Knight v. Mills
| Decision Date | 09 September 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. 87-1156,87-1156 |
| Citation | 836 F.2d 659 |
| Parties | Norman KNIGHT, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. Mark J. MILLS, etc., et al., Defendants, Appellees. . Heard |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit |
Craig A. MacDonnell with whom Valerie C. Samuels and Nutter, McClennen & Fish, Boston, Mass., were on brief, for plaintiff, appellant.
Marjorie Heins, Massachusetts Civ. Liberties Union Foundation, Robert Weber and David Engle, Mental Health Legal Advisors Committee, Boston, Mass., on brief for the Civ. Liberties Union of Massachusetts and the Mental Health Legal Advisors Committee, amici curiae.
Linda G. Katz, Asst. Atty. Gen., Crim. Bureau, with whom James M. Shannon, Atty. Gen., and A. John Pappalardo, Deputy Atty. Gen., Chief, Crim. Bureau, Boston, Mass., were on brief, for defendants, appellees.
Before CAMPBELL, Chief Judge, GARTH, * Senior Circuit Judge, and SELYA, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff-appellant, Norman Knight ("Knight") is a psychiatric patient at the Bridgewater Treatment Center (the "Treatment Center") who has been involuntarily committed for a period of one-day-to-life as a sexually dangerous person ("SDP") pursuant to Mass.Gen.L. ch. 123A, Secs. 1, 6 (1984). Knight brought this action against defendants-appellees Mark J. Mills ("Mills"), formerly the Massachusetts Commissioner of Mental Health, and Richard Boucher ("Boucher"), the Treatment Center's Chief Administrator, under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. Knight sought money damages as well as a declaratory judgment that, under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, he was entitled to psychological treatment while committed to the Treatment Center. 1
The district court granted Mills' motion for summary judgment on two grounds: first, that the Constitution does not contemplate a per se right to psychological treatment for involuntarily committed mental patients; and second, that, even if a per se right to treatment were recognized, Mills, as a government official, was entitled to qualified immunity from liability under Sec. 1983.
With respect to Mills' codefendant Boucher, the district court dismissed Knight's suit under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Because this action involves still other claims and parties, the district court directed entry of a final judgment as to Mills and Boucher pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.Pro. 54(b). 2
We are of the opinion that Mills and Boucher, as state officials, are entitled to qualified immunity from civil damages and that Knight's request for declaratory relief cannot be granted on this record. Thus, we will affirm the district court's order without considering Knight's substantive due process arguments. 3
On April 8, 1968, Knight was convicted of assault with a dangerous weapon and was sentenced to a prison term of 3-to-5 years. In late May of the same year, Knight was convicted of a second crime, not described in the record, and was sentenced to 3-to-7 years of imprisonment to be served concurrently with the aforementioned sentence. In July of 1970, again for reasons not made explicit in the record on appeal, Knight was adjudicated to be a sexually dangerous person pursuant to Mass.Gen.L. ch. 123A, Secs. 1, 6 (1984), and was civilly committed to the Treatment Center for a period of one-day-to-life.
In 1975, while participating in a gradual release program, Knight escaped from the Treatment Center. The Massachusetts Board of Parole issued a parole violation warrant but was unsuccessful in its attempt to locate and recommit Knight to the Treatment Center. On July 16, 1975, Knight was arrested in Providence, Rhode Island and was subsequently convicted of assault with intent to rape and assault with a dangerous weapon, for which he received concurrent ten year sentences.
On January 16, 1981, after having served six years in a Rhode Island prison, Knight was released and paroled to the outstanding Massachusetts warrant that had been issued after Knight's escape from the Treatment Center. According to Knight's complaint and affidavit, neither of which was contested on this point, Knight received no psychological therapy from the date of his return to the Treatment Center until early November of 1981, despite repeated requests for such treatment. The record reveals, however, that, while Knight did not receive the requested individualized therapy until November of 1981, he had in fact been offered, and rejected, some form of prescribed group therapy in August 1981.
Knight alleges that his initial receipt of treatment in November of 1981, and the fact that he continues to receive treatment, stem solely from his legal challenge to the Treatment Center's refusal to grant him the requested treatment.
