Knight v. Utah Power & Light Co.

Decision Date22 August 1949
Docket Number7161
Citation116 Utah 195,209 P.2d 221
PartiesKNIGHT et al. v. UTAH POWER & LIGHT CO. et al
CourtUtah Supreme Court

Appeal from District Court, Second District, Weber County; Hon C. G. Cowley, Judge.

Action for water damage by James C. Knight and another against the Utah Power & Light Company and another. Judgment for plaintiff and defendants appeal.

Affirmed.

Charles L. Ovard, Salt Lake City, Howell, Stine &amp Olmstead, Ogden, David K. Holther, Ogden, for appellants.

Thatcher and Thatcher, Ogden, for respondent.

Latimer Justice. Wade, Wolfe, and McDonough, JJ., concur. Pratt, Chief Justice (dissenting).

OPINION

Latimer, Justice.

On the 28th day of February, 1946, plaintiffs' home in Ogden Canyon was damaged by a large volume of water which flowed across their property and through their house. Their furniture, fixtures and clothing were damaged by the water and large quantities of mud and silt were deposited on the floors of their home. The water had escaped from a seventy five foot wood stave pipe line used by the defendants to divert water from Pineview Dam for power and irrigation purposes. In the action commenced in the court below, the matter was tried before a jury which found in favor of plaintiffs and from the judgment entered upon its verdict, defendants have appealed. We shall refer to the parties as they were designated in the trial court and the testimony will be viewed in a light favorable to respondents.

In 1935 pursuant to a contract between defendants and the United States of America a seventy five foot wood stave pipe line was constructed to carry water down Ogden Canyon. The conduit was installed on a right of way owned by defendant, Utah Power and Light Company, and for all practical purposes was to be aligned, graded and buried substantially the same as a line which was being replaced. The plans and specifications for the installation were subject to the approval of the Power Company and the work was to be done to its satisfaction. Since its installation the line has been used and maintained by the defendants jointly.

On the night in question, the pipe was broken in two places. The larger of the two breaks was on the west and the smaller on the east. From the position of the rocks after the break, it appears that the damage on the west was caused by a boulder estimated to weigh nine tons while that done on the east by one or two rocks of approximately two by two by three feet in size. Both breaks were of sufficient size to permit a large volume of water to escape according to witnesses who estimated the hole on the east to be four feet by two feet in size. The pipe had been covered with some dirt at the point where it was damaged on the west but was uncovered at the other place of damage.

The conduit had a carrying capacity of 320 cubic feet per second and at the time of the break the flow was about one half this volume. The line ran in an easterly-westerly direction down the canyon and, in the vicinity of the breaks, was at a higher elevation than the highway and homes built and occupied by people living in that area. There was a river bed in the bottom of the canyon which would canalize the water once it reached that level, but plaintiffs' home was between the conduit and the stream bed.

Winter snow had fallen and the state highway department in clearing the main travelled portion of the highway had banked the snow on the shoulders of the road. These snow banks confined the water that had escaped through the breaks and as it coursed down the canyon. Apparently the first point at which the water could escape from the highway was in close proximity to plaintiffs' house and as a result, the course of the water after leaving the road bed was through the plaintiffs' home.

There are rocky cliffs about one half mile north of the places where the pipe was broken. They are steep, rugged and nearly perpendicular at that distance. While the intervening territory is not nearly so steep, the slope continues to the south and once a boulder starts rolling there is little to stop or retard its speed until it reaches either the highway or the river bed.

Before concentrating on detail it may be well to place the principle issue in a large perspective. This issue affects the question of determining what is due care in the construction of a conduit designed to confine a large volume of water under the conditions as they exist at the time of construction. If the jury could find from the evidence that at that time a person could have reasonably anticipated that damage from rolling rocks would occur in the vicinity of the breaks, then defendants could be charged with lack of due care. If, however, the occurrence was so unusual or so unforeseeable that a person could not reasonably anticipate the damage which was done, then the issue should not have been submitted to the jury.

The appellant has by appropriate assignment of error challenged the court's orders in overruling the demurrer and in denying defendants' motion for non-suit and directed verdict. Moreover, error in refusing to submit requested instructions and in giving inappropriate instructions has also been assigned. We believe the first group of assignments of error can be disposed of by determining whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain the verdict.

