Knight v. State

• Citation: 186 So.3d 1005
• Decision Date: 10 March 2016
• Docket Number: No. SC13–564.,SC13–564.
• Parties: Jonathon KNIGHT, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

186 So.3d 1005

Jonathon KNIGHT, Petitioner,

v.STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. SC13–564.

Supreme Court of Florida.

March 10, 2016.

James S. Purdy, Public Defender, Robert Earl Wildridge, Assistant Public Defender, and Edward J. Weiss, Assistant Public Defender, Seventh Judicial Circuit, Daytona Beach, FL, for Petitioner.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL; Wesley Harold Heidt, Bureau Chief, and Kristen Lynn Davenport, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, FL, for Respondent.

QUINCE, J.

This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Knight v. State, 107 So.3d 449 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013). The district court certified that its decision is in direct conflict with the decisions of the First District Court of Appeal in Evans v. State, 32 So.3d 188 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010), and Cook v. State, 571 So.2d 530 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) ; the decisions of the Second District Court of Appeal in P.M.M. v. State, 884 So.2d 418 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004), N.K.W., Jr. v. State, 788 So.2d 1036 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001), and S.B. v. State, 657 So.2d 1252 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) ; and the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal in E.H.A. v. State, 760 So.2d 1117 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). The conflict concerns the proper application of the circumstantial evidence standard of review and whether the standard should continue to apply in Florida. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. We decline to abandon use of the standard but reject its use in Knight's case because this is not a wholly circumstantial case. We instead uphold Knight's conviction as supported by competent, substantial evidence.

FACTS

On November 21, 2010, Orange County Deputy Sheriff Donald Murphy conducted a traffic stop of a vehicle being driven by Jonathon Knight, but owned by Knight's friend, Chaka Miller, who was riding in the front passenger seat of the vehicle. Knight, 107 So.3d at 451–52. Knight's other friend, Chad Harris, was sitting in the backseat. Id. at 452. Once Knight had pulled over and parked the car in a convenience store parking lot, Deputy Murphy ordered him out and led him to the front of the car, leaving the remaining passengers in place. Id. Minutes later, as Deputy Murphy issued Knight a citation for a noise violation, a K–9 officer also pulled into the same parking lot. Id. After Murphy released Knight, Knight walked into the convenience store. Id. "At approximately the same time, the K–9 officer made an ‘impromptu’ decision to run his dog" around the car. Id. The dog alerted to the passenger side door, and Murphy re-detained Knight as he exited the store. Id. Murphy's search of the vehicle recovered a small bag of cannabis, weighing 24.4 grams, which was found in a suitcase that had been sitting on the backseat of the car. Id. The luggage tag on the suitcase identified Knight as the owner of the suitcase. Id. Knight was charged with (1) possession with intent to sell or deliver, and (2) possession of more than 20 grams of cannabis. Id. At trial, after the State rested, Knight moved for a judgment of acquittal. Id. The trial court denied the motion. Id.

Knight's friend, Miller, testified as the first defense witness. Id. He explained that he, Knight, and Harris were in Orlando the weekend of the arrest for the "Florida Classic" football game. Id. Miller testified that the cannabis did not belong to him, nor had he seen Knight with marijuana or heard him discuss it at all during their trip. Id. Miller did not contradict the State's evidence that Knight owned the suitcase, but he did testify that Harris was left in the backseat next to the suitcase after Deputy Murphy removed Knight from the car—"implying that Harris could have placed the cannabis in the suitcase at that time." Id.

Knight, testifying in his own defense, also reiterated that Harris was seated in the backseat of the car until the search occurred. Id. at 453. Knight testified that the cannabis was not his, and although he did not expressly admit ownership of the suitcase, Knight did not contradict the State's evidence that he owned it either. Id. at 452–53.¹ "On cross-examination, the State immediately sought to have Knight reiterate" what it viewed as "Knight's admission that the suitcase was his," but Knight denied owning the suitcase or that the luggage tag identified him as the owner. Id. at 453. When all the evidence was presented, Knight renewed his motion for judgment of acquittal, which the trial court again denied. Id. The jury deliberated and returned a verdict of guilty on count two only, for the crime of possessing more than 20 grams of cannabis. Id. Knight appealed, arguing that the trial court should have granted his motion for judgment of acquittal. Id. at 451.

