Knight v. State

• Citation: 907 So.2d 470
• Parties: Gregory KNIGHT v. STATE of Alabama.
• Decision Date: 01 October 2004
• Court: Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

907 So.2d 470

Gregory KNIGHT v. STATE of Alabama.

CR-00-2694.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

October 1, 2004.

Opinion on Return to Remand February 25, 2005.

Richard D. Jensen, Foley, for appellant.

William H. Pryor, Jr., and Troy King, attys. gen., and Kristi L. Deason Hagood and Stephen Shows, asst. attys. gen., for appellee.

WISE, Judge.

The appellant, Gregory Knight, was convicted of murdering his wife, Latisha Knight, while she was in a motor vehicle, an offense defined as capital by § 13A-5-40(a)(17), Ala.Code 1975. The jury recommended, by a vote of 10-2, that Knight be sentenced to death. The circuit court accepted the jury's recommendation and sentenced Knight to death.

The State's evidence tended to show the following. On June 17, 2000, Knight stabbed his wife to death while the two were in a motor vehicle. At the time of the murder Knight and Latisha had been married for two years but were separated. The couple had one child together and Latisha had another child while Knight was serving a prison sentence in Florida.¹ On the day before the murder Knight asked Latisha if he could come and visit the children. Latisha said that he could not. Later that day Knight saw Latisha and his cousin out together. Knight thought his wife and cousin were having an affair, and he became angry.

The next day Latisha came over to Knight's father's house and asked Knight to come and talk with her. When Knight left the house he took a butcher knife from the kitchen with him. As the two were driving in Latisha's car Latisha received a telephone call from Knight's cousin. Knight became angry, pulled out the butcher knife, and ordered Latisha to stop the car. She complied. Knight then stabbed Latisha 32 times. He dragged her body into a nearby wooded area and left the scene in her car. The coroner testified that some of the wounds inflicted on Latisha were 12 inches deep and penetrated her heart, lungs, liver, spleen, aorta, and face. Latisha's seven-month-old child was in the backseat during the stabbing.

After Knight disposed of Latisha's body he drove Latisha's car to Joseph and Jennifer Watson's house. The Watsons testified that when Knight arrived he was covered in blood and he asked them for a change of clothes. Jennifer Watson testified that she noticed that a baby was in the car and she convinced Knight to leave the baby with them. Knight telephoned his stepmother and she picked him up at the Watsons. After Knight left the Watsons telephoned the police. Knight was arrested at his father's house. He confessed to stabbing Latisha to death and led police to where he had disposed of her body.

Knight pleaded not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect. § 13A-3-1, Ala. Code 1975. At trial Knight presented the testimony of a clinical forensic psychologist, Dr. Robert Anthony DeFrancisco. Dr. DeFrancisco testified that Knight, at the time of the murder, had a brief reactive psychosis where his emotions overtook his reason. He said that this would make him feel justified in killing Latisha. Dr. DeFrancisco classified the crime as a "crime of passion."

The jury convicted Knight of killing Latisha while she was in a motor vehicle, a murder defined as capital by § 13A-5-40(a)(17), Ala.Code 1975.

A sentencing hearing was then held before the same jury. See § 13A-5-46, Ala. Code 1975. At that hearing the State presented evidence that Knight was on probation at the time of the murder and that he had previously been convicted of robbery in the third degree in the State of Florida. Knight introduced the testimony of his family and friends, who asked the jury to recommend a sentence of life imprisonment. Dr. DeFrancisco also testified that it was his opinion that the murder was a crime of passion because Knight's emotions overtook his reason when he stabbed his wife. The jury, by a vote of 10-2, recommended that Knight be sentenced to death.

The circuit court directed that a presentence report be prepared in accordance with § 13A-5-47(b), Ala.Code 1975. After the report was completed, the circuit court conducted a separate sentencing hearing at which it allowed counsel to present its arguments on sentencing. See § 13A-5-47(c). The circuit court found that the murder was committed while Knight was on probation and that Knight had a prior conviction for violence in Florida. The circuit court also found a nonstatutory aggravating circumstance related to Knight's "pattern of causing the victim wife fear by breaking in her door and breaking out her windshield."² In regard to mitigating circumstances, the circuit court found that Knight had been under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for a period before the murder because he had learned approximately three months before that a friend, and not he, had fathered Latisha's second child. The circuit court also considered as nonstatutory mitigating evidence Knight's family history. The circuit court weighed the aggravating circumstances and the mitigating circumstances and sentenced Knight to death. The court issued a written sentencing order pursuant to § 13A-5-47(d), Ala.Code 1975. This appeal, which is automatic in a case where the defendant has been sentenced to death, followed. See § 13A-5-53(a), Ala.Code 1975.

