Knight v. Keane

• Decision Date: 16 October 2002
• Docket Number: No. 99 CIV. 3955 RMBKNF.,99 CIV. 3955 RMBKNF.
• Citation: 247 F.Supp.2d 379
• Parties: Stacy KNIGHT, Plaintiff, v. John P. KEANE, Superintendent, Sing Sing Correctional Facility; Sergeant H. Kerrigan, Sing Sing Correctional Facility; Thomas Dixon, Lieutenant, Attica Correctional Facility; Donald Selsky, Director of Special Housing Unit and Inmate Disciplinary Program, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

247 F.Supp.2d 379

Stacy KNIGHT, Plaintiff, v. John P. KEANE, Superintendent, Sing Sing Correctional Facility; Sergeant H. Kerrigan, Sing Sing Correctional Facility; Thomas Dixon, Lieutenant, Attica Correctional Facility; Donald Selsky, Director of Special Housing Unit and Inmate Disciplinary Program, Defendants.

No. 99 CIV. 3955 RMBKNF.

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

October 16, 2002.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Stacy Knight (Pro Se), Wallkill, for plaintiff.

Ken Jones, Assistant Attorney General, New York, for defendant.

ORDER

BERMAN, District Judge.

I. Background

On or about June 1, 1999, pro se Plaintiff Stacy Knight ("Plaintiff), incarcerated at Shawangunk Correctional Facility, commenced this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 against Defendants John P. Keane ("Keane"), Superintendent, Sing Sing Correctional Facility, Sergeant H. Kerrigan ("Kerrigan"), Sing Sing Correctional Facility, Thomas Dixon ("Dixon"), Lieutenant, Attica Correctional Facility, and Donald Selsky ("Selksy"), Director of Special Housing Unit and Inmate Disciplinary Program, Department of Corrections ("DOCS") (collectively, "Defendants"). Plaintiff alleged that: (1) Defendants violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by confining him to "keeplock" for 365 days following an October 1996 disciplinary hearing;¹ (2) Defendants violated his First Amendment right to receive and send mail by confiscating his personal correspondence; and (2) Defendants Kerrigan and Dixon conspired to violate his civil rights. Complaint at IV, Statement of Claim, ¶¶ 1-10, and V.² Plaintiffs claims relate to the seizure of a letter he wrote to his mother dated October 13, 1996, during a facilitywide lockdown at Sing Sing Correctional Facility ("Sing Sing") following the stabbing of three inmates in October of 1996.³ Complaint at IV, Statement of Claim ¶ 1-5. The letter was relied upon at the October 1996 disciplinary hearing, following which Plaintiff was found guilty of assaulting another inmate. Id. ¶ 111, 2, 4, 9.

Prior to bringing this action, Plaintiff appealed the disciplinary hearing determination to Selsky, who affirmed the decision. Id. 1110. Plaintiff thereafter commenced an Article 78 proceeding in New York State Supreme Court. Id. The matter was "transferred" to the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, which on November 13, 1998, vacated the disciplinary determination because the "record in the instant case [did] not contain a written authorization allowing prison officials to open and read petitioner's outgoing correspondence. Under those circumstances, we conclude that the evidence utilized at the hearing was seized in contravention of respondent's rules and regulations." Knight v. Goord, 255 A.D.2d 930, 681 N.Y.S.2d 719, 720 (4th Dep't 1998).

On or about February 28, 2000, Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) ("Def.Mem."), arguing that: (1) Plaintiff was not deprived of his constitutional rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments because his keeplock confinement was not an "atypical and significant hardship," Def. Mem. at 6; (2) Plaintiff was not deprived of his First Amendment rights because interception of Plaintiffs mail occurred during a facilitywide mail watch which was reasonably related to the "legitimate penological interest of restoring order and safety," id. at 9, and (3) Defendants are protected by qualified immunity. Id. at 12. Plaintiff submitted an opposition to Defendants' motion entitled "Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs Motion to Grant Complaint and Proceed for Summary Judgment," dated February 4, 2000 ("Pl.Mot"). Defendants' filed a reply memorandum on March 27, 2000. Defendants' Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Fed. R.Civ. P. 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss, dated March 24, 2000.

