Knight v. Haviland, 2:09-cv-00281-JKS
| Decision Date | 10 August 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 2:09-cv-00281-JKS,2:09-cv-00281-JKS |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
| Parties | HARVEY KNIGHT, Petitioner, v. JOHN W. HAVILAND, Warden, California State Prison, Solano, Respondent. |
Harvey Knight, a state prisoner appearing pro se, filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus Relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Knight is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, incarcerated at the California State Prison, Solano. Respondent has answered, and Knight has replied.
Knight was convicted following a jury trial in the Los Angeles County Superior Court of three counts of Attempted Murder (Cal. Penal Code §§ 187(a), 664); three counts of Assault with a Firearm (Cal. Penal Code § 245(a)(2)), one count of Attempted Robbery (Cal. Penal Code §§ 211, 664), and one count of Robbery in the First Degree (Cal. Penal Code § 211), together with five enhancements for the use of a firearm (Cal. Penal Code § 12022.5) and five enhancements for inflicting great bodily injury (Cal. Penal Code § 12022.7). In April 1989 the trial court sentenced Knight to an indeterminate prison term of life with the possibility of parole, plus five years. Knight does not challenge his conviction or sentence in this proceeding.
In November 2007 Knight appeared for his fifth parole suitability hearing before the California Board of Parole Hearings ("Board). The Board, after finding Knight was not suitable for parole and would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society or a threat to public safety if released from prison, denied Knight parole for a period of two years. Knight timely filed a petition for habeas relief in the Los Angeles County Superior Court, which denied his petition in an unreported, reasoned decision. Knight's subsequent petition for habeas relief was summarily denied by the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, without opinion or citation to authority. The California Supreme Court summarily denied Knight's subsequent petition for habeas relief without opinion or citation to authority on December 23, 2008. Knight timely filed his Petition for relief in this Court on January 28, 2009.
Because the facts underlying Knight's conviction are well known to the parties and are unnecessary to a determination of the issues presented in Knight's Petition, they are not repeated here.
In his Petition, Knight raises three grounds: (1) the Board's unsuitability factors are unconstitutional; (2) the Board's decision to extend his term for an additional two years extends Knight's prison term beyond the maximum release date for the offenses for which he was convicted; and (3) the decision of the Board that he currently posed an unreasonable risk of danger to society was unsupported by relevant, reliable evidence. Respondent asserts no affirmative defense.1
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), this Court cannot grant relief unless the decision of the state court was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States" at the time the state court renders its decision or "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding."2 The Supreme Court has explained that "clearly established Federal law" in § 2254(d)(1) "refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court] as of the time of the relevant state-court decision."3 The holding must also be intended to be binding upon the states; that is, the decision must be based upon constitutional grounds, not on the supervisory power of the Supreme Court over federal courts.4 Thus, where holdings of the Supreme Court regarding the issue presented on habeas review are lacking, "it cannot be said that the state court 'unreasonabl[y] appli[ed] clearly established Federal law.'"5 When a claim falls under the "unreasonable application" prong, a state court's application of Supreme Court precedent mustbe objectively unreasonable, not just incorrect or erroneous.6 The Supreme Court has made clear that the objectively unreasonable standard is a substantially higher threshold than simply believing that the state court determination was incorrect.7 "[A]bsent a specific constitutional violation, federal habeas corpus review of trial error is limited to whether the error 'so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.'"8 In a federal habeas proceeding, the standard under which this Court must assess the prejudicial impact of constitutional error in a state court criminal proceeding is whether the error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the outcome.9 Knight has the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that he merits habeas relief.10
In applying this standard, this Court reviews the last reasoned decision by the state court.11 State appellate court decisions that summarily affirm a lower court's opinion without explanation are presumed to have adopted the reasoning of the lower court.12 This Court givesthe presumed decision of the state court the same AEDPA deference that it would give a reasoned decision of the state court.13
Under California's unique habeas procedure, a defendant who is denied habeas relief in the superior court files a new original petition for relief in the court of appeal. If denied relief by the court of appeal, the defendant has the option of either filing a new original petition for habeas relief or a petition for review of the court of appeal's denial in the California Supreme Court.14This is considered as the functional equivalent of the appeal process.15
Analysis starts with two principles. First, it is well-established by Supreme Court precedent that there is no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be conditionally released on parole before expiration of a sentence.16 A state may establish a parole system, but it is under no duty to do so.17 In creating a parole system, a state may be either specific or general in defining the conditions for release and the factors to be considered by the parole authority.18As the Supreme Court has observed, the inquiry by the parole authority is, in a sense, an "equity type judgment" that involves a synthesis of record facts and personal observation filtered through the experience of the decision maker and leading to the predictive judgment as to what is best forboth the individual inmate and for the community."19 In this respect, "the decision differs from the traditional mold of judicial decision making."20
If a state does create a parole system it may, as does California, create an enforceable liberty interest in parole protected by the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.21 That state-created liberty interest "is the interest in receiving parole when the California standards for parole have been met, and the minimum procedures adequate for due-process protection set forth in Greenholtz."22 The Constitution only requires that a prisoner be allowed an opportunity to be heard and be provided with a statement of the reasons why a parole is denied, nothing more.23 California prisoners are allowed to speak at their parole hearings and to contest the evidence against them, are afforded access to their records in advance, and are notified of the reasons why parole is denied. That is all that due process requires.24
Second, to the extent that Knight raises issues of the proper application of state law, they are beyond the purview of this Court in a federal habeas proceeding.25 "[The Supreme Court has] long recognized that a mere error of state law is not a denial of due process."26 "Federalcourts hold no supervisory authority over state judicial proceedings and may intervene only to correct wrongs of [federal] constitutional dimension."27
It is a fundamental precept of dual federalism that the states possess primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal law.28 "[A] state court's interpretation of state law, including one announced on direct appeal of the challenged conviction, binds a federal court sitting in habeas corpus."29 A determination of state law by a state intermediate appellate court is also binding in a federal habeas action.30 This is especially true where the highest court in the state has denied review of the lower court's decision.31
Knight argues that the suitability factors relied upon by the Board were unconstitutional and void on the basis that the administrative regulation establishing them32 exceeded the authority conferred by the California Legislature on the Board and were not reasonably necessary to effectuate the statute intended to be implemented. The Los Angeles County Superior Court rejected Knight's argument, holding: 33
The California Board of Parole Hearings is an executive department agency established by the California Legislature. Its powers and authority are delineated by California law. The extent of those powers and the Board's authority are purely questions of California law, beyond the purview of this Court in a federal habeas petition. Knight's argument on this ground is based upon California, not federal, law. Knight's reliance on Mistretta v. United States34 is misplaced. Mistretta was concerned with the powers of Congress to confer powers on federal administrative agencies under the separation of powers embodied in the Federal Constitution. Mistretta did not impose, and cannot be read as imposing, upon the several states a...
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