Knights of Maccabees of the World v. Sackett

• Court: Montana Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: HOLLOWAY, J.
• Citation: Knights of Maccabees of the World v. Sackett, 34 Mont 357, 86 P. 423 (Mont. 1906)
• Decision Date: 06 July 1906
• Parties: KNIGHTS OF MACCABEES OF THE WORLD v. SACKETT et al.

86 P. 423

34 Mont. 357

KNIGHTS OF MACCABEES OF THE WORLD v. SACKETT et al.

Supreme Court of Montana

July 6, 1906

Appeal from District Court, Yellowstone County; C. H. Loud, Judge.

Action by the Knights of the Maccabees of the World against Clarence M. Sackett and Fannie Sackett. From a judgment in favor of defendant Fannie Sackett, defendant Clarence M. Sackett appeals. Affirmed.

O. F Goddard, for appellant.

W. M Johnston, for respondent.

HOLLOWAY J.

Floyd L. Sackett was a member of the order of the Knights of the Maccabees of the World, having his membership in the local tent at Park City, Mont. He carried insurance on his life in the association to the amount of $1,000; his wife, Fannie Sackett, being named in the certificate of insurance as beneficiary. For some time prior to May, 1905, Floyd L. and Fannie Sackett had not lived together. The former made his home at Yule, N.D. The latter lived at Park City, Mont. Prior to May, 1905, Floyd L. Sackett wrote a letter to his mother at Park City, requesting her to call on the local record keeper of the tent of which Floyd L. Sackett was a member and ask him to change the beneficiary in his certificate of insurance from Fannie Sackett to Clarence M. Sackett and wife. This request was accompanied by the required fee of 50 cents. The request was made of the local record keeper by the mother of the insured, but she was thereupon informed that under the by-laws of the order the wife of Clarence M Sackett could not be named as a beneficiary, and the record keeper then filled out a proper application for change of beneficiary upon a blank form furnished by the association and mailed the same to Floyd L. Sackett, to be by him duly executed. This he did on May 8, 1905, and in the certificate he named his brother, Clarence M. Sackett, as sole beneficiary, and deposited this application in the post office at Yule, N. D., properly addressed to the local record keeper at Park City. The letter containing this application was carried to Sentinel Butte, the nearest railroad point, in the usual course of business, and was taken by the west-bound Northern Pacific train No. 3 on May 9th. This train passed through Park City in the early morning of May 10th; but train No. 3 in the course of its business did not leave mail at Park City, but carried the mail for that point on west until it met train No. 2, east-bound, when the mail for Park City was transferred to train No. 2 and by that train left at Park City. The letter containing this application was therefore not delivered at Park City until May 10th at about 3 p. m., and was received by the local record keeper immediately thereafter. In the meantime, however, Floyd L. Sackett on May 10th received a fatal wound and died at 9:45 a. m. of that day. Not knowing of Floyd L. Sackett's death, the local record keeper forwarded the application, with the fee, to the supreme tent at Port Huron, Mich., where on May 17th a new certificate was issued, in which Clarence M. Sackett was named as beneficiary.

This new certificate was received at Park City on May 21st and delivered to Clarence M. Sackett. After the death of Floyd L. Sackett both Fannie and Clarence M. Sackett made claim to the insurance money, and, in order to be relieved from annoyance, the governing body of the association commenced this action, setting forth these facts and asking that the claimants be brought into court and made to litigate their respective claims. The money was paid into court, the plaintiff association relieved from further liability, and the contending claimants then agreed upon the facts substantially as herein set forth. Upon this agreed statement of acts the court found the issues in favor of Fannie Sackett, and judgment in her favor was entered, from which Clarence M. Sackett appealed.

The contentions of appellant are succinctly set forth in his brief as follows: "Upon the foregoing statement of facts we assert the following propositions: First. The deceased had a right to change the beneficiary in his certificate of insurance by complying with the by-laws of the association. Second. If he failed to comply with all of the by-laws of the association regarding such change, and the association waived such requirements not complied with, the association alone having the right to insist upon a full compliance with its by-laws, the respondent cannot take advantage of such failure. Third. The deceased did all he could before his death to make the change of beneficiary from his wife to his brother (the appellant). The association, by voluntarily interpleading and paying the money into court, has waived noncompliance with its by-laws, aud the court will consider that done which ought to be done."

1. The first contention may be conceded. It is too well settled to be open to argument.

2. As a legal proposition, the second contention is not stated accurately. It should be to the effect that, if the insured failed to comply with all of the by-laws of the association regarding such change, and the association during his lifetime waived such requirements not complied with, the association alone having the right to insist upon a full compliance with its by-laws, the former beneficiary could not take advantage of such failure. As thus stated there cannot be any question of the correctness of this contention, and as we understand him, counsel for respondent does not controvert the same. That any waiver by the association must occur during the lifetime of the insured is too well settled in reason and by the authorities to require extended notice. The association contracts that it will at the death of the insured pay to the person named as beneficiary the amount of the policy. It is a contract between the association and the insured for the benefit of a third person, and the only interest of the beneficiary is in expectancy, until the death of the insured vests in the beneficiary the right to claim the amount of the benefit, and immediately upon the happening of that contingency a right of action in favor of the beneficiary arises which the courts will enforce. This being so, the reason for the rule that after the death of the insured the association cannot waive anything to the prejudice of the beneficiary is perfectly apparent; and that this is the rule is beyond question. 1 Bacon on Benefit Societies and Life Insurance, § 308; Fink v. Fink, 171 N.Y. 616, 64 N.E. 506; McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 104 Cal. 171, 37 P. 865, 43 Am. St. Rep. 83; Wendt v. Iowa Legion of Honor, 72 Iowa, 682, 34 N.W. 470; 3 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law (2d Ed.) 998. By...