Knight v. Commonwealth

Decision Date13 November 2012
Docket NumberRecord No. 0768–11–3.
Citation61 Va.App. 148,733 S.E.2d 701
CourtVirginia Court of Appeals
PartiesScott Edward KNIGHT v. COMMONWEALTH of Virginia.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Linda L. Czyzyk, Assistant Public Defender (Office of the Public Defender, on brief), for appellant.

Rosemary V. Bourne, Assistant Attorney General (Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, II, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

Present: ELDER and BEALES, JJ., and WILLIS, Senior Judge.

BEALES, Judge.

Scott Edward Knight (appellant) was convicted at a bench trial in the Circuit Court of the City of Staunton of four counts of malicious wounding in violation of Code § 18.2–51, and three counts of felony destruction of property in violation of Code § 18.2–137.1 On appeal, appellant asserts (1) that the evidence at trial was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he acted with malice or with intent to maim, disable, or kill—and (2) that he did not have the specific intent to damage property when he drove his vehicle more than 40 to 70 miles per hour in excess of the speed limit in a populated area, causing a multiple car crash that injured several people and “totaled” multiple vehicles. For the following reasons, we disagree and we affirm his convictions.

I. BACKGROUND

On April 6, 2010, at approximately 3:50 p.m., appellant was involved in a multiple car crash on West Beverley Street in the City of Staunton. Appellant was driving Tiffany Colvin's white Volkswagen Jetta, which was in good working condition with properly functioning brakes. Ms. Colvin, appellant's girlfriend, had asked appellant to drive her uncle, Stanley Colvin, to the Department of Motor Vehicles. On that clear and dry afternoon, the Jetta that appellant was driving reached speeds of 77 to 107 miles per hour—42 to 72 miles per hour over the posted speed limit of 35 miles per hour while driving east on West Beverley Street (where there is a “slight down grade” for vehicles traveling in that direction). He moved out of the through lane of traffic and into the left turn lane, and drove the Jetta into a Jeep Grand Cherokee in the left turn lane, causing the two vehicles to hit a Ford Taurus. The collision occurred in a populated area inside the City of Staunton where there was a Food Lion, Wade's Store, Two by Two Learning Center, and other places of business.

Eight eyewitnesses testified that appellant was driving at dangerously excessive speeds immediately prior to the crash. Approximately five minutes before the crash, two Augusta County Sheriff's deputies, who were on their way to another call, observed a white Jetta traveling eastbound on Parkersburg Pike toward Staunton. One of the officers, Officer Pultz, testified that the car was “flying” past him, and he estimated that it was traveling “well over” 80 miles per hour. The other officer, Officer Smith, testified that he estimated the Jetta was traveling 80 miles per hour or above. The posted speed limit at the location where Officer Smith observed appellant's speed was 45 miles per hour.

Chuck Berry, a water truck driver, was travelling in the vicinity of Parkersburg Pike just west of Staunton, when he witnessed a white Jetta traveling at a high rate of speed. While he could not give an exact estimate of how fast appellant was traveling, he testified that the white Jetta was traveling “at a high rate of speed toward [him] and that the white Jetta “was going pretty good.” Thomas Newman, a general contractor, testified that he saw a white Volkswagen Jetta pass a red Corvette at a “high rate of speed”—so fast that it made the Corvette look as though it was “almost sittin[g] still.” Tammy Balser, the assistant customer service manager at Food Lion on West Beverley Street, testified that she observed a white car going “really fast” and “a lot quicker than what you would see on a normal day.” She further noted that “there is a lot of traffic on that road.”

Elizabeth Tinsley was getting ready to turn into the Two by Two Learning Center when she observed a vehicle go past her “really fast,” forcing her to pull over to the side of the road to avoid being hit by appellant. When asked if appellant appeared to be braking, she testified that [i]t didn't appear that [appellant was] stopping.” Joy Riley Surratt, a preschool teacher at Two by Two Learning Center, was at the Center's playground at the time of the crash. As part of her job, she is regularly out on the playground located between the Two by Two Learning Center and the Food Lion. Surratt, who hears traffic on West Beverley Street all the time, testified that on the day of the crash, she saw a white car traveling “at a very high rate of speed” toward the Food Lion. She noted that “traffic is normally not going very fast” in that area because the speed limit drops from 35 miles per hour to 25 miles per hour just after the crash site.