Standard of Review

As with every direct appeal from a capital-murder conviction and death sentence, this Court must review the record of the circuit court proceedings for "plain error." See Rule 45A, Ala.R.App.P. Rule 45A states:

"In all cases in which the death penalty has been imposed, the Court of Criminal Appeals shall notice any plain error or defect in the proceedings under review, whether or not brought to the attention of the trial court, and take appropriate appellate action by reason thereof, whenever such error has or probably has adversely affected the substantial right of the appellant."

We have stated:

"`In considering what constitutes plain error in a capital case, we have adhered to the interpretation of the term "plain error" adopted by the Alabama Supreme Court, which follows the interpretation given that term by the federal courts. See Ex parte Harrell, 470 So.2d 1309 (Ala.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 935, 106 S.Ct. 269, 88 L.Ed.2d 276 (1985); Ex parte Womack, 435 So.2d 766 (Ala.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 986, 104 S.Ct. 436, 78 L.Ed.2d 367 (1983). See also Hooks v. State, 534 So.2d 329 (Ala.Cr.App. 1987), aff'd, 534 So.2d 371 (Ala.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1050, 109 S.Ct. 883, 102 L.Ed.2d 1005 (1989). Plain error is error that has or probably has adversely affected a substantial right of the appellant, Ala.R.App.P. 45A, or is so obvious that the failure to notice it would seriously affect the fairness or integrity of the judicial proceedings. Ex parte Womack. The failure to object at trial weighs against any claim of prejudice an appellant may make. Kuenzel v. State, 577 So.2d 474 (Ala.Cr.App.1990), aff'd, 577 So.2d 531 (Ala.1991).'"

Frazier v. State, 758 So.2d 577, 582 (Ala. Crim.App.), aff'd, 758 So.2d 611 (Ala.1999), quoting Bush v. State, 695 So.2d 70, 87 (Ala.Crim.App.1995), aff'd, 695 So.2d 138 (Ala.1997). With these principles in mind we review the following issues.

Guilt-Phase Issues

I.

Knight argues that the circuit court erred in failing to grant his motion for a mistrial after the district attorney elicited allegedly improper hearsay evidence of Knight's prior bad acts. Knight asserts that this hearsay evidence was not admissible and that its admission prejudiced him.

During Officer James Brown's testimony, the prosecutor asked Brown about an earlier domestic dispute between Knight and his wife where police had been called to the Knight residence. The following occurred:

"Q [Prosecutor]: Was there a report of any sort of weapon?

"[Defense counsel]: Objection, Judge.

"The Court: I sustain the objection.

"Q [Prosecutor]: Who was the other person that was to have been involved in the fight?

"[Defense counsel]: Objection, Judge. May we approach?

"The Court: Yes, sir.

"[Defense counsel]: Judge, the prosecutor has asked three questions in a row that call for hearsay. She's clearly trying to testify by her own questions as to what happened. I would move at this time for a mistrial based upon improper questions and prosecutorial misconduct.

"The Court: I deny the motion for a mistrial. I'll allow the officer to testify as to what he observed but not what the victim told him."

(R. 1011-12.) Knight argues that this line of questioning was prejudicial because it implied that Knight had been violent toward the victim before the murder.

Knight relied on a defense of insanity and introduced the testimony of a clinical forensic psychologist. In rebuttal, the State introduced the testimony of Officer Brown and two of the victim's friends, Monica Absher and Scotty Conway, concerning a prior domestic dispute between the victim and Knight when police had been called to the Knight home. Officer Brown testified that in March 2000, just three months before Latisha's murder, police were called to the Knight apartment. Brown testified that when he arrived Latisha had marks on her arms and neck. Another officer, Officer Benjamin Burke, testified that in March 2000 he arrested Knight on a domestic-violence complaint and when he searched the car Knight was driving he recovered a knife. Absher and Conway testified that they were with the victim at the time of the March 2000 domestic disturbance. They said that Knight had kicked in the apartment door and that he had knocked out the windshield in Latisha's car.

We have stated, "`A motion for a mistrial is a drastic remedy that should be used only to prevent manifest injustice. The ruling of the trial court on the motion will not be reversed unless there is a clear showing of abuse of discretion.'" Patterson v. State, 845 So.2d 861, 866 (Ala.Crim. App.2002), quoting Smith v. State, 745 So.2d 284, 292-93 (Ala.Crim.App.1998).

Here, the State introduced evidence of...