Knighton v. Univ. of Tex. at Arlington
| Decision Date | 24 May 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 4:18-cv-00792-P-BP |
| Parties | JENIFER LYNE KNIGHTON, Plaintiff, v. UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT ARLINGTON, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas |
Before the Court are the Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 88), Brief in Support (ECF No. 89), and Appendix in Support (ECF No. 90) filed on February 9, 2021 by Defendants University of Texas at Arlington ("UTA"), Dawnetta Smith, Debra Woody, Eddie Freeman, Jean Hood, Vistasp Karbhari, and Shelby Boseman (collectively the "Defendants"); the Response and Objection (ECF No. 93) and Brief in Support (ECF No. 94) filed by Plaintiff Jenifer Lyne Knighton ("Knighton") on March 2, 2021; and the Defendants' Reply (ECF No. 95) filed on March 9, 2021. Although the Motion and Reply were filed on behalf of Defendants, Defendant UTA is the only remaining defendant, and the Brief in Support of the Motion refers solely to UTA as the moving party. See ECF No. 89 at 24.
After considering the pleadings and applicable legal authorities, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that United States District Judge Mark T. Pittman GRANT the Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 88).
In this discrimination case, Knighton sues UTA alleging that it violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VI") and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) ("Title IX"). ECF No. 31. Knighton was a student in UTA's Master of Social Work program and was in the process of completing her required field education internship at the Wellspring Family and Community Institute ("Wellspring"). ECF No. 89 at 6. Knighton reported to UTA that David Jones ("Jones"), the owner of Wellspring, demonstrated "inappropriate, intimidating, and controlling behaviors." ECF No. 31 at 8. Knighton also reported that Jones charged her and other students money in exchange for Wellspring staff members signing off on the students' field placement hours. Id. at 9.
UTA removed the students, including Knighton, from their placement at Wellspring and investigated Knighton's complaint. ECF No. 89 at 9. Knighton viewed this removal as a disciplinary action and felt that she was wrongfully discharged. ECF No. 31 at 12. UTA contends that Knighton wanted to leave Wellspring, and it worked with Knighton to find another placement so that she could complete her field hours. ECF No. 89 at 9. When these attempts were unsuccessful, UTA gave Knighton special permission to withdraw from the course. Id. at 9-10. However, Knighton was unhappy because she wanted to receive an "incomplete" grade for the course. Id. Knighton viewed this action by UTA as a punishment. ECF No. 31 at 12-13.
As part of its investigation, UTA spoke to Jones, who complained about Knighton's performance at Wellspring. ECF No. 89 at 9-10. On March 2, 2018, Knighton lodged another complaint with UTA concerning the way it handled the investigation into her complaint. Id. at 11. UTA's investigation did not reveal any violations of Title IX, Equal Opportunity Services, or university policies by any of its employees. Id. at 11. Ultimately, Knighton decided to withdrawfrom the course, and UTA refunded her tuition for the class. Id. at 9. Knighton did not return to UTA. ECF No. 31 at 16.
Knighton filed suit on September 24, 2018, against UTA, Dawnetta Smith, Debra Woody, Eddie Freeman, Jean Hood, Vistasp Karbhari, and Shelby Boseman. ECF No. 1. Senior United States District Judge Terry R. Means ordered Knighton to file an amended complaint in accordance with Federal Civil Procedure Rule 8(a). ECF No. 30. On January 14, 2019, Knighton filed her Amended Complaint asserting various causes of action against UTA and several of its employees in their individual and official capacities. She sued UTA for: (1) Title IX gender discrimination; (2) Title IX retaliation; (3) violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"); (4) failure to respond and/or accommodate in violation of Title VI; and (5) race discrimination in violation of Title VI. She sued the individual defendants for (6) negligent infliction of emotional distress; (7) equal protection violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (8) conspiracy against rights; (9) substantive due process violations under § 1983; and (10) Fourteenth Amendment due process violations under § 1983. Additionally, she claimed (11) defamation per se against Dawnetta Smith and Eddie Freeman; (12) breach of contract against UTA; and (13) interference with a prospective business relationship against the individual defendants. ECF No 31. On October 9, 2019, Judge Means transferred the case to Judge Pittman. On March 27, 2020 Judge Pittman granted in part the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 41), leaving only Knighton's claims against UTA for gender discrimination and retaliation under Title IX and failure to respond and/or accommodate and race discrimination under Title VI. ECF No. 49.
UTA now moves for summary judgment on each of Knighton's remaining claims, asserting that: (1) there is no evidence that UTA intentionally discriminated against Knighton on the basis of sex or race; (2) Knighton does not allege facts that that amount to discrimination or harassmentunder Title VI or Title IX; (3) even if Knighton's claims do not fail as a matter of law, there is no genuine issue of material fact that UTA responded to and investigated her complaints in a manner that was not deliberately indifferent as a matter of law; (4) Knighton's retaliation claim is unfounded; and (5) Knighton's claims for injunctive relief are moot and claims for punitive damages are unavailable under Title VI and Title IX. ECF No. 89 at 14.
Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is proper when the pleadings and evidence illustrate that no genuine issue exists as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Slaughter v. Southern Talc Co., 949 F.2d 167, 170 (5th Cir. 1991). Disputes concerning material facts are genuine if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1429 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). An issue is "material" if it involves a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Burgos v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 20 F.3d 633, 635 (5th Cir. 1994). "The movant bears the burden of identifying those portions of the record it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Triple Tee Golf, Inc. v. Nike, Inc., 485 F.3d 253, 261 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-25 (1986)).
When a movant carries its initial burden, the burden then shifts to the nonmovant to show that the entry of summary judgment is inappropriate. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-24; Duckett v. City of Cedar Park, Tex., 950 F.2d 272, 276 (5th Cir. 1992). Although the nonmovant may satisfy this burden by tendering depositions, affidavits, and other competent evidence, "conclusory allegations, speculation, and unsubstantiated assertions are inadequate to satisfy the nonmovant'sburden," Douglass, 79 F.3d at 1429, as "the adverse party's response . . . must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Merely colorable evidence or evidence not significantly probative, however, will not defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50. Furthermore, a mere scintilla of evidence will not defeat a motion for summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252; Davis v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 14 F.3d 1082, 1086 (5th Cir. 1994).
Summary judgment evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd., v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Rosado v. Deters, 5 F.3d 119, 123 (5th Cir. 1993). In addition, factual controversies are resolved in favor of the nonmovant, but only when both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts, thus creating an actual controversy. Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc). In the absence of any proof, however, the Court does not assume that the nonmovant could or would prove the necessary facts. Id.
In making its determination on the motion, the Court looks at the full record including the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Williams v. Adams, 836 F.2d 958, 961 (5th Cir. 1988). However, "the [Court's] function is not [ ] to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. The movant's motion for summary judgment will be granted only if he meets his burden and the nonmovant fails to make the requisite showing that a genuine issue exists as to any material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2).
Title IX provides that "[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, beexcluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . ." 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). Title VI provides that no person shall, "on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefit of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq.
The intent of Congress in passing Title IX and Title VI was to prohibit discriminatory practices based on sex or race by federally-funded...
To continue reading
Request your trial