Knodel v. Knodel

• Citation: 122 Cal.Rptr. 521,537 P.2d 353,14 Cal.3d 752
• Court: United States State Supreme Court (California)
• Decision Date: 16 July 1975
• Parties: , 537 P.2d 353 Nell Giles KNODEL, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Walter James KNODEL, Defendant and Appellant. L.A. 30083.

Page 521

122 Cal.Rptr. 521

14 Cal.3d 752, 537 P.2d 353

Nell Giles KNODEL, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Walter James KNODEL, Defendant and Appellant.

L.A. 30083.

Supreme Court of California In Bank.

July 16, 1975.

Rehearing Denied Aug. 20, 1975.

Richard S. Henderson, San Diego, for defendant and appellant.

Smith, Shifflet & Sharp and Phillip D. Sharp, Jr., San Diego, for plaintiff and respondent.

BY THE COURT

Walter James Knodel appeals from a judgment making an award to Nell Giles Knodel of a sum representing arrearages for unpaid spousal support and denying his motion to terminate such support or, in the alternative, to modify provisions therefor. A preliminary question to be resolved is whether Walter's appeal is timely. We conclude that it is but that on the merits Walter is not entitled to relief from his obligation for spousal support.

Walter and Nell were married in the State of Virginia in 1964. They experienced marital difficulties while residing in that state and entered into an agreement 'relating to the amount that Husband shall pay to Wife as alimony and the property rights of the parties.' ¹ The agreement recites that it is to be governed by the laws of the State of Virginia and that in the event of a divorce the decree was to contain no provision for support or property rights 'as the provisions contained herein are in lieu thereof.' It is also provided in the agreement that it 'shall survive and shall not become merged in any final decree of divorce between the parties.'

In 1968 Walter obtained in Virginia a divorce from Nell on the ground of her desertion. The decree recited that the agreement for spousal support was 'ratified, confirmed and approved' but contained no express provision for property rights or spousal support nor did it purport to merge the agreement. ²

Walter moved to California after the divorce. In 1970 Nell commenced an action for breach of contract against Walter in the municipal court in California seeking the sum of $901.52 for medical expenses claimed to be due under the Virginia agreement. Walter answered and cross-complained seeking, inter alia, the transfer of the cause to the superior court, the establishment in that court of the Virginia decree as a foreign judgment, and the modification of the foreign judgment to eliminate any requirement therein that he pay money to Nell as 'alimony or support in lieu of alimony.' Nell answered the cross-complaint, admitting Walter's allegation of the Virginia divorce decree.

On November 25, 1970, upon motion by Walter therefor, an order was made in the municipal court transferring the cause to the superior court. On January 27, 1971, in the latter court it was ordered upon stipulation of the parties that the Virgiaia decree 'is hereby established as a foreign judgment . . . in full force and effect.' The court also issued on January 27 an order directing Nell to show cause why the relief sought by Walter, that is the elimination or modification or provisions for spousal support, should not be granted. ³ On February 4, Nell filed a memorandum of points and authorities in response to the order to show cause. ⁴ On February 17 Walter filed a memorandum of points and authorities intended to refute Nell's contention that under the Virginia decisions, and hence under the California law (see Avery v. Avery, supra, 10 Cal.App.3d 525, 532, 89 Cal.Rptr. 195), a California court could not make an order relating to alimony which was inconsistent with the agreement of the parties. ⁵

On April 6 after oral argument the court ordered that the relief prayed for by Walter for termination of spousal support be denied. The reasons for the denial do not appear. We may assume, however, based on the materials submitted in opposition to the motion, that the court concluded that the provisions set out in the agreement for support could not be modified. The only arguments advanced on appeal relate to that ground for denial. ⁶

Also on April 6 the court made an order directing Walter to show cause why he should not cure arrearages in spousal support payments ⁷ and why he should not pay the $901.52 medical expenses claimed by Nell to be due under the Virginia agreement.