Before treating this question, we dispose of defendants' contention that the damage done by the large rock was brought about by such a sequence of unusual events and circumstances that careful construction would not have protected the line. The term "construction" as herein used means more than one design and fabrication of the conduit -- it includes as well the precaution taken to shield it from anticipated damage. It might be that if this were the only break we could say as a matter of law that defendants were not negligent and that the large rock bounding down the hill and striking the pipe as it did was, in effect, a vis major. However, the evidence was such that the jury could have reasonably found that the water escaping through the smaller break did the damage. Taking this view of the evidence we need not concern ourselves with discussing the defendants' duty to protect against damages from a major catastrophe.

The evidence concerning the courses taken and the damage done by the smaller rocks did not establish an unusual occurrence in the sense that the angle of fall was unexpected, that the weights of the rocks were excessive, or that reasonable protective measures had failed in their purpose. The damage to the pipe was on the side near the cliff. There was no evidence that the rocks came bounding down the hill in large or excessive bounds and there is no reason apparent from the record that would lead us to believe that had the line been covered at that place where the conduit was broken, the rocks would not have rolled over it without damage. Therefore, if the defendants could be charged with reasonably anticipating that rocks rolling in that immediate vicinity might damage their pipe line and permit water to escape which would cause injury to property owners below, the jury could find them negligent in failing to bury the conduit.

There is evidence in the record from which the jury could conclude not only that defendants could have reasonably anticipated that rocks would damage the pipe line but also that defendants were charged with knowledge that this was an area in which rocks periodically rolled down the mountainside. For more than thirty five years, rocks have rolled from ledges in the vicinity of the breaks onto the highway below. Every spring, according to the witnesses, rocks varying in size from some approximately the size of the human hand to boulders weighing many tons have rolled down in that vicinity. While it is true that they have not always rolled down in the same spot, witnesses always fixed the places at which rocks had rolled down as being in the vicinity of the breaks. Moreover, previous conduits that had been located along the same or nearly the same contour line had twice been broken in practically the same spot. Some 25 years earlier, the pipe line of the Power Company which had been replaced by the present installation was broken, and from other evidence, the jury could have reasonably found that the present line had been broken on one prior occasion some two years before the present breaks occurred. The city conduit, which was a much smaller line, had been broken in the same spot some 17 years before and in that general vicinity many times. As a matter of fact, because of its past experience, the city buried its line across this area to protect it.

We do not pause to detail all the evidence given by all witnesses for the reason that in viewing the record as a whole we are convinced there is evidence from which the jury could reasonably conclude that the defendants could anticipate damage to its line by rolling rocks in that immediate vicinity.

Appellants argue that the principles of law announced in the case of Logan, Hyde Park & Smithfield Canal Company v Utah Power and Light Company, 45 Utah 491, 146 P. 560, 561, support their contention that they could not reasonably foresee the damage that occured. Our inquiry in this connection is whether there is a difference in the facts concerning the reasonableness of anticipating damage to the line. In that case the Power Company constructed a wooden flume along a mountain side. Above the canal were many rocks and boulders. The rock or rocks doing the damage in that case were started rolling by a third person and in the 12 years time the flume had been installed it had not been injured by rolling rocks. Mr. Justice Frick writing for this Court announces reasonable foreseeability as the...

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2 cases
  • Garden City Company v. Bentrup
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit
    • November 17, 1955
    ...235 P.2d 780; Taylor v. Roosevelt Irr. Dist., 71 Ariz. 254, 226 P.2d 154, affirmed 72 Ariz. 160, 232 P.2d 107; Knight v. Utah Power & Light Co., 116 Utah 195, 209 P.2d 221; West Union Canal Co. v. Provo Bench Canal & Irr. Co., 116 Utah 128, 208 P.2d 1119; Albrethson v. Carey Valley Reservoi......
  • White v. Weber Basin Water Conservancy Dist.
    • United States
    • Utah Supreme Court
    • September 30, 1969
    ...582, 343 P.2d 565.2 N. M. Long & Co. v. Cannon-Papanikolas Const. Co., 9 Utah 2d 307, 343 P.2d 1100; see also Knight v. Utah Power & Light Co., 116 Utah 195, 209 P.2d 221.3 As to the trial court's prerogative to make findings re the jury's answers, see First Security Bank v. Lundahl, 22 Uta......

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