Knight v. Chatelain

• Decision Date: 13 June 2019
• Docket Number: 8:19CV206
• Parties: PHYLLIS MARIE KNIGHT, Plaintiff, v. JOHN C. CHATELAIN, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Nebraska

PHYLLIS MARIE KNIGHT, Plaintiff, v. JOHN C. CHATELAIN, et al., Defendants.

8:19CV206

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA

June 13, 2019

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Plaintiff, Phyllis Marie Knight ("Knight"), who also refers to herself as Dr. Phyllis Marie Knight-Bey, D.M., filed this case on May 8, 2019, and was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis on May 9, 2019. The court now conducts an initial review of Knight's Complaint (Filing 1) and Supplement (Filing 7) to determine whether summary dismissal is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

I. SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT

Knight alleges that she "has identified herself as an aboriginal Moorish American National, a citizen of the Moorish National Republic Federal Government, Northwest Africa,¹ and as a participant in the Moorish Divine and National Movement of the World-the North Gate," and that she is "seeking damages due the unlawful eviction filing by (attorney) John C. Chatelain on behalf of his client (defendant) La Chelle Phillips without any proof of a contractual violation ..." (Filing 1, p. 1).

Five Defendants are named in the Complaint: John C. Chatelain ("Chatelain"), La Chelle Phillips ("Phillips"), the Douglas County Court Clerk's Office, Judge Sheryl L. Lohaus, and the City of Omaha (Filing 1, pp. 2-3), but in a Supplement filed on May 20, 2019, Judge Lohaus and the City of Omaha are not included in the list of Defendants (Filing 7, p. 3). However, the caption of both filings lists six Defendants: Chatelain, Phillips, an unidentified County Court Judge, County Court Clerk Supervisor (Etta), the City of Omaha, and the State of Nebraska.

Knight alleges that she "entered [a] motion in the (Douglas County Court) on May 7, 2019 demanding case number CI 19-8911 be dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction over the person, the subject and the matter due to diversity of citizenship." (Filing 1, p. 1) The court takes judicial notice of the proceedings in La Chelle Phillips v. Phyllis Marie Knight, County Court of Douglas, Nebraska, Case No. CI 19-8911 (available on the JUSTICE public database at www.nebraska.gov).² The county court file reflects that a complaint for restitution and detainer was filed against Knight on April 24, 2019, by attorney John C. Chatelain ("Chatelain") on behalf of La Chelle Phillips ("Phillips"), who was alleged to be the owner of a residence located at 5403 Grand Avenue in Omaha, Nebraska. The matter was dismissed without prejudice following a hearing on May 8, 2019.

II. STANDARDS ON INITIAL REVIEW

The court is required to review in forma pauperis complaints to determine whether summary dismissal is appropriate. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The court must dismiss a complaint or any portion of it that states a frivolous or malicious claim, that fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

Pro se plaintiffs must set forth enough factual allegations to "nudge[] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible," or "their complaint must be dismissed." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569-70 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) ("A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.").

"The essential function of a complaint under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is to give the opposing party 'fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds for a claim, and a general indication of the type of litigation involved.'" Topchian v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 760 F.3d 843, 848 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Hopkins v. Saunders, 199 F.3d 968, 973 (8th Cir. 1999)). However, "[a] pro se complaint must be liberally construed, and pro se litigants are held to a lesser pleading standard than other parties." Topchian, 760 F.3d at 849 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

Federal district courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). "If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

Original jurisdiction of the federal district courts over civil actions is generally set forth in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332. Subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, commonly referred to as "federal question" jurisdiction, is proper when a plaintiff asserts a claim arising under a federal statute, the Constitution, or treaties of the United States. McLain v. Andersen Corp., 567 F.3d 956, 963 (8th Cir. 2009). Subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, commonly referred to as "diversity of citizenship" jurisdiction, is proper when "the citizenship of each plaintiff is different from the citizenship of each defendant." Ryan v. Schneider Natl. Carriers, Inc., 263 F.3d 816, 819 (8th Cir. 2001). The necessary diversity of citizenship can be between citizens of different States" or between "citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state." 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1)-(2). In addition, the amount in controversy in an action brought under "diversity of citizenship" jurisdiction must be greater than $75,000.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).

