Knod v. Dir. TDCJ-CID
| Decision Date | 01 December 2011 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:11cv140 |
| Parties | DANIEL LEE KNOD, #1593785 v. DIRECTOR, TDCJ-CID |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas |
On March 23, 2011, Petitioner, proceeding pro se and seeking to proceed in forma pauperis, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (docket entries #1 & 2). The case was referred to Magistrate Judge Judith K. Guthrie pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b).
The petition in this case purports to challenge both a parole revocation proceeding and a disciplinary proceeding. The filing consisted of 69 pages, including reproduced portions of a Texas Department of Criminal Justice ("TDCJ") policy manual and a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The pleading also includes a form petition and a separate statement of facts, by itself totaling 44 pages. Eastern District of Texas Local Rule CV-3 limits pro se filings to 20 pages, including attachments. Petitioner did not seek leave to file an over-length document in this case. Further, he also purported to incorporate by reference a number of documents and exhibits from a separate case styled Knod v. Director, TDCJ-CID, Case No. 6:10cv22.1
The Magistrate Judge ordered the petition as it was submitted stricken and directed Petitionerto file a new petition within 30 days, conforming to L.R. CV-3(b). See docket entry #5. In her Order, the Magistrate Judge cited several reasons for striking the petition as filed, including that it exceeded the length limitation of L.R. CV-3(b); it did not contain sufficient information regarding the facts of Petitioner's case; and it purported to impermissibly incorporate by reference documents from another case.
Petitioner did not file a conforming petition, but requested an extension of time in which to do so and concurrently filed a number of substantive motions all in one omnibus document (docket entry #9). These include a Motion for Reconsideration; a Motion for Declaratory Judgment; a Motion to Disqualify the Magistrate Judge; a Motion for Reproduction of Record; and, a Motion for Appointment of Counsel. On September 13, 2011, this Court issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order addressing only Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, treated as a motion for de novo review pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a), and granting his request for an extension of time to file an amended petition. See Docket Entry #15. Because Petitioner seeks a declaratory judgment and because the issues are intermingled with the undersigned District Judge's de novo review pursuant to Rule 72(a), the undersigned now supplements its earlier Memorandum Opinion and Order and addresses the remaining issues raised in Petitioner's omnibus motion. In that light, the Court will also address Petitioner's associated Motion for Speedy Hearing (docket entry #10) and letter motion seeking a ruling (docket entry #11).
Petitioner first seeks a declaratory judgment that Eastern District Local Rule CV-3 is unconstitutional "insofar as it attempts to limit the filing of an original petition for writ of habeas corpus to (20) pages without permission. . . ." Motion at 5. Local Rule CV-3 states:
Absent permission obtained from the presiding judge, all documents filed by pro se prisoners and pro se non-prisoners are limited to twenty pages, including attachments.
See Local Rule CV-3(b). Therefore, the Local Rule states an essentially managerial function in control of the Court's dockets. In this case, the Clerk accepted and docketed Petitioner's overly long and deficient petition, consistent with the recent holding of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit's brief discussion of Local Rule CV-3(b) in Marquez v. Woody, 2011 WL 3911080, at *10 n.11 (5th Cir. Sept. 6, 2011) (), and the Magistrate Judge reviewed it prior to ordering it stricken and an amended petition filed. Petitioner nonetheless contends that the length requirement of Local Rule CV-3(b) itself is unconstitutional as applied to federal habeas corpus petitions.
The Declaratory Judgment Act states in pertinent part:
In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction . . . any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought. Any such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as such.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (inapplicable exceptions omitted). The statute uses permissive, not mandatory, language. American Federation of State, County, and Mun. Employees, Local 59 v. El Paso City/County Health District, 198 F.3d 240, 1999 WL 824479, at *3 (5th Cir. 1999). "The district court has broad discretion to grant (or decline to grant) declaratory judgment." Winton v. Seven Falls Co., 41 F.3d 934, 935 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Torch, Inc., v. LeBlanc, 947 F.2d 193, 194 (5th Cir. 1991)), aff'd, 515 U.S. 277, 115 S. Ct. 2137, 132 L. Ed. 2d 214 (1995). Decisions of the district court will be reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. Id. (citing Rowan Cos. v.Griffin, 876 F.2d 26, 29 (5th Cir. 1989)).
