Knott v. Knott

• Decision Date: 05 September 2002
• Docket Number: No. 1187,1187
• Citation: 146 Md. App. 232,806 A.2d 768
• Parties: James F. KNOTT v. Marlene D. KNOTT.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

806 A.2d 768

146 Md. App. 232

James F. KNOTT v.Marlene D. KNOTT.

No. 1187, September Term, 2001.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

September 5, 2002.

Rudolf A. Carrico, Jr., La Plata, for Appellant.

Marlene Denise Knott, Mechanicsville, for Appellee.

Argued before DAVIS, DEBORAH S. EYLER and GREENE, JJ.Opinion by GREENE, J.

This appeal arises from a decision of the Circuit Court for St. Mary's County refusing to modify or vacate an interlocutory consent order for the payment of money.Appellant, James Francis Knott, Jr., agreed with his wife, appellee, Marlene Denise Knott, that he would pay the mortgage and other expenses in connection with the family home during the period of use and possession enjoyed by appellee and the parties' minor child, Mallory Jean Knott.

The Consent Order that memorialized the agreement designated the payments as "payments in lieu of child support."Appellant's new obligation equaled $1,316 monthly, more than double the amount he was obligated to pay under a previous consent pendente lite child support order.The new Consent Order, signed by the circuit court judge on September 3, 1999, terminated appellant's obligation under the prior pendente lite order.As of the time this appeal was noted, the September 3, 1999 Consent Order had not been made final by the entry of the Judgment of Divorce,¹ which finally disposed of all remaining issues in the case without incorporating the Consent Order in it.

ISSUES

Appellant noted this appeal to present the following questions for review, which we have rephrased:

1.Did the circuit court err in denying appellant's request to modify the September 3, 1999 Consent Order requiring him to pay specific monthly and annual expenses in lieu of child support?

2.Did the circuit court, after concluding that the Consent Order does not contain a form of child support, err in failing to find that the order was in violation of the State's public policy and therefore void?

Appellee further raises the following question:

Should the appeal be dismissed as premature?

With regard to appellee's question, we hold that we have jurisdiction to decide the matter.

For reasons that we shall explain, we reverse the court's denial of appellant's request to modify the order.We remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Because the order appealed was interlocutory, the correct standard for modification of an order concerning care, custody or support of a minor child is the best interest of the child pursuant to FL 8-103.Such orders are subject to revision at any time before the entry of a final judgment that adjudicates all of the claims by and against all of the parties.Md. Rule 2-602(a)(3).The basis for modification of a final order concerning care, custody, or support of a minor child is material change of circumstances, pursuant to FL 12-104.We further hold that the circuit court erred by failing to consider the child support guidelines as required by FL§ 12-202 before adopting the agreement of the parties.Because of our answer to the first issue raised by the appellant, the second issue is moot.

FACTS

The parties were married on April 19, 1986, in St. Mary's County, where they resided.Mallory was born on January 18, 1990.On November 13, 1998, appellant filed a Complaint for Absolute Divorce against appellee in the Circuit Court for St. Mary's County.The complaint requested an absolute divorce, custody of Mallory, use and possession of the family home and personal property, contribution to the mortgage payments and other expenses in connection with the family home, a monetary award, and further relief.

On May 26, 1999, the parties appeared before the circuit court for a hearing on pendente lite child support.On July 15, 1999, the circuit court signed a Consent Pendente Lite Order requiring appellant to pay pendente lite child support in the amount of $650.00 per month.²

On August 23, 1999, the parties again came before the circuit court to litigate issues of custody, visitation, child support, use and possession of the family home, and other incidental relief.At that time, the parties reached an agreement on several outstanding issues.The resulting Consent Order terminated the original pendente lite child support obligation and included, in pertinent part, that the parties would share joint legal custody of Mallory and that she would reside with appellee in the family home.The agreement gave appellee use and possession of the family home through June 15, 2004.Appellant received reasonable and liberal visitation.³The Consent Order set forth appellant's new financial obligation as follows:

ORDERED, that [appellant] shall be responsible for the mortgage, taxes and insurance for the marital home effective August 30, 1999 through the use and possession term and shall make all payments on a timely basis.That said payments on the marital residence shall be in lieu of child support; and it is further,

ORDERED, that [appellant] will ensure that all monthly debts associated with the home will be paid up to date through August 30, 1999; and it is further,

ORDERED, that [appellee] shall be responsible for all debts associated with the home effective August 30, 1999 through June 15, 2004;....