Knight alleges that she "is proceeding as a Natural Person, in Propria Persona, Sui Juris under the status 28 U.S. Code § 1331 and 42 U.S. Code § 242 [sic]" (Filing 1, p. 3). The second statutory reference presumably was intended as 18 U.S.C. § 242, which is a "civil rights statute making it criminal to act (1) 'willfully' and (2) under color of law (3) to deprive a person of rights protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States." United States v. Peterson, 887 F.3d 343, 347 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 264 (1997)). There is no private cause of action under this statute. Garrison v. Rock Creek Holding, LLC, No. 5:19-CV-05021, 2019 WL 1186862, at *2 (W.D. Ark. Mar. 13, 2019) (citing Rockefeller v. United States Court of Appeals Office, for Tenth Circuit Judges, 248 F. Supp. 2d 17 (D.D.C. 2003)); see Allen v. Gold Country Casino, 464 F.3d 1044, 1048 (9th Cir. 2006) (18 U.S.C. § 242 is a criminal statute that does not give rise to civil liability). However, the statute has a civil counterpart, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege a violation of rights protected by the United States Constitution or created by federal statute and also must show that the alleged deprivation was caused by conduct of a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

Knight cites three federal statutes that Defendants allegedly violated. She first cites 28 U.S.C. § 4101, which is the definitions section of the Securing the Protection of our Enduring and Established Constitutional Heritage Act (the "SPEECH Act"). The SPEECH Act makes foreign defamation judgments unenforceable in the United States unless it can be shown that such judgments satisfy the protections of freedom of speech and press guaranteed by both the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and the constitution of the state in which the domestic court is located. See 28 U.S.C. § 4102(a)(1); Naoko Ohno v. Yuko Yasuma, 723 F.3d 984, 1004 n. 22 (9th Cir. 2013). It has no possible application here, either as the predicate for a § 1983 action or on its own. Next, Knight cites the Hate Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 249, which also bears no relationship to the facts alleged in Knight's Complaint, and which, as a criminal statute, does not create any rights cognizable under § 1983. See Wolf v. Jefferson Cty., Missouri, No. 4:15-CV-1174-CEJ, 2016 WL 233247, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 20, 2016), aff'd, No. 16-1442, 2016 WL 10592264 (8th Cir. Oct. 12, 2016). Finally, Knight cites 18 U.S.C. § 872, which makes it illegal for a federal officer or employee to commit or attempt an act of extortion. Again, this criminal statute has nothing to do with this case (because, among other reasons, it only applies to federal officers and employees) and,in any event, it does not create any private right of action. See Ramirez v. United States, No. SACV 14-1299-JLS ANX, 2015 WL 3606218, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2015).

Knight asserts that "Intentional Inflection [sic] and Emotional Distress is protect[ed] under the First Amendment" (Filing 1, p. 10). While it is true that "[t]he Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment ... can serve as a defense in state tort suits, including suits for intentional infliction of emotional distress," Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 451 (2011), there is no recognized constitutional claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. See Moore v. City of Chicago, No. 05 C 5868, 2008 WL 516338, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 20, 2008) ("[W]hile damages for emotional distress may be recovered in a § 1983 action, intentional infliction of emotional distress is not itself a cognizable constitutional claim."); Wiggins v. Steiner, No. C 96-1982 VRW, 1996 WL 432327, at *1 (N.D. Cal. July 29, 1996) ("[A]lleged infliction of emotional distress may be the basis for a state tort claim, but it is not the basis for a constitutional claim for damages.").³ Similarly, "[i]t is well established in this circuit that '[a]n action for malicious prosecution by itself is not punishable under § 1983 because it does not allege a constitutional injury.'" Pace v. City of Des Moines, 201 F.3d 1050, 1055 (8th Cir. 2000) (quoting Sanders v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 984 F.2d 972, 977 (8th Cir.1993)).

Even if Knight could legitimately claim that she was deprived of some right under a federal statute or constitutional provision, she cannot bring a § 1983 action unless the deprivation was caused by the conduct of a person acting under color of state law. "The traditional definition of acting under color of state law requires that ...