Here, Petitioner relies on Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546, 548-49, 61 S. Ct. 640, 85 L. Ed. 1034 (1941), in support of his contention that the 20-page limitation is unconstitutional as applied to a federal habeas petition. There, a prison warden had imposed a regulation on prisoners filing court briefs that all such briefs would have to first be submitted to prison officials for review and approval as to form before being submitted to the federal court. Disapproved documents, including federal habeas petitions, would be returned to the prisoner. Id. The Supreme Court held that regulation to be invalid because a "state and its officers may not abridge or impair petitioner's right to apply to a federal court for a writ of habeas corpus." Id. at 549; see also Crowder v. Sinyard, 884 F.2d 804, 811 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 924, 110 S. Ct. 2617, 110 L. Ed. 2d (1991). That precept applies to a state's attempt to curtail access to federal court, however, not the managerial power of the federal court itself. As the Supreme Court went on to add, "[w]hether a petition for writ of habeas corpus addressed to a federal court is properly drawn and what allegations it must contain are questions for that court alone to determine." Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. at 549 (emphasis added). In this case, no state agency has imposed any restriction or filter on Petitioner's ability to access this Court; indeed, his very petition demonstrates that. Instead, the Court itself imposed its managerial authority to limit the volume of the filing in Petitioner's case and exclude unnecessary and superfluous material while requiring the inclusion of certain essential information at the initial pleading stage. As the Court stated in its Memorandum Opinion and Order of September 13, 2011:
An order of that nature is amply supported by the axiom that "a federal district court has both specific and inherent power to control its docket." See Miller v. Thaler, 2011 WL 3209879, at *1 (5th Cir. July 28, 2011) (quoting In re United Markets Int'l, Inc., 24 F.3d 650, 654 (5th Cir. 1994)). That power in this case is reflected in the managerial function of L.R. CV-3(b). That local rule limits the size of pleadings submitted by pro se litigants who, as Petitionerhimself admits, are not lawyers trained in legal drafting.
See id. at 4. As the Court further noted, exercise of Local Rule CV-3(b) is not inflexible and page limits may be exceeded for good cause shown. This function is wholly consistent with Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. at 549, on which Petitioner relies. However, here, Petitioner has made no such showing of good cause, or even an effort to do so. Indeed, his original petition was disjointed with superfluous material and yet incomplete by its attempt to incorporate by reference documents that do not appear in this case. The exercise of the Court's managerial function to require him to file an amended petition, consistent with the Court's internal rules, was appropriate.
Petitioner further contends, without explanation, that this Local Rule has "violated his right to due process, denied him access to the court, operated as a suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and undermined the prison mailbox rule." Motion at 5-6. He does not argue these points, but merely cites to a string of authorities, including 28 U.S.C. § 2202; Wright v. Dickson, 336 F.2d 878 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1012, 87 S. Ct. 1360, 18 L. Ed. 2d 444 (1967); Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts (the "Habeas Rules"); and U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 and U.S. Const. amend. V.
First, 28 U.S.C § 2202 does not aid Petitioner's claim. In full, it states:
Further necessary or proper relief based on a declaratory judgment or decree may be granted, after reasonable notice and hearing, against any adverse party whose rights have been determined by such judgment.
See id. The statute simply provides that "a declaratory judgment might serve as the basis for issuance of a later injunction to give effect to the declaratory judgment . . . ." See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 461 n.11, 94 S. Ct. 1209, 39 L. Ed. 2d 505 (1974); see also Bauhous USA, Inc. v. Copeland, 292 F.3d 439, 449 & n.18 (5th Cir. 2002) (). It does not provide a basis in support of Petitioner's claims herein.
Next, Petitioner's citations to the Ninth Circuit case of Wright, supra, and Rule 4...
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