Recognizing that Knight was convicted under a theory of constructive possession, the Fifth District described the two elements of the crime as requiring proof that the defendant had dominion and control over the contraband and knowledge that the contraband was in his presence. Id. at 453.² The district court acknowledged that other district courts have applied the circumstantial evidence standard of review in constructive possession cases. Id. at 454. However, the Fifth District rejected that approach because the standard only applies in "wholly circumstantial" cases, which it held are those in which all the elements of an offense are proven by circumstantial evidence alone. Id. at 462. The Fifth District noted that possession cases such as this one typically include direct evidence of dominion and control in the form of testimony that contraband was found near the defendant. Id. at 462–63. Because of the direct evidence of dominion and control, the district court found that these cases cannot be deemed wholly circumstantial, making application of the circumstantial evidence standard inappropriate. Id. The court certified conflict with constructive possession cases in which it believed other district courts had instead applied the circumstantial evidence standard where only one element had been entirely demonstrated by circumstantial evidence. Id. at 451.

Nonetheless, the Fifth District applied the circumstantial evidence standard to the instant case in the following manner:

Turning to this case, the two inferences that could logically be drawn from the circumstantial evidence are that: (1) Knight knew that the marijuana was in his suitcase (and is guilty); or, (2) Knight did not know that the marijuana was in his suitcase because Chad Harris placed it there without his knowledge after Deputy Murphy removed Knight from the car (Knight's hypothesis of innocence). This is admittedly a close case. However, we believe that a reasonable fact-finder could reject Knight's hypothesis of innocence as unreasonable based upon: (1) the very short window of opportunity Harris would have had to move the marijuana from another hiding place to the suitcase (the K–9 deputy arrived within minutes of the stop); (2) the fact that an inference could reasonably be drawn from [Chaka] Miller's testimony that Harris did not place the marijuana in Knight's suitcase (Miller was in a position to detect any attempt by Harris to hide 24.4 grams of marijuana in Knight's suitcase, but did not testify to any facts indicating that Harris actually did so); and (3) the jury's unique ability to assess Knight's demeanor on the witness stand during the whole of his testimony.

Id. at 468. The court noted that the same outcome would result under what it viewed as the appropriate standard of review:

If after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could find the existence of the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, sufficient evidence exists to sustain a conviction. Applying this general standard in no way changes the fact that there are two possible inferences that could be drawn from the evidence relating to the knowledge element in this case, or that a conviction can only be sustained if a trier of fact could rationally find guilt by rejecting the second inference as unreasonable, speculative, imaginary or forced based upon the evidence.

Id. (internal citation omitted). The district court then affirmed Knight's conviction. Id. at 468–69. Knight now appeals.

ANALYSIS

This Court has described the circumstantial evidence standard as follows: "[w]here the only proof of guilt is circumstantial, no matter how strongly the evidence may suggest guilt[,] a conviction cannot be sustained unless the evidence is inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence." Jaramillo v. State, 417 So.2d 257, 257 (Fla.1982). The standard applies upon appellate review, id., and when a trial judge rules on a motion for judgment of acquittal, State v. Law, 559 So.2d 187, 188 (Fla.1989). In the instant opinion, the Fifth District engaged in a lengthy discussion about why this Court should reconsider use of this standard in Florida. Knight, 107 So.3d at 455–62. However, we find that discussion and the rationale raised by the State to be unpersuasive. Accordingly, we uphold the continued use of the standard in Florida. Having done so, we next address the certified conflict issue by clarifying when the standard applies.

I. Certified Conflict

The Fifth District found that the circumstantial evidence standard should apply only where both elements of constructive possession are proven solely by circumstantial evidence. Knight, 107 So.3d at 462. The court then certified conflict with constructive possession cases from other district courts which seemed to apply the circumstantial evidence standard where only one element had been established by purely circumstantial evidence. Id. at 451 (certifying conflict with Evans, P.M.M., N.K.W., E.H.A., S.B., and Cook ).

While there is some confusion as to when the circumstantial evidence standard applies, we agree with the Fifth District that it should not be applied based on any particular element of a crime being itself proven...