Knight v. Mississippi Transp. Com'n

• Decision Date: 21 April 2009
• Docket Number: No. 2008-CA-00897-COA.,2008-CA-00897-COA.
• Parties: Joe KNIGHT, Wrongful Death Beneficiaries of Charles Prather, Deceased and Brandi Holland, Wrongful Death Beneficiary of Carolyn Prather, Deceased, Appellants v. MISSISSIPPI TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION, Appellee.
• Court: Mississippi Court of Appeals

10 So.3d 962

Joe KNIGHT, Wrongful Death Beneficiaries of Charles Prather, Deceased and Brandi Holland, Wrongful Death Beneficiary of Carolyn Prather, Deceased, Appellants v. MISSISSIPPI TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION, Appellee.

No. 2008-CA-00897-COA.

Court of Appeals of Mississippi.

April 21, 2009.

A.E. (Rusty) Harlow, Jr., Sabrina Ann Davidson, Kathi Leigh Chrestman, attorneys for appellants.

F. Ewin Henson III, Greenwood, attorney for appellee.

Before KING, C.J., ROBERTS and CARLTON, JJ.

CARLTON, J., for the Court.

¶ 1. Charles and Carolyn Prather died in a car accident after crashing into a bridge on Mississippi Highway 8 in Calhoun County, Mississippi. Their beneficiaries, the Appellants,¹ filed a wrongful death suit against the Mississippi Transportation Commission (MTC). The Appellants claimed in their suit that the MTC had negligently maintained Highway 8 and had failed to warn of dangerous conditions on the road, thus, causing the Prathers' deaths. The MTC moved for summary judgment and claimed immunity under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA) pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated section 11-46-9(1)(d) (Supp.2008). The circuit court granted the MTC's motion for summary judgment. The Appellants argue on appeal that the circuit court erred in granting the MTC's motion for summary judgment because the MTC was not entitled to governmental immunity under section 11-46-9(1)(v) (Supp.2008) of the MTCA. We find no error and affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2. While driving in the rain late at night, Charles hydroplaned on Highway 8 and crashed into a bridge. He and his wife, Carolyn, died instantly as a result of the crash. The Appellants subsequently sued the MTC for the Prathers' alleged wrongful deaths. The MTC moved for summary judgment and claimed that it was exempt from liability pursuant to section 11-46-9(1)(d) of the MTCA. Section 11-46-9(1)(d) reads:

(1) A governmental entity and its employees acting within the course and scope of their employment or duties shall not be liable for any claim:

. . . .

(d) Based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a governmental entity or employee thereof, whether or not the discretion be abused[.]

¶ 3. The circuit court stated the following in its order granting MTC's motion for summary judgment:

The maintenance of Highway No. 8 at the time of the accident required the exercise of engineering judgment and judgment as to the allocation of limited financial resources in order to perform maintenance on the various public highways within the district where the bridge is located.... The maintenance of [Highway 8] at the time of the accident was a discretionary function. The [MTC] used ordinary care in maintaining the bridge and the highway approaching the bridge.² The Court is therefore of the opinion that [the] Plaintiffs have failed to convince the Court that the maintenance of [Highway 8] and the bridge in question is ministerial.

¶ 4. The Appellants claim that the MTC was liable for the Prathers' deaths because the MTC had failed to (1) maintain Highway 8 so as to minimize hydroplaning in rainy conditions, (2) put guardrails on the bridge the Prathers crashed into, and (3) warn the public of the dangerous conditions on Highway 8. The Appellants claim that by statute (although they fail to cite to any governing statutory authority regarding the maintenance of highways in their briefs), the MTC is charged with the duty to keep existing bridges and roadways in compliance with the latest safety designs and appurtenances and that the MTC failed to do so in this case. See Miss.Code Ann. §§ 65-1-61 (Rev.2005) and 65-1-65 (Rev.2005) (directing the MTC to consider funding and practicability when maintaining and repairing roads).³

¶ 5. The Appellants also claim that the MTC failed to comply with the MTC's "overall objective" in its design manual. The Appellants cite to section 11-2.07.04, allegedly of the MTC's design manual, entitled "Safety Appurtenances," which states, in part, that "[d]uring the design of a 3R project, all existing safety appurtenances should be examined to determine if they meet all the latest safety performance and design criteria." However, the Appellants never contend that the maintenance of Highway 8 was a 3R design project.

¶ 6. The Appellants cite subsections 11-46-9(1)(d), (g), and (v) in support of their proposition that this Court should reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment and allow this matter to proceed to trial on the issues of fact. Subsections 11-46-9(1)(d), (g), and (v) read as follows:

(1) A governmental entity and its employees acting within the course and scope of their employment or duties shall not be liable for any claim:

. . . .

