Knop v. National Fire Ins. Co.

Decision Date10 December 1895
Citation65 N.W. 228,107 Mich. 323
CourtMichigan Supreme Court
PartiesKNOP v. NATIONAL FIRE INS. CO. OF HARTFORD, CONN.

Error to circuit court, Wayne county; Joseph W. Donovan, Judge.

Action by August Knop against the National Fire Insurance Company of Hartford, Conn., on a fire policy. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant brings error. Reversed.

Elbridge F. Bacon, for appellant.

E. S Clarkson, for appellee.

GRANT J.

This is an action to recover for loss by fire upon a policy of insurance which covered $300 on a one-story dwelling house, and $300 on household furniture and other contents. The principal defense was that the plaintiff had made a false statement under oath of the amount of the loss and that he himself set the fire with intent to defraud the defendant.

1. The circuit court instructed the jury as follows: "Now I come to a very important question. It is called in law 'fraud.' Fraud is a trick, a deceit, a device whereby one misleads another to do something to his prejudice. In law, however, it is not to be presumed. It is not even to be guessed at, and not arrived at by slight circumstances. It must be proven the same as any other substantial fact in the case. The burden of proving fraud is upon the one that claims it,-the one that charges it,-because it is out of the ordinary. It may be proven by circumstantial evidence; but if proven by circumstantial evidence, the rule of circumstantial evidence being a rather strict one, it must be proven with force and conclusiveness to this degree that all the circumstances (where circumstances are relied upon to make the proof) must point to the one thing claimed, and admit of no other reasonable explanation. That is the rule always for circumstantial evidence,-that this must always converge or direct your mind between the points, and not admit of any other reasonable explanation." The error in this charge is manifest. It virtually instructed the jury that the defense must be established beyond a reasonable doubt. Morley v. Insurance Co., 85 Mich. 219, 48 N.W. 502. In that case the erroneous instruction was as follows: "Proof of fraud should be of such a character as to be inconsistent with any other view than that Mr Lenhoff was guilty of fraud." In the present case the court instructed them, in substance, that the facts relied upon to show fraud must not admit of any other reasonable explanation. It is perhaps fair to the jury in this case to say that they must have understood this instruction to mean that they must find the fraud proven beyond any reasonable doubt, for they were not controlled in their verdict by the clear preponderance of the evidence. The above instruction was given near the close of the charge, and there is no other language in it to explain or modify it. The charge, in fact, is entirely silent as to the preponderance of evidence.

2. Shortly after the fire, the general agent of the defendant investigated the loss. An examination of the house, which was not entirely destroyed, and the contents, aroused his suspicion. Plaintiff had made a list of the property which he claimed to have been destroyed. By the terms of the policy (a Michigan standard policy), he was entitled to place the plaintiff under oath, and examine him in regard to the loss. To this plaintiff made no objection, and they went before a justice of the peace with a stenographer and an interpreter. Among other things, plaintiff said in his affidavit that "there was in the house when it burned one Domestic sewing machine, which I purchased from Albert Janke. *** This sewing machine was burned up in the dwelling. I found some of the castings after the fire. They are now in the stable." The machine was not burned, but, with other household goods, was covered up by firewood in a small barn or shed in the rear of the house. Plaintiff admits that on the Sunday morning, before the fire, about half past 4, he commenced to wheel two one-horse wagon loads of wood into this shed, and that he wheeled it all in that morning. This was stated in his affidavit before the justice. The fire occurred the next morning, about 10 o'clock. The plaintiff was at his work in a factory near by; his children had been left at a neighbor's; and his wife had gone to Detroit. It is insisted by the defendant that this statement was false in fact, and therefore rendered the policy void. It is conceded by plaintiff's counsel in his brief that he stated that the machine was burnt up, but that he made a reasonable explanation of this when he testified that when he made out the list, and swore to it, he thought the machine had burned up, but he found out afterwards that it was in the barn. This is the only explanation given by him of his false affidavit. The policy contains the following clause: "This entire policy shall be void if the insured has concealed or misrepresented, in writing or otherwise, any material fact or circumstance concerning...

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