Knight v. Gen. Telecom, Inc.

• Decision Date: 27 September 2017
• Docket Number: Case No.: 2:16–CV–218–VEH
• Citation: 271 F.Supp.3d 1264
• Parties: Ronald KNIGHT, Plaintiff, v. GENERAL TELECOM, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama

271 F.Supp.3d 1264

Ronald KNIGHT, Plaintiff,

v.GENERAL TELECOM, INC., Defendant.

Case No.: 2:16–CV–218–VEH

United States District Court, N.D. Alabama, Southern Division.

Signed September 27, 2017

Daniel E. Arciniegas, Yezbak Law Offices, Nashville, TN, Jon C. Goldfarb, L. William Smith, Wiggins Childs Pantazis Fisher & Goldfarb, Birmingham, AL, for Plaintiff.

John James Coleman, III, Henry Carlton Hilson, Burr & Forman LLP, Birmingham, AL, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS, United States District Judge

This is a civil action filed by the Plaintiff, Ronald Knight, against the Defendant, his former employer, General Telecom, Inc. ("GTI"). The Complaint alleges that: the Plaintiff was fired (and not reinstated) by the Defendant, because of his disability, diabetes, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111 – 12117 (the "ADA") (Count One); the Defendant failed to accommodate the Plaintiff's disability in violation of the ADA (Count Two); and, after his termination, the Defendant failed to give the Plaintiff the required notice of his rights pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1166(a), of the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 ("COBRA") (Count Three).

The case comes before the Court on the Defendant's motion for summary judgment on all counts (doc. 23), and the Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment as to Count Three, the COBRA Claim (doc. 31). For the reasons stated herein, both motions will be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part .

I. STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a) ; see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ("[S]ummary judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The party requesting summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings or filings that it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex , 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Once the moving party has met its burden, Rule 56(e) requires the non-moving party to go beyond the pleadings in answering the movant. Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. By its own affidavits—or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file—it must designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id.

The underlying substantive law identifies which facts are material and which are irrelevant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). All reasonable doubts about the facts and all justifiable inferences are resolved in favor of the non-movant. Chapman , 229 F.3d at 1023. Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Anderson , 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. A dispute is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. If the evidence presented by the non-movant to rebut the moving party's evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may still be granted. Id. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

How the movant may satisfy its initial evidentiary burden depends on whether that party bears the burden of proof on the given legal issues at trial. Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta , 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir. 1993). If the movant bears the burden of proof on the given issue or issues at trial, then it can only meet its burden on summary judgment by presenting affirmative evidence showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact—that is, facts that would entitle it to a directed verdict if not controverted at trial. Id. (citation omitted). Once the moving party makes such an affirmative showing, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to produce "significant, probative evidence demonstrating the existence of a triable issue of fact." Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added).

For issues on which the movant does not bear the burden of proof at trial, it can satisfy its initial burden on summary judgment in either of two ways. Id. at 1115–16. First, the movant may simply show that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-movant's case on the particular issue at hand. Id. at 1116. In such an instance, the non-movant must rebut by either (1) showing that the record in fact contains supporting evidence sufficient to withstand a directed verdict motion, or (2) proffering evidence sufficient to withstand a directed verdict motion at trial based on the alleged evidentiary deficiency. Id. at 1116–17. When responding, the non-movant may no longer rest on mere allegations; instead, it must set forth evidence of specific facts. Lewis v. Casey , 518 U.S. 343, 358, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996). The second method a movant in this position may use to discharge its burden is to provide affirmative evidence demonstrating that the non-moving party will be unable to prove its case at trial. Fitzpatrick , 2 F.3d at 1116. When this occurs, the non-movant must rebut by offering evidence sufficient to withstand a directed verdict at trial on the material fact sought to be negated. Id.

II. FACTS¹

A. GTI

GTI installs and maintains electric equipment and towers for cellular telephone communications customers including AT & T, Verizon, Sprint, T–Mobile, Ericsson, and, in the past, General Dynamics. The parties agree that, at all relevant times, GTI employed 19–24 employees. (Doc. 24 at 5, ¶ 2 (not disputed by Plaintiff)). However, the record contains evidence that GTI "employed 31 full-time employees on July 18, 2014, [and] 27 full-time employees on July 17,2015." (Doc. 31–1 at 17).² All but four GTI employees spent most of their time completing work for customers in the field. All GTI employees worked in the field from time-to-time. Individuals employed by GTI had different skill sets, and would perform different duties based on customer needs.

At all relevant times, GTI employees have been required to adhere to policies in GTI's Employee Handbook, which GTI distributes and explains to all of its employees. GTI's Handbook includes Equal Opportunity and Americans with Disabilities Act policies, which, inter alia , call for reasonable accommodation of employee disabilities and strictly prohibit discrimination in all employment terms and conditions based on an employee's disability. Also, pursuant to GTI's Employee Handbook, employees are subject to discipline up to and including termination, for: poor job performance, unsatisfactory quality or quantity of work, failing to follow instructions or company procedure, failing to meet safety expectations, insubordination or refusal to perform work, disorderly conduct or acts of violence, misusing or destroying company property, and using illegal drugs or reporting to work under the influence of same.

B. Ronald Knight

Knight was employed by GTI as a "helper" from April 2006 until his termination on June 24, 2015. The duties of a helper include generator installation, simple directed wire splicing, and ditch digging.

Knight was diagnosed with Type 2 diabetes

in 2012. He takes metformin to control his diabetes and also takes medication for diabetic nerve damage in his feet. His diabetic condition constrains his diet, limiting the foods he is able to eat. Knight has to eat in order to keep his blood sugar up so that he can work.

1. Knight's Training, Certifications, and Abilities

Knight can only read "some" and cannot write. (Doc. 25–2 at 9(29); doc. 25–1 at 2, ¶ 8.b.). It is undisputed that Knight was never certified to perform tower climbs because he feared heights. Further, he obtained no industry or other certifications, and he did not attend any training or classes in the telecommunications field.

At all relevant times in this case, Knight reported to GTI's Chief Financial Officer Dr. Lee Chamoun, and Field Manager Jeff Bowerman.³ Chamoun states in his affidavit that:

Ron's skill set was the smallest of all employees who worked for the Company; coworkers reported occasions in which he aggressively declined to learn how to follow blueprints and perform even the simplest tasks, and he never pursued training opportunities.

(Doc. 25–1 at 5, ¶ 12.b.). Accordingly, "[Knight's] skills were confined to digging ditches and following specific A–B–C instructions on what wire to place where." (Doc. 25–1 at 3, ¶ 8.c.) Bowerman who has "worked with Ronald Knight for approximately twenty years," and who was Knight's supervisor at GTI, states the following in his declaration:

At GTI, Ronald Knight was typically assigned work tasks such as running pipe and simple electrical wiring. Mr. Knight's skills and job knowledge were limited in comparison to other employees under my supervision. Based on my observation, Mr. Knight was not able to read and/or write and did not have any desire to learn new technologies or skills. To my knowledge, Mr. Knight never expressed interest in attending training or classes to advance in the telecommunications field.

Because Mr. Knight was limited with regard to job skills and knowledge, I had to assign him to jobs that offered simple electrical work tasks. Unlike employees such as Michael Jones, Mr. Knight could not perform technical electrical tasks such as integration and fiber optic work on telecommunications job sites.

(Doc. 25–7 at 2, ¶¶ 5–6). Michael Jones, who worked with Ronald Knight "from approximately 2009 until [Knight's] employment ended," stated:

[Knight's]...