(d) Based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a governmental entity or employee thereof, whether or not the discretion be abused;

. . . .

(g) Arising out of the exercise of discretion in determining whether or not to seek or provide the resources necessary for the purchase of equipment, the construction or maintenance of facilities, the hiring of personnel and, in general, the provision of adequate governmental services;

. . . .

(v) Arising out of an injury caused by a dangerous condition on property of the governmental entity that was not caused by the negligent or other wrongful conduct of an employee of the governmental entity or of which the governmental entity did not have notice, either actual or constructive, and adequate opportunity to protect or warn against; provided, however, that a governmental entity shall not be liable for the failure to warn of a dangerous condition which is obvious to one exercising due care[.]

¶ 7. In turn, the MTC states that the trial court properly granted MTC's motion for summary judgment based on the discretionary exception from liability under section 11-46-9(1)(d). Additionally, the MTC claims that its motion for summary judgment was also properly granted based on supporting documents, which included the affidavit of MTC's former District Two Engineer, Jimmy Dickerson. The MTC contends that Dickerson's affidavit demonstrates that the MTC was authorized by statute to use its discretion in maintaining the roads under its jurisdiction and considered the policy implications of doing so. The MTC states the following in its brief about Dickerson's deposition and affidavit testimony:

Because funds were limited for purposes of performing maintenance on existing state highways such as Mississippi Highway 8, the District Engineer [Dickerson] had to make judgment calls when work appears to be necessary as to what type of work is to be performed in order to maintain or upgrade the various highways within the [d]istrict. There must be a balancing of the competing needs for maintenance within the [d]istrict and judgment calls made as to when and where work will be performed and to what extent any safety upgrades are necessary or desirable considering the funding available for each year and the needs and/or conditions of the various highways within the [d]istrict.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 8. For a summary judgment motion to be properly granted, no genuine issue of material fact can exist, and the moving party must be entitled to judgment as a matter of law. M.R.C.P. 56(c). We apply a de novo standard of review to a trial court's grant of summary judgment. Moss v. Batesville Casket Co., 935 So.2d 393, 398(¶ 15) (Miss.2006). "The moving party has the burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact exists, and the non-moving party must be given the benefit of the doubt concerning the existence of a material fact." Howard v. City of Biloxi, 943 So.2d 751, 754(¶ 4) (Miss.Ct. App.2006).

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE MTC IS IMMUNE FROM SUIT PURSUANT TO THE MTCA.

¶ 9. The principal statutory law relevant to this case falls under the MTCA pursuant to section 11-46-9(1)(a-y) (Supp.2008). This section is used to determine whether governmental entities and their employees acting within the scope of their duties are immune from liability pursuant to the exemptions found therein. Miss. Dep't of Transp. v. Trosclair, 851 So.2d 408, 413(¶ 12) (Miss.Ct.App.2003).

¶ 10. The Appellants claim that the MTC bears liability under the MTCA based on section 11-46-9(1)(v) as the rutting on Highway 8 was an unobvious, dangerous condition of which the MTC had knowledge, and, of which, the MTC did not warn the public. The Appellants conclude that the failure to warn of a known, unobvious danger is not discretionary pursuant to section 11-46-9(1)(d). Rather, the Appellants contend it is a ministerial duty to warn pursuant to section 11-46-9(1)(v); therefore, the MTC is not immune from suit in this case.

¶ 11. In turn, the MTC argues that the maintenance of the public highways and the placement of warning signs are discretionary functions pursuant to section 11-46-9(1)(d). Furthermore, the MTC argues that pursuant to Willing v. Estate of Benz, 958 So.2d 1240, 1254-55(¶ 40) (Miss.Ct. App.2007), the MTC is exempt from liability because if one of the exemptions from liability found in section 11-46-9(1)(a-y) applies, it does not matter if the application of other exemptions in that section involve a question of material fact; summary judgment must be granted on the exemption established as a matter of law.

¶ 12. In order to address the merits of the Appellants' and MTC's arguments, our discussion will cover three areas: (1) strict construction of the MTCA, (2) discretionary acts pursuant to 11-46-9(1)(d), and (3) "Frasier's Octupus."

I. Strict Construction of the MTCA

¶ 13. As to sovereign immunity, "when [the supreme court] abolished common-law sovereign immunity in Pruett v. City of Rosedale, 421 So.2d 1046 (Miss.1982), [the court] expressly stated that [it][was]...