Knight v. Board of Commissioners of the County of Clay

• Decision Date: 28 May 1913
• Docket Number: 22,000
• Citation: 101 N.E. 1010,179 Ind. 568
• Parties: Knight et al. v. Board of Commissioners of the County of Clay
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

101 N.E. 1010

179 Ind. 568

Knight et al. v. Board of Commissioners of the County of Clay

No. 22,000

Supreme Court of Indiana

May 28, 1913

From Clay Circuit Court; John M. Rawley. Judge.

Action by George A. Knight and another against the Board of Commissioners of the County of Clay. From a judgment for defendant, the plaintiffs appeal.

Affirmed.

B. F Watson, George A. Knight and Austin W. Knight, for appellants.

C. G Scofield, for appellee.

OPINION

Morris, J.

This was an action by appellants, against appellee, for judgment for professional services alleged to have been rendered by appellants in defending one Jesse Sluder, on a charge of murder. On a former appeal of the cause, to the Appellate Court, a judgment in favor of appellants was reversed, and, on petition to transfer the cause to this court, the same was denied. Board, etc., v. Knight, 44 Ind.App. 722, 85 N.E. 736.

Appellants filed an amended complaint, averring facts, which, appellants claim, present the question of the constitutional validity of § 27 of the "County Council Act" of 1899, which reads as follows: "No court, or division thereof, of any county, shall have power to bind such county by any contract, agreement, or in any other way, except by judgment rendered in a cause where such court has jurisdiction of the parties and subject matter of the action, to any extent beyond the amount of money at the time already appropriated by ordinance for the purpose of such court, and for the purpose for which such obligation is attempted to be incurred, and all contracts and agreements, express or implied, and all obligations of any and every sort attempted beyond such existing appropriations shall be absolutely void." § 5944 Burns 1908, Acts 1899 p. 343, § 27.

It is averred in the amended complaint that Sluder's trial had been set for a certain date; that he was a poor person, unable to employ counsel and had no attorney to defend him; that the State was demanding a trial of the cause, on the day set; that the court at defendant's suggestion, requested appellants to defend Sluder, but, on inquiry, they discovered that only $ 125 had been appropriated by the county council, which was available for Sluder's defense, and appellants declined the offered appointment because the reasonable value of the proposed service was greatly in excess of $ 125; that the judge of the circuit court then appeared before the county council (in session at that time) and requested it to make a larger appropriation, and one sufficient to pay the reasonable value of anticipated services required in Sluder's defense; that the council refused to increase the appropriation, and thereupon the defendant again requested the court to appoint appellants to conduct his defense, and it appointed them for such services, and appellants accepted the appointment, and the question of the amount of compensation for appellants' services, was left open until after they should have been completed. It is averred that no one volunteered to defend Sluder, and he had no reason for demanding a continuance, and, under the above conditions appellants accepted the appointment and rendered services, in Sluder's defense, of the value of $ 1,000 and for which they have received only $ 125.

The complaint contains the following: "Plaintiffs further aver, that at the time of their said employment and appointment by the court, the circumstances then existing created an immediate emergency requiring the exercise of the inherent power of the court to make said appointment in order to protect the constitutional rights of the said Sluder, and that the acceptance of said employment by these plaintiffs, under said circumstances, entitled them to reasonable compensation for their services, over and above the amount remaining of the said appropriation, and for the balance so due them; they aver that there was created thereby a just and rightful unliquidated claim against the board of commissioners of said Clay County, Indiana. That if the said employment and appointment had not been made by the court and had not these plaintiffs acted thereupon as aforesaid, said Sluder would have been forced to trial without legal counsel to aid in his defense, in plain violation of the rights secured to him by the Constitution of Indiana, Article 1, §§ 12, 13, above referred to, and his said rights would have thereby been greatly jeopardized." Judgment is demanded in the sum of $ 875.

The trial court sustained a demurrer to the amended complaint and this ruling is the...