Knight v. State

Decision Date30 September 1976
Docket NumberNo. 47599,47599
PartiesThomas KNIGHT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
CourtFlorida Supreme Court

William Hutchinson, Jr., Miami, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Raymond L. Marky, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

This cause is before us on direct appeal to review the convictions of Thomas Knight on two counts of murder in the first degree and sentence to death. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Article V, Section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution.

Appellant was indicted for the first degree murder of Lillian and Sydney Gans in that he did kill and murder them from premeditated design by shooting them with a rifle. Briefly the facts leading up to the murder and defendant's apprehension by the authorities are as follows. Upon arriving at his place of business and parking in his designated space, Mr. Gans was approached by the defendant who was carrying an automatic rifle and was told to re-enter his automobile, to drive home and get Mrs. Gans, and to drive to the bank and get $50,000. While inside the bank, Mr. Gans informed the president about the abduction. The police and FBI were alerted. Mr. Gans then returned to his car with the money. He and his wife, shortly thereafter, were found shot to death, the fatal shots--perforating through their necks--having been fired from the rear seat of the vehicle. Thereafter, appellant was apprehended and taken into custody in a weeded area about 2,000 feet from the Gans' vehicle. Underneath him buried in the dirt was an automatic rifle and a paper bag containing $50,000. There were blood stains on his pants.

After an extensive trial, the jury returned verdicts of guilty of both counts of murder in the first degree and, after separate hearing on sentencing, recommended the death penalty be imposed. The trial judge agreed that under the circumstances the death penalty was the appropriate sentence and wrote his order on sentence carefully evaluating the mitigating and aggravating circumstances, stating in part:

'1. That the aggravating circumstances found by the Court to be present and listed by the Court with the lettering as set forth in Florida Statute 921.141(5), are as follows:

'(d) That the capital felonies were committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of or in flight after committing the crime of kidnapping of Lillian Gans, and/or the robbery of Sidney Gans.

'(e) That the capital felonies were committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest.

'(f) That the capital felonies were committed for pecuniary gain.

'(h) That the capital felonies were especially heinous, atrocious or cruel.

'It might be considered a close question as to whether these murders were especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, because of the fact that when the defendant actually killed the victims, death was almost instantaneous. However, the Court is of the opinion that the hours preceding the actual killings constituted exceedingly cruel treatment of the victims. Mr. Gans was continually under severe strain, not only thinking of his own life but that of his wife. Mrs. Gans was also under continuous strain. Mr. and Mrs. Gans proceeded to follow the directions of the defendant hoping to escape death, although probably fearing for their lives at every instant. When it became apparent to them that the defendant was forcing them to a deserted area, it probably also became apparent to them they were going to be murdered. This feeling no doubt continued up to the actual moment of the deaths. Mr. Gans' actions were particularly noteworthy. After the initial danger, he could have escaped when directed by defendant to the bank. However, Mr. Gans, with commendable courage, attempting to save the life of his wife, again voluntarily submitted himself to the control of the defendant, only to lose his life together with his wife. All of these circumstances constitute particularly cruel, heinous and atrocious actions by the defendant when he finally shot the victims.

'3. That as to mitigating circumstances, the Court finds as follows:

'(a) the defendant has a history of prior criminal activity.

'(b) the defendant was not under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance when the capital felonies were committed.

'(c) the victims were not participants in the defendant's conduct nor did they consent to his acts.

'(d) the defendant was not an accomplice in the capital felonies committed by another person and his participation was not relatively minor.

'(e) the defendant did not act under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of another person.

'(f) the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was not substantially impaired.

'(g) the age of the defendant at the time of the crime was 23 years. The Court finds age not to be a mitigating circumstance. The Court finds that the defendant is of at least average intelligence and experience as an adult.

'. . . The Court finds, as did the jury, that the defendant is legally sane, knows right from wrong, knows the nature and consequences of his actions and did at the time of the commission of the two murders.'

Twenty three points have been stated as points on appeal by appellant although not all of these points are argued. Careful review of the briefs and voluminous transcript of record reveal that none of these contentions constitutes reversible error.

Appellant urges error in the trial court's denial of his challenge for cause as to the impartiality of a juror. Preliminarily, it must be noted that the record does not reveal any challenge for cause of Juror Hochstadt. The record examination of Juror Hochstadt does not indicate any showing of partiality toward the State. In fact, the record evidences that the subject juror had formed no opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant and would be completely impartial.

The trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion for additional peremptory challenges because of pervasive pre-trial publicity. He expressly determined that no showing of prejudice had been made. Additionally we note that the record clearly shows that the trial judge was extremely liberal in excusing jurors for cause in order that an impartial trial would be secured.

Appellant's argument that the court erred in denying his motion for change of venue is without merit. He has failed to prove that he did not receive a fair and impartial trial and that the setting of his trial was inherently prejudicial. Recently, in Dobbert v. State, 328 So.2d 433 (Fla.1976), this Court restated the requirements set out by the Supreme Court of the United States in Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 95 S.Ct. 2031, 44 L.Ed.2d 589 (1975), relative to a fair and impartial trial, as follows:

'The constitutional standard of fairness requires that a defendant have 'a panel of impartial, 'indifferent' jurors.' Irvin v. Dowd, supra, 366 U.S. (717), at 722, 81 S.Ct. (1639), at 1642, (6 L.Ed.2d 751). Qualified jurors need not, however, be totally ignorant of the facts and issues involved.

"To hold that the mere existence of any preconceived notion as to the guilt or innocence of an accused, without more, is sufficient to rebut the presumption of a prospective juror's impartiality would be to establish an impossible standard. It is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and...

To continue reading

Request your trial
81 cases
  • Pulley v. Harris
    • United States
    • U.S. Supreme Court
    • January 23, 1984
    ...warranted under circumstances of particular case), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 991, 99 S.Ct. 592, 58 L.Ed.2d 666 (1978); Knight v. State, 338 So.2d 201, 205 (Fla.1976) (affirming death sentence weighing circumstances in case before it); Meeks v. State, 336 So.2d 1142, 1145 (Fla.1976) (same); see......
  • Delap v. Dugger
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit
    • November 20, 1989
    ...or premeditated murder theory when the indictment charges only the offense of first degree murder or premeditated murder. Knight v. State, 338 So.2d 201, 204 (Fla.1976). See Lightbourne v. State, 438 So.2d 380, 384 (Fla.1983) ("first-degree murder may be committed in several ways, including......
  • Knight v. Dugger, 86-5610
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit
    • December 8, 1988
    ... ...         RONEY, Chief Judge: ...         This is an appeal from the denial of a writ of habeas corpus in a capital case, the tragic facts of which have been referred to as "unusual and bizarre." Knight v. State, 394 So.2d 997, 999 (Fla.1981). On July 17, 1974, Askari Abdullah Muhammad, formerly known as Thomas Knight, abducted Sydney Gans, a wealthy Miami business man on his way to work, forced him to return to his home and held his wife Lillian hostage, demanding a $50,000 ransom. After Gans obtained ... ...
  • Muhammad v. Tucker
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida
    • November 9, 2012
    ...respect to those murders is as follows. Mr. Muhammad ambushed Mr. Gans as he arrived at his business. See Knight v. State, 338 So.2d 201, 202 (Fla.1976)( Knight I ) (per curiam). As Mr. Gans parked his car, a Mercedes Benz, Mr. Muhammad strode toward him. Mr. Muhammad, who was carrying an a......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT