Knighten v. American Auto. Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 31 May 1960
• Docket Number: No. 5020,5020
• Citation: 121 So.2d 344
• Parties: Reola KNIGHTEN et al. v. AMERICAN AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY et al.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US

Page 344

121 So.2d 344

Reola KNIGHTEN et al. v. AMERICAN AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY et al.

No. 5020.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.

May 31, 1960.

Rehearing Denied June 29, 1960.

Jos. A. Gladney, Baton Rouge, for appellants.

Seale, Hayes, Smith & Keogh, Baton Rouge, for appellees.

Before ELLIS, LOTTINGER, LANDRY, and PUGH, JJ.

PUGH, Judge ad hoc.

This is a damage suit which arose out of a collision between a one-half ton pick-up truck owned and operated by James R. Wilson (in which plaintiff, Reola Knighten, was riding as guest passenger) and an automobile which was operated by defendant Clarence V. Johnson (in which J. C. Thompson and J. B. Thompson were riding as passengers). Reola Knighten's husband, Granger Knighten, was joined as plaintiff, and the American Automobile Insurance Company, the liability insurer on the Johnson vehicle, was joined as defendant.

Pursuant to the prayer in the petition, plaintiffs were awarded a jury trial. During the course of the trial, and for reasons not here pertinent, the suit as to Granger Knighten was dismissed by order of the District Judge. It does not appear that an appeal was taken on behalf of Granger Knighten from the order of dismissal, and the correctness of the District Court's ruling as to this matter is not before us on this appeal. The jury returned a verdict in favor of defendants (11 to 1), the trial judge denied plaintiff Reola Knighten's application for a new trial, and judgment was entered dismissing her suit. Plaintiff Reola Knighten took this appeal.

The collision in question occurred November 28, 1955, at about 1:00 p.m. on Plank Road which, where the collision occurred, is a two-lane, hard-surfaced State highway running generally north-south. The Wilson truck, followed by the Johnson automobile, was proceeding north on Plank Road when, several miles north of the Baton Rouge city limits, the collision occurred, as Johnson attempted to overtake and pass the Wilson truck and as Wilson attempted to execute a left turn into a gravelled private road to the west. The left rear portion of the Wilson truck was struck by the right front portion of the Johnson vehicle. The impact occurred in the left or passing lane, a short distance to the west of the center line.

The first question, of course, concerns whether Johnson was negligent. In this connection, plaintiff Reola Knighten relies heavily upon another case which grew out of the same collision, Johnson v. Wilson, which was considered first by this Court (1957, 97 So.2d 674), and later was reversed in part by the Supreme Court (La. 1960, 118 So.2d 450). In the earlier case, suit had been instituted by Johnson to recover damages to his car caused by the alleged negligence of Wilson. The defendant Wilson had denied that he was negligent and reconvened to recover $235,965.37 for personal injuries he allegedly sustained as a result of the accident. The case was tried before a jury, which rejected plaintiff Johnson's claim and awarded defendant Wilson a verdict in the sum of $8,507.37. In our opinion in that case we observed that the evidence was 'sharply contradictory,' and went on to state:

'We see no need to detail the discrepancies. In reaching a verdict for appellee Wilson, the jury must necessarily have accepted Wilson's version of the accident. The factual determinations of the trier of fact, particularly when based upon an evaluation of the credibility of opposing witnesses, should not be disturbed on appeal unless manifestly erroneous. Jones v. Jones, 232 La. 102, 93 So.2d 917; Fouquier v. Fouquier, 231 La. 430, 91 So.2d 591; Guidry v. Crowther, La.App. 1 Cir., 96 So.2d 71. Furthermore, the District Court, who saw and heard the witnesses, refused to grant a new trial upon the appellants' application for same.' 97 So.2d at page 676.

This Court concluded that it was not manifestly erroneous for the jury to have accepted Wilson's version of the accident, and it was in the light of the Wilson version, thus accepted for purposes of appellate review, that we stated that Johnson was guilty of gross negligence. In its review of our decision in that case, the Supreme Court expressed no disagreement with our position in this regard, and we feel that the statements in the opinion by the Supreme Court relative to negligence on the part of Johnson is to be interpreted to mean that if the version of the collision by Wilson in that case be accepted, and it was not manifestly erroneous for the jury to so accept it, Johnson was guilty of negligence. The Supreme Court's reversal in part of our decision was on another point, i.e., whether in the light of uncontroverted facts defendant Wilson was guilty of contributory negligence.

In her reliance upon the pronouncements of this Court and the Supreme Court in the prior litigation of Johnson v. Wilson, plaintiff Reola Knighten contends that it 'has been settled as a matter of law' that Johnson was guilty of negligence, and that this decision 'is binding on the defendants herein as a matter of law.' The theory which underlies his contention is not altogether clear. In support thereof she relies upon a number of cases, none of which, in our opinion, are controlling here. Several of these cases (Alba v. Holstead, 1946, 210 La. 357, 27 So.2d 130; Lewis v. Baker, 1911, 128 La. 92, 54 So. 482; Davis v. Lewis & Lewis, La.App.1954, 72 So.2d 612; Noe v. Maestri, La.App.1939, 190 So. 590) concern the binding effect of prior rulings in the Same case between the Same parties. (See, generally, the discussion in Moore's Federal Practice §§ 0.401 and 0.404 (2d ed. 1959) and 'Developments in the Law of Res Judicata,' 65 Harv.L.Rev. 818, at 822 (1952)). These cases have no application whatsoever to a situation where, as here, it is a Different case, the parties are different and the cause of action is different. Another case relied upon by plaintiff (Coyle v. Horton, La.App.1937, 174 So. 277) concerns the situation where cases involving identical issues were, for all purposes, consolidated for trial. One of the cases so tried was appealed to the Supreme Court, which recited the facts in all of the cases, discussed the issues and the law applicable thereto, and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. The Court of Appeal in its consideration of those of the consolidated cases which were appealed to it concluded that it was controlled by the prior decision of the Supreme Court on the same record. In the instant case there was no consolidation for trial, the cases were tried at different times before different juries, and of course there is a different record. (Only a minute portion of the record in the prior case, page 84 thereof, we offered in evidence in the instant case.) The last of the Louisiana state court cases relied upon by plaintiff in this connection (Heymann v. Mathes, 1931, 18 La.App. 403, 137 So. 871) concerned a question of law (whether attorney fees may be collected by a money lender operating under the Small Loan Law, LSA-R.S. 6:571 et seq.). The same Court of Appeal which decided the Heymann case had previously decided the same question in the affirmative in a different case between different parties, and the Supreme Court in denying an application for review had declared that the decision by the Court of Appeal was correct. The Court of Appeal in the Heymann case felt that it was bound by the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the prior proceeding. We are not here concerned with what rule of law should be applied to uncontroverted facts, but rather with the facts themselves. In the prior case between different litigants arising out of the same occurrence, the trier of fact resolved sharply conflicting testimony against Johnson, and on appeal it was found that their determination was not manifestly erroneous. Here a different factual determination was made between different parties in a different trial in the light of evidence then adduced. The problem now appears to be whether this determination was manifestly erroneous.

The federal cases relied upon by plaintiff in support of her position (Campbell v. United States, D.C.E.D.La.1948, 75 F.Supp. 181, reversed 5 Cir., 1949, 172 F.2d 500, certiorari denied 1949, 337 U.S. 957, 69 S.Ct. 1532, 93 L.Ed. 1757; Westmoreland et al. v. Mississippi Power & Light Co., 5 Cir., 1949, 172 F.2d 643; Zimmerman v. Mathews Trucking Corp., 8 Cir., 1953, 203 F.2d 864, rehearing denied, modified 8 Cir., 1953, 205 F.2d 837; West v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 1940, 311 U.S. 223, at pages 236--237, 61 S.Ct. 179, at page 183, 85 L.Ed. 139; Yoder v. Nu-Enamel Corp., 8 Cir., 1941, 117 F.2d 488) are also not persuasive as to this issue. It is true that both the Zimmerman and Westmoreland cases concerned problems arising from several suits growing out of the same occurrence, but both of these cases make it clear that a factual finding in one case is not conclusive in another. In the Westmoreland case, the Court made it clear that the prior judgment would not ground a plea of res judicata and that the appellant was not 'bound by the facts as presented to the state court.' And in the Zimmerman case the court was concerned with whether if a state court jury verdict in favor of plaintiff in a state court action was upheld on review by the state's Supreme Court it would be improper for a federal court in a case arising out of the same occurrence to set aside a federal jury verdict which was Also in favor of plaintiff. That the state court action did not cause negligence of defendant to be established as a matter of law in the Zimmerman case, is clear from the fact that on rehearing the court ordered a new trial, that the case be again submitted to the jury For determination of the facts and the application of the proper law. In this connection, see also Roucher v. Traders & General Insurance Co., 5 Cir., 1956, 235 F.2d 423, 424, wherein it was stated:

'The district court granted summary judgment for the defendant,...