Knight v. Pennsylvania R.R.

• Decision Date: 24 October 1939
• Citation: 280 Ky. 191
• Parties: Knight v. Pennsylvania R.R.
• Court: Supreme Court of Kentucky

280 Ky. 191

Knight v. Pennsylvania R.R.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky. Common Pleas Branch, Third Division.

October 24, 1939.

1. Pleading. — A demurrer to a reply to plea of jurisdiction searches the entire record in testing its sufficiency on the question of jurisdiction.

2. Pleading. — On demurrer to reply to the plea of jurisdiction, court would accept as true the allegations of fact against defendant where they were admitted or denied and consider favorable allegations which were not controverted.

3. Pleading. — In action against terminal carrier for damage to interstate

shipment of livestock, allegation of reply to plea of jurisdiction that there would be no inconvenience or expense or detriment such as would burden interstate commerce by trying the case in Jefferson county, Ky., presented a mixed allegation of fact and conclusion of law.

4. Carriers. — Under statute providing that an action against a carrier for injury to property must be brought in county in which defendant resides, and statute providing that transitory action may be brought in county in which defendant resides, an action to recover for loss and damage to shipment of freight is a "transitory action" maintainable wherever railroad carrier may be brought before the court (Civil Code of Practice, secs. 73, 78).

5. Carriers. — Under federal statute imposing liability for damages to shipments on any carrier delivering goods in the course of interstate transportation, the responsibility of all carriers handling a shipment is unified, since otherwise suit could only be maintained as against carrier which committed some breach of duty on its lines (Interstate Commerce Act, sec. 20(11), 49 U.S.C.A., sec. 20(11)).

6. Courts. — That right of action arises under federal statute imposing liability for damages to shipment upon any carrier delivering shipment in the course of interstate transportation does not deprive state court of jurisdiction which is concurrent with the federal courts (Interstate Commerce Act, sec. 20(11), 49 U.S. C.A., sec. 20(11)).

7. Courts. — The interpretation of a federal statute by the United States Supreme Court is entitled not only to great deference but to absolute obedience.

8. Carriers. — The federal statute imposing liability on terminal carrier for damages to interstate shipment did not enlarge venue of action as against foreign corporation as the initial carrier, nor make it liable to suit, where it was not carrying on business in the sense which had theretofore been necessary to confer jurisdiction (Interstate Commerce Act, sec. 20(11), 49 U.S.C.A., sec. 20(11)).

9. Carriers. — Where statute providing that an action against a terminal carrier for damage to interstate shipment shall be brought, "if in the district court of the United States, only in a district, and if in a state court only in a state through or into which the defendant carrier operates a line of railroad," is a restriction and also a recognition if not a grant of jurisdiction of a state court "through or into which the defendant carrier operates a line of railroad" (Interstate Commerce Act, sec. 20(11), 49 U.S.C.A., sec. 20(11)).

10. Carriers. — Under federal statute imposing liability on terminal carrier for damage to interstate shipment, where railroad operated line of railroad and had division offices in Jefferson county, Ky., wherein consignor of livestock shipment resided, Jefferson circuit court had jurisdiction of action for damages to interstate

shipment of livestock (Civil Code of Practice, secs. 73, 78; Interstate Commerce Act, sec. 20(11), 49 U.S.C.A., sec. 20(11)).

11. Carriers. — An action under federal statute imposing liability upon terminal carrier for damages to interstate shipment of freight may be maintained in any state where railroad company operates line of railroad, even though the cause of action arose outside the state (Interstate Commerce Act, sec. 20(11), 49 U.S.C.A., sec. 20(11)).

12. Commerce. — That railroad did only an interstate business in Kentucky, and that it would be inconvenienced if action against it or terminal carrier for damage to interstate shipment of livestock were brought in Jefferson county, wherein railroad had line of railroad and division officer, was not determinative of whether action could be maintained against railroad in Jefferson county (Interstate Commerce Act, sec. 20(11), 49 U.S.C.A., sec. 20(11)).

Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court.

Thomas C. Mapother, Sr., for appellant.

Crawford, Middleton, Milner & Seelbach for appellee.