On or about June 28, 2002, United States Magistrate Judge Kevin Nathaniel Fox, to whom this matter had been referred, issued a report and recommendation ("Report") recommending that Defendants' motion to dismiss be denied with respect to Plaintiffs Fourteenth Amendment claim against Defendants Kerrigan, Dixon and Selsky because, "[i]n the absence of [a more detailed factual record] ... it does not appear beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his procedural due process claim." Id. at 9. The Report also recommends against dismissal of Plaintiffs Eighth Amendment claim as to these (three) Defendants because it "does not appear that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his allegation that defendants have violated his constitutional right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment." Id. at 10. Magistrate Fox also recommends Plaintiffs First Amendment claim go forward where "the record evidence is insufficient to establish that inspection of plaintiffs mail was based on good cause." Id. at 11. The Report further recommends that "defendants' motion to dismiss ... be granted with respect to plaintiffs § 1985 claim against [Defendants Kerrigan and Dixon," id. at 17, absent "specific facts in support of a conspiracy on the part of the defendants." Id. at 14 n. 6. With respect to Defendant Keane, the Report found Plaintiffs "broad and conclusory allegation" that Keane "was negligent in supervising subordinates who committed wrongful acts" was "insufficient to state a claim under § 1983." Id. at 14.

The Report notifies the parties that "[pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c) and Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall have ten (10) days from service of this Report to file written objections." Id at 17. On July 26, 2002, Defendants filed objections ("Objections") to the Report. Plaintiff has not submitted a response or any objections. For the reasons stated below, the Report is adopted in part and rejected in part.⁴

II. Standard of Review

A district court evaluating a Magistrate's report may adopt those portions of the report to which no "specific, written objection" is made, as long as those sections are not clearly erroneous. Fed. R.Civ.P. 72(b); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L.Ed.2d 435 (1985); Greene v. WCI Holdings Corp., 956 F.Supp. 509, 513 (S.D.N.Y.1997). "Where a party makes a `specific written objection' within `[ten] days after being served with a copy of the [magistrate judge's] recommended disposition,' however, the district court is required to make a de novo determination regarding those parts of the report." Cespedes v. Coughlin, 956 F.Supp. 454, 463 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (quoting United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676, 100 S.Ct. 2406, 65 L.Ed.2d 424 (1980)). A district judge may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings and recommendations of the Magistrate. See DeLuca v. Lord, 858 F.Supp. 1330, 1345 (S.D.N.Y.1994); Walker v. Hood 679 F.Supp. 372, 374 (S.D.N.Y.1988).

A court may dismiss an action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), only if "`it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which will entitle him to relief.'" Cohen v. Koenig, 25 F.3d 1168, 1172 (2d Cir.1994) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). The court must "view the complaint in the light most favorable to plaintiff and accept all allegations in the complaint as true." Jackson v. Goord 1997 WL 728243, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.20, 1997). Where, as here, a party is proceeding pro se, the court has an obligation to "read [the pro se party's] supporting papers liberally, and ... interpret them to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest." Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir.1994) (emphasis added); see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976).

III. Analysis

The facts as set forth in the Report are incorporated by reference unless otherwise noted.

The Court has conducted a de novo review of the Report, the record, applicable legal authorities, along with the Objections. As to the portions of the Report to which no objections have been made, the Court concludes that the Report is not facially erroneous or contrary to law. See Pizarro v. Bartlett, 776 F.Supp. 815, 817 (S.D.N.Y.1991) ("the Court is permitted to adopt those sections of the report to which no objections have been made and which are not facially erroneous").

The Objections are addressed below in the order presented by Defendants. See Objections at 5-16.

A. First Amendment Claim

Defendants object to the Report's conclusion that "there is not `a sufficiently detailed record' to justify dismissing plaintiffs First Amendment claim." Objections at 5. Defendants argue, among other things, that the Report "fails to acknowledge the `heightened deference' to which the defendants' security related determinations are entitled."⁵ Id. at 5.

The Magistrate acknowledges that "the prevention of ongoing criminal activity and the preservation of prison security and discipline constitute legitimate penological interests." Id. at 12. See also Giano v. Senkowski 54 F.3d 1050, 1055 (2d Cir.1995) ("[p]rison officials must be given latitude to anticipate the probable consequences of certain speech, and must be allowed to take reasonable steps to forestall violence"). As Magistrate Fox also noted, "[p]rison inmates have a First Amendment right to the free flow of their mail, both incoming and outgoing," Report at 10, and that "under the circumstances, the inspection of plaintiffs outgoing mail cannot be said to have been reasonably related to those interests."⁶ Id. at 12.

"Prison restrictions on inmate mail must be reasonably related to prison interests in security and order." France v. Coughlin, 1987 WL 10724, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 1987); Duamutef v. Hollins, 297 F.3d 108, 112 (2d Cir.2002) ("restrictions that implicate prisoners' constitutional rights may be upheld if they are `reasonably related to legitimate penological interests' ") (quoting Turner v. Safley,...