The Consent Order also required appellant to pay the monthly home equity loan payments; the payment on a family trailer; one half of the annual tuition, books, and fees for Mallory's private schooling; and any uncovered medical expenses.

Appellant's new monthly payment obligation totaled $1,316⁴ to begin on September 1, 1999.A review of the transcript reveals that the child support guidelines apparently were never considered or discussed at the time of the hearing.The circuit court signed the Consent Order on September 3, 1999.

On May 17, 2000, appellant filed an Amended Complaint for Absolute Divorce alleging, among other things,⁵ that a material change of financial circumstances had occurred and requesting a modification of his child support obligation under the Consent Order.Appellant alleged that modifying the terms and conditions of any child support and/or custody agreement set forth in the September 3, 1999 Consent Order would be in the best interest of the child.

On February 6, 2001, the issues raised in appellant's amended complaint came before a master.Appellant testified that at the time of the Consent Order he was employed with Johnson Controls, earning approximately $44,000 per year, and was also self-employed with Patuxent Heating and Cooling, earning approximately $25,000 a year.He also testified that in October 1999, he was laid off from his employment with Johnson Controls and that he was now only working for Patuxent Heating & Cooling.Appellant argued that this change in circumstances justified a modification of terms of the Consent Order relating to child support.

In response to appellant's amended complaint, appellee noted that the Consent Order contained no direct child support obligation and that payments made by appellant were "in lieu of" child support.Appellee argued that an order directing a parent to make payments for the benefit of the child did not constitute child support, and thus was not subject to modification.Appellee further asserted that the Consent Order had become enrolled and that no timely motion had been made by appellant to alter or revise it.Appellee concluded that, once enrolled, the Consent Order constituted a contract between the parties that was binding regardless of appellant's employment circumstances.The master requested memoranda regarding the issues raised by appellee.

On February 27, 2001, appellant filed a Motion to Revise and/or Vacate the Consent Order.Appellant contended in this motion that if the payments he was making pursuant to the Consent Order did not constitute child support, the parties, by their agreement, had "bargained away" child support.Appellant concluded that such an agreement violated public policy and would thus be void.Appellant further contended that because the Consent Order was not a final judgment resolving all of the issues involved in the case, it could be modified at any time prior to the entry of a final judgment.Consequently, appellant argued he was not obligated to seek a modification of the Consent Order within the 30 day time limit specified in Maryland Rule 2-535.Finally, appellant contended that the Consent Order impermissibly intertwined issues of child support, custody, visitation, use and possession, mortgage, and other matters that require the court to declare the Consent Order to be "invalid and unenforceable."

Appellee merely restated the arguments she had made previously at the master's hearing.

On April 9, 2001, the matter again came before the master with respect to appellant's request to modify child support and other issues.The master noted that no child support guidelines had been prepared and requested that the attorneys provide a guidelines worksheet.Two guidelines worksheets were provided showing appellant's child support obligation as $244.30 per month and $290.63 per month, respectively.⁶

After hearing argument, the master found that the payments appellant was required to make did not constitute child support.The master determined that the agreement to make the payments had justified a downward deviation of his child support obligation to zero.The master also found that appellant had lost his job at Johnson Controls through no fault of his own, resulting in a substantial reduction of his monthly income.Nonetheless, the master decided that it would be inequitable to modify one paragraph of the Consent Order without allowing the other side to seek modifications of the rest of the order.The master recommended that appellant's request for modification of child support be denied.

Appellant filed exceptions to the master's findings, and the matter came before the circuit...