Before Wm. H. Field, Judge.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY STANLEY, COMMISSIONER.

Reversing.

The question is one of jurisdiction. The trial court, deciding the case upon the pleadings, held that the Jefferson circuit court was without jurisdiction. We summarize the pleadings so as to disclose the only features necessary to be considered in solving the problem posed by the appeal of the plaintiff.

The plaintiff sued to recover loss and damage to livestock shipped from points in Virginia to a point in Pennsylvania, the defendant Pennsylvania Railroad Company being only the terminal carrier. He stated that both he and the defendant resided in Jefferson County. The defendant filed a plea to the jurisdiction of the court in which it denied that the plaintiff resided in Jefferson County, and affirmed that he resided in Tennessee. It averred that the shipments were in interstate commerce and were never in Kentucky and none of its agents in Kentucky had anything to do with the transactions; that it is a Pennsylvania corporation and that its operations in Kentucky are in Louisville for terminal purposes and that it engages only in interstate transportation in this state; that in one shipment described in the petition Hamilton was the consignor and Lorah the consignee, and in the other that King was the consignor and Dunlap the consignee, and that in both the Norfolk and Western Railroad Company was the initial carrier, which had issued the bills of lading that the alleged cause of action had been assigned to plaintiff by the consignors. It was further averred that claims for loss and damage to freight against interstate carriers and this defendant were numerous and often the amounts large; that these transactions were remote from Jefferson County, Kentucky. It was elaborately pleaded that a trial there would be inconvenient and expensive to the defendant in overcoming the presumptions of liability which the law imposes upon a carrier; that to properly develop this and other like cases would require the testimony of numerous witnesses from various points through which the shipments were carried and would require the absence of employees from their customary positions; that it would impair the efficiency and operation of the railroad and burden interstate commerce. It was further set out that the courts of Virginia and Pennsylvania, the places where the witnesses were engaged in their work and could testify without leaving their customary occupations and traveling great distances, were available to the plaintiff for redress. It was pleaded that under the specified conditions to construe the sections of the Kentucky Civil Code of Practice relating to the venue of actions against common carriers in the several counties so as to vest jurisdiction of the court in this case would violate the commerce and equal protection clauses of the Constitution of the United States (U.S.C.A. Constitution, Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3; Amendment 14).

The court overruled a demurrer to the pleading, and the plaintiff filed a reply in which he denied practically all of its allegations. He affirmatively pleaded the application of the Interstate Commerce Act of Congress making the delivering carrier of a shipment liable for its loss or damage, and specifically relied upon that part of the act relating to the jurisdiction of State courts of actions therefor, which will be presently considered. It was further averred that in Jefferson County, Kentucky, the defendant operates a line of railroad for both freight and passenger trains; owns extensive properties; has both freight and passenger depot and officers; and employs many agents and servants, including a division passenger agent and division freight agent, important officers of the company. It was further averred that the company, a foreign railroad corporation, had complied with the terms of Section 841, of the Kentucky Statutes, relating to domestication within the state for the purpose of operating railroads herein, and had its principal office and place of business in Jefferson County. The plaintiff alleged that he had taken formal assignments to himself from the consignors named in the bills of lading because they were his agents and he was the owner of the livestock, and because such assignments had been made to meet the requirements of the defendant's freight claim agent, with whom the claims had been filed. It was further stated that the points of origin, transportation and destination are within 24 hours travel of Louisville, that the testimony of all witnesses could be given by deposition, and it was not essential that they should appear in person.

The court sustained a demurrer to this reply to the plea of jurisdiction. The plaintiff suffered the dismissal of his petition by declining to plead further, and brings an appeal.

The demurrer searches the entire record in testing its sufficiency on the question of jurisdiction. For that test we accept as true the allegations of fact against the defendant railroad company, whether they are admitted or denied, and consider its favorable allegations which are not controverted. Those allegations may be thus condensed and arranged. The plaintiff is a resident of Jefferson County, Kentucky, and the consignor and owner of the shipments. The defendant is also a resident of that county where it operates a line of railroad and has division officers. The defendant was the terminal...