We preface our discussion of the issues presented on appeal with the observation that our disposition is affected in large part by the state of the record. Thus, at the outset, we are compelled to focus our attention on that aspect of the instant action.
Knight filed his initial pro se complaint in September 1981. Thereafter he amended his pro se complaint in December 1981. It was this amended pro se complaint which was the subject of Boucher's motion to dismiss. On December 16, 1981, when Boucher moved to dismiss, no allegation appeared in the December 1981 pro se complaint charging that Boucher had violated the federal constitution or other federal laws. Thus, the December 1981 pro se complaint did not satisfy the requirements for a Sec. 1983 cause of action against Boucher. See Williams v. City of Boston, 784 F.2d 430, 434 (1st Cir.1986).
In August 1982, Knight alleged certain additional conclusory facts with respect to his claim that he was receiving inadequate treatment. These allegations, which appear in Knight's brief but not in the record, may have surfaced as a result of an application made by Knight for appointment of counsel, but because the record is silent in this respect, we cannot be certain. In any event, on September 30, 1982, Knight executed an affidavit which included reference to Boucher in its last paragraph. Knight claimed that Boucher was one of some six individuals who had told him (Knight) to take his requests for a therapist to court. This statement had allegedly been made by Boucher in February 1981.
On November 7, 1983 the Magistrate entered a "Procedural Order" which treated Knight's September 30, 1982 affidavit as an amendment to Knight's December 1981 amended pro se complaint. At no time however, did Knight, as a pro se claimant, amend his complaint again to reflect the statements which appear in his affidavit. Once again, Boucher moved to dismiss, as did certain other defendants, including Mills.
On December 14, 1984, the district court ruled on the motions to dismiss, but without identifying whether its ruling was addressed to Boucher's first motion brought against Knight's September 1981 pro se complaint or Boucher's second motion brought against Knight's amended December 1981 pro se complaint. The district court granted Boucher's motion, without permitting Knight leave to amend, stating "that [it could not] see how an amendment could cure the defect in the claim against [Boucher]." The same order granted Mills' motion to dismiss, but permitted Knight leave to amend his complaint, requiring Knight to set forth "with specificity" the claims against Mills and a co-defendant, Dennis McNamara, who was the Director of Operations at the Treatment Center.
By this time, however, counsel had been appointed for Knight, and it was counsel who filed a second amended complaint on January 15, 1985. This complaint named only Mills and McNamara as defendants--Boucher, as noted, having been previously dismissed. 4 Whereas Knight's initial and amended pro se complaints were verified complaints, the second amended complaint filed on Knight's behalf by counsel, was not.
In June 1985, Mills moved for summary judgment, and in the alternative, moved that the claims against him be dismissed. The only affidavit accompanying Mills' motion was that of McNamara, the Director of Operations. That affidavit described the treatment that Knight had received during his stay at the Treatment Center from July 2, 1970 through 1985, and apparently continuing to date.
Knight filed a memorandum opposing Mills' motion for summary judgment. This memorandum was accompanied by an affidavit by Knight describing the treatment he had received while committed to the treatment center.
On June 19, 1986, in an opinion by District Court Judge McNaught, Mills' motion for summary judgment was granted and Knight's motion to have the district court reconsider its December 14, 1984 ruling dismissing Boucher was denied.
On September 12, 1986, Knight's attorney moved for a 54(b) certification asking "... that the court determine that there was no just reason for delay and that it direct the entry of final judgment as to defendants Mark J. Mills and Richard Boucher." Endorsed at the foot of that motion under the date of January 23, 1987, the district court ruled See note 2 supra. It was from that order that this appeal was noticed.
We have detailed this chronology not only because of what appears of record, but because of what does not appear. The most notable omission of course is the absence of affidavits filed on behalf of Mills. Mills it will be recalled, had moved for summary judgment arguing in his trial memorandum, (although not specified as such in his moving papers), that: (1) Knight had no constitutional right to treatment and even if such right existed, it was not violated; (2) that Mills had qualified immunity and was immune from damages; and (3) that the federal court had no power over any pendent state law claim. 5 While it is difficult to discern on what basis the district court granted Mills' summary judgment motion, we...
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