Knotts v. State, 30172
| Decision Date | 12 February 1963 |
| Docket Number | No. 30172,30172 |
| Citation | 187 N.E.2d 571,243 Ind. 501 |
| Parties | Charles William KNOTTS, Appellant, Phyllis Jean Terry, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee. |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Ferdinand Samper, Indianapolis, for appellant.
Edwin K. Steers, Atty. Gen., Donald L. Adams, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
This is an appeal from a conviction of the crime of larceny by shoplifting by the defendant, Charles William Knotts. Phyllis Jean Terry, a defendant below, is not appealing.
Burns' §§ 10-3025 and 10-3026, under which appellant was charged, read as follows:
'Any person who with felonious intent takes, steals or carries away any goods offered for sale or displayed by any mercantile establishment shall be deemed guilty of the criminal offense of larceny by shoplifting.' Acts 1959, ch. 194, § 2, p. 441, being § 10-3025, Burns' 1962 Supp.
'The concealment of said goods and the removal of said goods from said mercantile establishment by the person or persons charged shall constitute prima facie evidence of a felonious intent to take, steal or carry away the said goods.' Acts 1959, ch. 194, § 3, p. 441, being § 10-3026, Burns' 1962 Supp.
In a motion to quash and in a motion to arrest judgment the appellant contends that the statute and the affidavit charging the offense are defective because there is no allegation as to the ownership of the property taken. The affidavit reads as follows:
'BE IT REMEMBERED, That, on this day before me, ........ PHILLIP L. BAYT ........ Prosecuting Attorney of the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, personally came ........ DENNIS HICKEY ........ who being duly ........ sworn, upon his oath says that ........ CHARLES WILLIAM KNOTTS and ........ PHYLLIS JEAN TERRY .......... on or about the 14th day of ..... DECEMBER ..... A.D. 1959, at ........ and in the County of Marion in the State of Indiana, did then and there unlawfully and with felonious intent, take, steal or carry away goods, to-wit: One (1) three (3) piece set of Chic Shortie Pajamas, then and there of the value of Five and Ninety Eight ........ Hundredths ($5.98) Dollars, One (1) McGregor Man's Sport Shirt, then and there of the value of Five ($5.00) Dollars; Six (6) ........ pair of Stretch Socks, then and there of the vale of One ($1.00) Dollar per pair, said six (6) pair of Stretch Socks being of the total value of Six ($6.00) Dollars; Three (3) packages of Trim-Fit Cable Tights then and there of the value of Two and ninety ........ Eights Hundredths ($2.98) Dollars per package, said three (3) packages of Trim-Fit Cable Tights being of the total value of Eight and Ninety-Four Hundredths ($8.94) Dollars, said merchandise being of the total value of Twenty Five and Ninety-Two Hundredths ($25.92) Dollars, offered for sale or displayed by PACKAGED APPAREL, INC. a Corporation, a merchantile establishment D/B/A PAUL HARRIS STORES, then and there being * * * contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Indiana.
'/s/ Wayne L. Stalcup
'/s/ Dennis Mickey
'DENNIS MICKEY
'Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
'Nineteenth Judicial Circuit.
'Subscribed and sworn to before me, this ..... 16th ..... day on DECEMBER ....., A.D. 1959 .....
'PHILLIP L. BAYT ........
'Prosecuting Attorney
'Nineteenth Judicial Circuit'
In Indiana no common-law crimes exist, and the legislature fixes the elements necessary for any statutory crime. Burns' § 9-2401, 1956 Repl.
Although Indiana has a statute fixing larceny under which the ownership of the property must be alleged and proved, it seems that the legislature has defined and created another offense commonly known as 'shoplifting.' Under that statutory offense, instead of alleging and proving ownership, the statute contains a requirement that whoever with 'felonious intent * * * carries away any goods offered for sale or displayed by any mercantile establishment' shall be guilty of the offense. The affidavit here alleged that the goods in question at the time they were 'carried away' were 'offered for sale' and displayed by a particular person, 'Packaged Apparel, Inc. a Corporation, a merchantile establishment.' Under the 'shoplifting' statute it is necessary to allege and prove that the person from whom the property was taken or 'carried away' was the one who displayed and offered it for sale, regardless of ownership. This appears to be the primary distinction and objective of the 'shoplifting' statute. The allegation in the affidavit on this point sufficiently meets the requirements of the statute, as did the proof at the trial. It is not necessary to allege ownership under the 'shoplifting' statute since the statute defining the crime does not require such proof as is required under the statute defining larceny. McAdams v. State (1948), 226 Ind. 403, 81 N.E.2d 671.
In the above case, where the question arose as to whether or not the common-law definition of burglary should be used or that fixed in the statute, the court stated (p. 409, 81 N.E.2d p. 673):
'* * * and we hold that the burglary statute here involved defines the crime, not in generic or general terms, but definitely and particularly, and it is not necessary or proper to look to the common law for additional elements necessary to constitute the crime which the legislature has, we may presume, deliberately omitted.'
The trial court did not err in its ruling on the motion to quash or on the motion in arrest of the judgment.
The evidence in this case shows that two special police officers held certificates of police authority under Burns' § 48-6312. They were police officers hired and paid by the mercantile establishment and served without pay from the city. Apparently their authority was limited to the City of Indianapolis. A motion was made to suppress the evidence which they obtained upon arresting the appellant because first, there was no evidence that they made the arrest within their jurisdiction, namely, the City of Indianapolis; and secondly, there was no evidence that they made a legal arrest and that they had any authority to arrest and search the appellant.
The evidence most favorable to the State shows that these two special police officers saw the appellant and his co-defendant take several items of clothing from the counter of the store named in the affidavit and hide the items in a purse and on the person of the appellant. They observed the appellant through a one-way mirror. After he removed the goods from the counter and had hidden them on his person, he then walked out of the store without paying for any of the goods. The police officers ran after the appellant and his co-defendant...
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