On April 14, prior to the time the court had ruled on those matters still pending before it, Walter filed a notice of motion for reconsideration of the April 6 order denying his motion for modification of the spousal support provisions. He sought in the alternative 'that so much of the Virginia decree as was established as a judgment of this court be vacated insofar as the provisions therein relating to alimony or support in lieu of alimony are concerned.' The notice was supported by a memorandum of points and authorities pursuant to which Walter sought to establish that if Virginia law was construed to deny him the right to modify alimony payments in the circumstances of this case, the denial was unconstitutional and that, aside from the unconstitutional application of the Virginia law, the support provisions were modifiable. Walter also obtained from the court on April 16 an ex parte order shortening time for hearing the motion for reconsideration. In the declaration in support of the order signed by the court, it is recited that Walter proposed to appeal from the court's 'indication that it lacks jurisdiction to modify on constitutional grounds' the spousal support provision; that it was necessary if Walter was to preserve the constitutional issues on appeal that they be raised before the trial court; and that in the interest of conserving the court's and counsels' time the motion should be heard and the time for hearing thereof should be shortened.

On April 26, after oral argument, the court made a 'Partial Order' whereby it required Walter to pay the sum of $901.52 to Nell for medical expenses provided for in the 1967 agreement, and it continued to May 6 Nell's motion for an award of the arrearages of spousal support payments under the agreement.

On April 28 Nell filed an extensive memorandum of points and authorities in which she argued the merits of her claim for spousal support under the provisions of the agreement. Therein she addressed arguments in opposition to Walter's interrelated claim set out in his motion for reconsideration noticed on April 14 that the Virginia law as applied in the circumstances of this case was unconstitutional. ⁸

On June 25 the court after oral argument made an 'Order and Judgment,' requiring Walter to pay the spousal support arrearages, and also ordered that his 'Motion for Reconsideration re Termination of Spousal Support' be denied. On June 30 Walter filed a notice of appeal 'from the order made . . . on June 25' which, according to the notice of appeal, denied Walter's motions to terminate spousal support or, in the alternative, vacate those provisions in the decree of divorce. ⁹

The Appealability of The Order of June 30

If we deem Walter's appeal to be from the April 6 order denying his motion for modification of the provisions for spousal support (which would be consistent with the express recitations of his notice) and if that order was appealable the notice was not timely filed as more than 60 days had elapsed since April 8, the date upon which a notice of entry of judgment had been mailed by the court. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 2(a), 2(b).) If, however, we consider Walter to have appealed from the order of June 30, which is the order he is deemed to make reference to in his notice (see 525, supra), then a serious question is raised whether an appeal lies from an order denying a motion for reconsideration of a previous order (Code Cov.Proc., § 904.1), if in fact that is one of the legal consequences of the order of June 30. (See Estate of Richards (1941) 17 Cal.2d 259, 267, 109 P.2d 923.) The view we take of the entire course of proceedings, however, persuades us for the reasons which are next discussed that all orders prior to the June 30 order were interlocutory in nature and were thus not appealable until the final judgment of June 30. The notice of appeal from the judgment denying the relief sought by Walter was thus timely filed.

The right of appeal is limited to appeals from 'judgments' which do not include interlocutory judgments except in particular instances not here pertinent. (Code Civ.Proc., § 904.1, subds. (a), (h), (i) and (j).) The reason for the one judgment rule is that 'piecemeal disposition and multiple appeals in a single action would be oppressive and costly, and . . . a review of intermediate rulings should await the final disposition of the case. (Citations.)' (6 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed.) pp. 4050--4051.)

It is clear in the instant case that the court had before it a number of issues presented for resolution, some of which were interdependent, and all of which related to the applicability and validity of the agreement executed in Virginia and its significance, if any, as a part of the divorce decree granted in that state. Nell first sought particular damages for breach of the agreement. Walter sought as affirmative relief, first, the transfer of the cause from the municipal to the superior court. Thereafter he sought the establishment of the decree as a foreign judgment and the elimination or modification of the support provisions contained therein. ¹⁰ The cause was so transferred by a municipal court order and no challenge has been made to that order. The initial order made in the superior court, other than an order to show cause, was made pursuant to stipulation on January 27 establishing the decree as a foreign judgment. That order was clearly intended to be interlocutory as there were still pending before the court Nell's claim for damages for breach of contract and Walter's claim for termination of spousal support provisions. ¹¹ In fact, none of the real disputes between the parties had been resolved as of that time.

The next order made by the court, other than another order...