Another witness, Rhoda Derstine, testified that at approximately 3:45 p.m., while she was driving home after working at her job as a school librarian, she was almost hit by a lighter colored vehicle traveling at a “startlingly fast” rate. She was traveling on Parkersburg Pike when she saw a vehicle “down a ways, far enough that [she] felt like [she] had plenty of time to turn ... to the right lane,” but she “did not have [her] turn completely made and there was a vehicle immediately ... outside [her] rearview mirror.” Derstine pulled over to the side of the road because she was “shaking” and felt that she “would have been killed if [she] hadn't moved.” She testified that she noticed the passenger in the vehicle was “sitting upright and stiff, just staring straight ahead” and that [t]he driver ... looked like he was laughing.”

The Commonwealth's expert, Master Trooper Joel W. Sullivan, Jr., testified that, based on his reconstruction of the scene of the crash, the Jetta continued driving in a straight direction through the turn lane, until the point of impact. Master Trooper Sullivan estimated that the Jetta must have been traveling between 103 and 107 miles per hour immediately prior to beginning its pre-impact skid and that the Jetta was traveling between 77 and 83 miles per hour at the moment of impact with the Jeep Grand Cherokee. The posted speed limit at the site of the collision was 35 miles per hour.

The first car that appellant hit was a Jeep Grand Cherokee that was owned and driven by Elizabeth Benbow. She was driving, at most, 10 miles per hour eastbound in the left turn lane of West Beverley Street, and preparing to turn left into the Food Lion parkinglot when she was struck by appellant. She testified that, as a result of the crash, she suffered injuries to her brain, clavicle, and scapula, as well as a broken rib. Her Jeep Grand Cherokee, which she estimated to be worth $6,000 before the crash, was declared “totaled” by the insurance company. Her 14–year–old son, who was a passenger in the vehicle at the time of the collision, testified that he suffered cuts, bleeding, bruises, headaches, and neck pain from the crash.

As a result of appellant's driving the Jetta into the Jeep Grand Cherokee, the two vehicles both hit another vehicle—a Ford Taurus owned and driven by Nannie Brown. She was in the westbound lane of traffic when she was hit. Brown tried to apply her brakes to avoid being hit by appellant, but she was unsuccessful. Brown suffered a deep abrasion on her leg and fractured her sternum. She estimated her car to be worth $1,600 before the crash, but it was declared “totaled” by the insurance company after the crash.

The passenger in the Jetta driven by appellant, Stanley Colvin, did not testify at trial due to his severe physical injuries.2 Stanley Colvin's brother, Donald Colvin, testified without objection to his brother's injuries. Donald Colvin stated that, before the crash, Stanley Colvin had been in good health, but that, after the crash, he was hospitalized and almost died as a result of the injuries sustained in the crash. Donald Colvin testified that, as a result of the crash, his brother was in intensive care for three months and that his leg bone had been pushed up through his hip socket and had broken his pelvis. Corporal Campbell, who was one of the first to respond to the collision, testified that Stanley Colvin was “bloody and obviously screaming in pain.” Tiffany Colvin, the owner of the Jetta driven by appellant, estimated that the value of the car was $2,300 before the crash.

II. ANALYSIS

When considering the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, “a reviewing court does not ‘ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’ Crowder v. Commonwealth, 41 Va.App. 658, 663, 588 S.E.2d 384, 387 (2003) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318–19, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)). “Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, as we must since it was the prevailing party in the trial court,” Riner v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 296, 330, 601 S.E.2d 555, 574 (2004), [w]e must instead ask whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt,’ Crowder, 41 Va.App. at 663, 588 S.E.2d at 387 (quoting Kelly v. Commonwealth, 41 Va.App. 250, 257, 584 S.E.2d 444, 447 (2003) ( en banc )). See also Maxwell v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 437, 442, 657 S.E.2d 499, 502 (2008). “This familiar standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. at 2789.

Moreover, Code § 8.01–680 states that:

When a case, civil or criminal, is tried by a jury and a party objects to the judgment or action of the court in granting or refusing to grant a new trial on a motion to set aside the verdict of a jury on the ground that it is contrary to the evidence, or when a case is decided by a court without the...

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