(1). The relevant executive order permits classification of information that "could reasonably be expected to cause identifiable or describable damage to the national security" if disclosed, and that "pertains to" either "intelligence activities" or "intelligence sources or methods." Exec. Order No. 13,526 § 1.4(c), 75 Fed. Reg. 707, 709 (Dec. 29, 2009).

To claim a FOIA exemption, an agency ordinarily must "acknowledge the existence of information responsive to a FOIA request and provide specific, non-conclusory justifications for withholding that information." Roth v. DOJ , 642 F.3d 1161, 1178 (D.C. Cir. 2011). But if "the fact of the existence or nonexistence of agency records" itself falls within a FOIA exemption, the agency may "refuse to confirm or deny the existence" of the requested records. Wolf v. CIA , 473 F.3d 370, 374 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (cleaned up). This is now known as a Glomar response, after the Central Intelligence Agency successfully refused to confirm or deny whether it had records about a ship called the Glomar Explorer . See Phillippi v. CIA , 546 F.2d 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1976). In considering a Glomar response, courts apply the "general exemption review standards established in non-Glomar cases." Wolf , 473 F.3d at 374. An agency thus bears the burden to sustain a Glomar response. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B).

If an agency has "officially acknowledged otherwise exempt information through prior disclosure," it has "waived its right to claim an exemption with respect to that information." ACLU v. CIA , 710 F.3d 422, 426 (D.C. Cir. 2013). A plaintiff urging official acknowledgment must point to "specific information in the public domain that appears to duplicate that being withheld." Id. at 427 (quoting Wolf , 473 F.3d at 378 ). The prior disclosure must match the information requested, must be as specific, and must have been "made public through an official and documented disclosure." Fitzgibbon v. CIA , 911 F.2d 755, 765 (D.C. Cir. 1990). To constitute official acknowledgment in the Glomar context, the prior disclosure must confirm the existence or nonexistence of records responsive to the FOIA request. ACLU , 710 F.3d at 427.

II

A

Jamal Khashoggi, a Saudi national and United States resident, frequently and prominently criticized the Saudi government. On October 2, 2018, Khashoggi visited the Saudi consulate in Istanbul to obtain documents for his upcoming marriage. Inside the consulate, fifteen assailants injected him with a sedative, suffocated him to death, and dismembered his corpse with a bone saw. The murder provoked international outrage. The CIA and the United Nations both investigated it.¹ On December 4, 2018, the CIA briefed Senate leaders. Shortly thereafter, Congress passed a joint resolution stating its belief that the Saudi Crown Prince had ordered the murder.

Soon after the murder, a State Department spokesman fielded questions at a press conference. A reporter asked whether "the U.S. had intelligence, overheard or intercepted communications, suggesting that there was a threat to Mr. Khashoggi." The spokesman responded: "[A]lthough I cannot comment on intelligence matters, I can say definitively the United States had no advanced knowledge of Jamal Khashoggi's disappearance." Press Briefing , Dep't of State (Oct. 10, 2018), 2017-2021.state.gov/briefings/department-press-briefing-october-10-2018. Asked a second time whether "you" had prior knowledge of a threat, the spokesman answered that "we" had no such knowledge. Id. Asked a third time whether "the administration" had prior knowledge, the spokesman answered: "[A]lthough I can't go into intelligence matters, I can definitively say that we had no knowledge in advance of Mr. Khashoggi's disappearance." Id.

B

This case concerns a FOIA request for records bearing on whether the intelligence community had prior knowledge of the threat. The intelligence community includes eighteen executive agencies that "conduct intelligence activities necessary for the conduct of foreign relations and the protection of the national security of the United States." Exec. Order No. 12,333 § 1.4, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941, 59,943 (Dec. 4, 1981) ; see also 50 U.S.C. § 3003(4) (listing intelligence-community agencies). The Director of National Intelligence is the head of the intelligence community, id. § 3023(b)(1), and so may direct how the community "carries out its mission," DiBacco v. U.S. Army , 795 F.3d 178, 198 (D.C. Cir. 2015). Exercising that authority, the Director promulgated Intelligence Community Directive 191. Under that Directive, any intelligence-community agency that "acquires credible and specific information indicating an impending threat of intentional killing, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping ... shall have a duty to warn the intended victim." Intelligence Community Directive 191, § E.1 (July 21, 2015). Each intelligence agency must "document and maintain records" regarding "duty to warn actions" such as the "method, means, and substance of any warning given." Id. § F.13.

The Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University and the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) submitted FOIA requests for records relating to Khashoggi. On October 19, 2018, Knight sent requests to the Department of State and four intelligence-community agencies—the CIA, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the National Security Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. From each of the five agencies, Knight requested "[a]ll records concerning the duty to warn under Directive 191 as it relates to Jamal Khashoggi." J.A. 31. CPJ then filed an identical request. After receiving no response, Knight and CPJ sued.

The intelligence agencies issued Glomar responses. They asserted that the existence or nonexistence of responsive records is classified information protected by Exemption 1.² Each agency gave essentially the same justification for the Glomar response: The existence of responsive records would signal that the agency had acquired credible and specific information of an impending threat to Khashoggi—i.e. , that the agency had an intelligence interest in, and the ability to learn in advance about, the plot to murder the journalist. In turn, that could expose intelligence activities, sources, and methods. On the other hand, the nonexistence of responsive records would signal a blind spot in United States intelligence.

Knight voluntarily dismissed its claims, and CPJ dismissed its claims against the State Department. The remaining parties—CPJ and the four intelligence agencies—cross-moved for summary judgment. The district court upheld the agencies’ Glomar responses and granted them summary judgment. Knight First Amend. Inst. at Colum. Univ. v. CIA , 424 F. Supp. 3d 36, 42–46 (D.D.C. 2020).

III

CPJ raises two arguments on appeal. First, it contends that the State Department officially acknowledged that no responsive records exist, thus precluding the intelligence agencies from making a Glomar response. Second, on the merits, it argues that Exemption 1 does not cover the existence or nonexistence of responsive records. Our standard of review is de novo . Wolf , 473 F.3d at 374.

A

We begin with the question of official acknowledgement. An agency waives any right to make a Glomar response by disclosing whether responsive records exist. ACLU , 710 F.3d at 426. Once an agency makes such an acknowledgment, "there is no value in a Glomar response. The secret is out." Leopold v. CIA , 987 F.3d 163, 167 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 2021).

To establish official acknowledgment, a plaintiff must identify information in the public domain that (1) matches the information requested, (2) is as specific, and (3) has "been made public through an official and documented disclosure." Fitzgibbon , 911 F.2d at 765. CPJ invokes the State Department's assertion that "the United States" had no advance knowledge of Khashoggi's "disappearance" or of a threat to his life. Without prior knowledge of an impending threat to Khashoggi, CPJ reasons, the intelligence agencies could have had neither a duty to...