Knight v. Knight
| Decision Date | 30 June 1938 |
| Docket Number | No. 1388.,1388. |
| Citation | 200 A. 431 |
| Parties | KNIGHT v. KNIGHT. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Certified from Superior Court, Kent County.
Suit in equity by Hazel L. Knight against Albina Knight for the construction of a will of Willard W. Knight, deceased, and for determination of what interests or estates were devised and bequeathed to the complainant and respondent respectively. When the pleadings were closed, there being no issues of fact between the parties, the suit being ready for hearing for final decree was certified to the Supreme Court for determination.
Decree in accordance with opinion.
Joseph R. McKanna, of West Warwick, for complainant. Grim & Littlefield and Benjamin W. Grim, all of Providence, for respondent.
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This is a suit in equity brought by the daughter of Willard W. Knight, who at the time of his death was a resident of this state and left a will that was duly admitted to probate. The suit was brought against his widow as executrix and also as a devisee and legatee under the will; and the prayer of the amended bill of complaint is that the will be construed, and that it be determined what interests or estates were devised and bequeathed to the complainant and respondent respectively. When the pleadings were closed, there being no issues of fact between the parties, the suit, being ready for hearing for final decree, was certified to this court for determination, under General Laws 1923, chapter 339, sec. 35.
The second clause of the will is the only one the construction of which is sought. It is claimed by the respondent that the language of the first clause, just because it contains a bequest of $1000 to the complainant, supports the respondent's contention that under the second clause the complainant received no valid estate or interest in the property of the testator. We cannot see any merit in that claim; and therefore now quote only the second clause, as follows:
The contention of the widow is that by the first part of that clause, including all of it except the last sentence, she is given an absolute title to the residue of the estate, both real and personal; and that the last sentence, purporting to provide that on the death of the widow the remainder shall become the property of the daughter, is repugnant to the first part of the clause and is therefore null and void.
There is no doubt, and indeed the daughter admits, that the doctrine of repugnancy is in force in this state. But she contends that as there are no words of inheritance or of absolute gift in the former part of the clause, and as it is quite reasonable and involves no inconsistency, when the whole clause is read together, to construe the first part as giving the widow only a life estate in the residuary real and personal property, coupled with very broad powers of control, sale, use and consumption, there is no repugnancy between the two parts of the clause.
Therefore, the daughter contends, there is no reason in law why the daughter should not have the right, under the second part, to receive, on the widow's death, any and all of the property, given to the widow for life under the first part of the clause, which may then remain unconsumed by the latter in the exercise of the powers of use and consumption given her, and in whatever form it may then be in consequence of the exercise by the widow of her powers of control, sale, etc. In our opinion, these contentions of the daughter...
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