Knights & Ladies of Sec. v. Grey
Decision Date | 12 March 1918 |
Docket Number | Case Number: 8308 |
Parties | KNIGHTS AND LADIES OF SECURITY v. GREY. |
Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
¶0 Insurance -- Life Insurance -- Warranties--Effect.
An applicant for life insurance warranted in his application that the answers made by him to the questions propounded by the medical examiner were true, full, and correct, and agreed that the same, together with the application, should form the basis of his agreement with the order and should constitute a warranty. The certificate issued upon application recited that the application and the report of the medical examiner are true in all respects, and that each and every part shall be held to be a warranty and to form the only basis of liability of the order, and, if not true, the certificate shall be null and void. Held, that the answers of the insured to the questions propounded by the medical examiner were warranties, and a false statement made by the insured as to his having applied to the Knights and Ladies of Security, or any other life insurance company, or association, or society, and been rejected, rendered the policy void.
Error from District Court, Oklahoma County; Edward Dewes Oldfield, Judge.
Action by Fannie A. Grey against the Knights and Ladies of Security. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Reversed, and cause remanded for new trial.
Hainer, Burns & Toney, for plaintiff in error.
T. J. McComb and Stephen C. Treadwell, for defendant in error.
¶1 The plaintiff in error on October 18, 1912, issued a beneficiary certificate to Henry H. Grey payable to his wife. He died in March, 1914, and upon the refusal of the plaintiff in error to pay the amount claimed to be due upon said policy the beneficiary instituted this action.
¶2 In the petition it is alleged that the policy was issued upon the life of said Henry H. Grey, payable upon his death to the defendant in error, and that the said insured had died in March, 1914, and there was due by virtue thereof a certain fixed sum.
¶3 The answer admits the execution of the insurance contract, etc., but denied liability upon several grounds, all of which save one has been decided adversely to plaintiff in error in the case of M. B. A. v. White, 66 Okla. 241, 168 P. 794.
¶4 It is claimed by plaintiff in error that it issued said certificate and thereby promised to pay the beneficiary said sum only upon the said Henry H. Grey having complied with all of the terms and provisions of said certificate, and with the by-laws and constitution of the society, and with the warranties, representations, and agreement contained in the written application for said insurance by the said insured, together with the statements made by him in his answers to the questions propounded to him in his medical examination, and that said insured falsely and fraudulently represented to its medical examiner that he had never applied for membership to any other life insurance company, or association, or society and been rejected, whereas, in truth and in fact, he had prior to the time his application was made here anti his answer given to said medical examiner or said certificate issued to him made an application to the Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York for insurance, and had been rejected, and that by the terms and conditions of the certificate sued upon, the application and the medical examiner's report constituted a part thereof, and was a warranty that the insured had never applied to any other life insurance company, or association, or society, and been rejected, and that by virtue thereof, said warranty was broken, and said policy rendered void, and no liability accrued to it on account thereof.
¶5 The certificate sued upon contains the following stipulations:
¶6 In the application or medical examination of the insured, the following questions and answers thereto appear:
¶7 And in addition thereto the following agreement is twice embraced therein.
¶8 In Woodmen v. Prater, 24 Okla. 214, 103 P. 558. 23 L.R.A. [N. S.] 917, 20 Ann. Cas. 287, it is held:
"[2] An applicant for a life insurance policy warranted in her application that her answers to the medical examiner on the reverse side of her application were true and accurate,' and that they should constitute the basis for the covenant. The policy recited that it was executed in consideration of the warranties made in the application, and that the application should be made a part of the covenant. Held, that the answers of the insured to the medical examiner were her warranties and that a false statement made therein by her rendered the policy void.
¶9 In 14 R C. L., p. 1080, it is said:
¶10 See, also, the following cases: Owen v. United States Surety Cop., 38 Okla. 123, 131 P. 1091; Cobb v. Covenant Mutual Ben Ass'n. 153 Mass. 176, 26 N.E. 230, 10 L.R.A. 666, 25 Am. St. Rep. 619: Metro Life Ins. Co. v. McTague, 49 N.J.L. 587, 9 A. 766, 60 Am. Rep. 661; Bradley v. United States Life Ins. Ass'n, 60 F. 727. 9 C. C. A. 252; Sladden v. N.Y. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 86 F. 102, 29 C. C. A. 596; Pennsylvania Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Mechanics' Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Mechanics' Savings Bank & Trust Co., 72 F. 413, 19 C. C. A. 286, 28 L.R.A. 33; Home Friendly Society v. Berry, 94 Ga. 606, 21 S.E. 583; Aloe v. Mut. Reserve Life Ass'n, 147 Mo. 561, 49 S.W. 553; McCullom v. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 55 Hun 103, 8 N.Y.S. 249; Id., 27 N.E. 412; March v. Met. Life Ins. Co., 186 Pa. 629, 40 A. 1100, 65 Am. St. rep. 887; Moore v. Mut. Res. Fund Life Ass'n, 133 Mich. 526 95 N.W. 573; Germania Life Ins. Co. v. Lunkenheimer, 127 Ind. 536, 26 N.E. 1082: Silverman v. Empire Life Ins. Co., 24 Misc. 399, 53 N.Y.S. 407; Finch v. M. W. A., 113 Mich. 646, 71 N.W. 1104; Am. Mut. Aid Society v. Bronger, 12 Ky. L. Rep. 284; Id., 91 Ky. 406, 15 S.W. 1118, 12 Ky. Law Rep. 971; and Clemans v. Sup. Assembly royal soc. of Good Fellows, 131 N.Y. 485, 30 N.E. 496, 16 L.R.A. 33.
¶11 Under the authority of Com. Cas. Co. v. Owen, 38 Okla. 107, 131 P. 1084, and of Shawnee Life Ins. Co. v. Watkins, 53 Okla. 188, 156 P. 181, the provisions of section 3467 Rev. Law 1910, are not applicable to the contract involved in the present case
¶12 In 6 R. C. L. § 227, p. 837, it is said:
"The whole context is to be considered in ascertaining the intention of the parties, even though the immediate object of inquiry is the meaning of an isolated clause. * * *"
¶13 And in 9 Cyc. p. 577, it is said:
"The first and main rule of construction is that the intent of the parties as expressed in the words they have used must govern."
¶14 Applying the rules above given to the words used in questions and answers above cited, how must they be construed and what is their meaning?
¶15 It is asserted by the beneficiary that the doctrine of ejusdem generis should be applied here, and, when so applied, that the words "or any other life insurance company or association or society" must be construed to mean organizations of a kindred nature to the Knights and Ladies of Security. With this contention we cannot agree.
¶16 The intention and aim of the interrogatories was to embrace all character of insurance companies. Not alone the Knights and Ladies of Security and other kindred societies or organizations, but all insurance companies issuing policies. This is apparent from question 26, immediately following.
¶17 It might not be amiss to refer to section 3402, Rev. Laws 1910,...
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